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Abstract 
The aim of the thesis is to examine the implications of the internationalisation of 
regulation in China as a developing country. To achieve this, variations in different 
Chinese food regulatory regimes are compared, ranging from those for domestic 
consumption to export. In particular, the three control components of a regulatory 
regime, namely standard-setting, information-gathering and behaviour-modification are 
analysed. 
This study finds a pattern of changes in the Chinese food regulatory regimes. At 
the initial stage, Chinese national food standards were less stringent than international 
standards, and the gap between established national standards and local enforcement 
was significantly high. In recent years, it is observed that Chinese national food 
standards have witnessed an upward movement to converge with international food 
standards. In the meantime, regulatory enforcement in the localities has undergone 
continual adjustment to strengthen enforcement force towards areas under public 
concern.  
This thesis aims to explain this trend of changes in terms of the 
internationalisation of regulation. It argues that while coercive international pressure is 
mainly exerted on the Chinese exported food regulatory regime, the domestic food 
regulatory regime in China has also been increasingly influenced by global forces over 
the past decade, in terms of policy transfer from developed countries and policy learning 
from the transnational professional networks. Regarding domestic food standard-setting, 
normative influence from the international community has induced a generally higher 
level of Chinese national food standards. With respect to regulatory enforcement, while 
enforcement work has been constrained by the incapacity of regulators and the 
inextricably linked interests in the localities, these domestic factors are becoming less 
influential under the context of internationalisation of regulation. In particular, food 
safety crises prompt the Chinese government to push forward regulatory changes in 
spite of strong resistance in the localities. This has been attributed to the aim of the 
Chinese government to safeguard the reputation of products ‘Made in China’ under the 
context of internationalisation of regulation, and build up an international image that 
China is a committed and responsible trading partner and world leader.  
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Chapter 1 : Research objectives and outline 
In the context of globalisation and booming international trade, recent decades have 
seen a transformation away from state regulation towards more reliance on international 
regulation to protect society from risks induced by environmental pollution, diseases, 
product quality and safety and other issues. This evolution in regulation is certainly not 
limited to developed countries but is much the same in many developing countries such 
as China. This thesis is intended to examine the implications of the internationalisation 
of regulation for China as a developing country. To this end, variations in terms of how 
food risks are handled in different food sectors are compared. It seeks to explain the 
way and the extent to which internationalisation of regulation impacts on China’s food 
safety regulation.   
This study finds a pattern of change in the Chinese food regulatory regimes. At 
the initial stage, Chinese national food standards were less stringent than international 
standards, and the gap between established national standards and local enforcement 
was significantly high. In recent years, it is observed that Chinese national food 
standards have witnessed an upward movement to converge with international food 
standards. In the meantime, regulatory enforcement in the localities has undergone 
continual adjustment to strengthen enforcement force towards areas under public 
concern. To explain the pattern of change, international influence is explored in this 
thesis. It shows that under the context of internationalisation of regulation, local factors 
such as the incapacity of regulators and the organised interests of food businesses, 
politicians, bureaucrats and regulators are becoming less influential than they were in 
the past. This thesis also sets forth the theoretical contributions and empirical 
implication of the research findings – how existing theories need to be supplemented to 
account for regulatory variations and changes in the context of developing countries and 
authoritarian regimes; and how the analysis furthers our understanding of regulation in 
the less developed countries under exposure to international influence.  
In this introductory chapter, it sets the scene by outlining the main research 
issues in regulation in developing countries such as China, and in particular the impact 
of internationalisation. By exploring the three control components in a risk regulatory 
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regime, namely standard-setting, information-gathering and behaviour-modification, 
food regulation in China is analysed in a comprehensive way, covering both policy-
making and implementation. The chapter then provides a map of the thesis and a 
summary of the content of the following chapters, highlighting the contributions of each 
chapter to addressing the research issue of the internationalisation of regulation in China.  
1.1 Research question, objectives and intended contributions 
The research question of this study is: ‘in what way and to what extent does 
internationalisation impact on regulation in China’. This study explores the research 
inquiry by comparing different Chinese food regulatory regimes, ranging from those for 
domestic consumption to those for export and the three control components inside 
different regimes, namely, standard-setting, information-gathering and behaviour-
modification (Hood, Rothstein, & Baldwin, 2001). It seeks to contribute to the current 
debates about how international force changes state regulation in developing countries.  
1.1.1 The significance of examining regulation in China as a developing 
country in the context of internationalisation of regulation 
Researching into regulation in developing countries is of great value for two main 
reasons. As suggested by Cook, Kirkpatrick, Minogue, and Parker (2004), the nature of 
information asymmetries in the specific context of developing economies brings 
persistent challenges to regulators in obtaining the necessary information to regulate 
effectively. The problem is of particular concern under the context of the controlled 
media in some developing countries. The other reason is the incapacity of regulators and 
other constraints in an institutional arrangement (Levy & Spiller, 1996). The lack of 
adequate regulatory resources in terms of manpower and budget and the 
underdeveloped judicial system impose a further challenge to regulatory enforcement in 
developing countries. The need for regulatory capacity building becomes an issue of 
concern. On the other hand, regulation in developing countries can be impeded by the 
lack of commitment rather of incapacity, and the incentives of regulators resulting from 
regulatory capture and political capture. For example, government officials might have 
an incentive to turn a blind eye to regulatory infringements caused by state-owned 
enterprises, or those that are costly or politically controversial.  
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Under the aforementioned conditions in developing countries, the enforcement 
gap is seemingly foreseeable. However, what needs to be emphasised here is that the 
nature of enforcement gap is never static. Instead, the enforcement gap can be widened 
or reduced. Some further speculation is warranted about the circumstances that 
widening or reducing the enforcement gap brings about, and the implications for 
effective regulation in developing countries. This study suggests that the movement of 
enforcement gap can be explained by reasons of the evolving external regulatory 
environment such as increasing international pressure and media attention, or changing 
internal values of different levels of government and frontline inspectors.  
In this research, China is selected for study not only because it is an emerging 
economy with a relatively weak state capacity, but also because it is a post-communist 
country with an authoritarian government. As an industrialising country since the late 
1980s and early 1990s, China has undergone reforms in terms of economic, political 
and bureaucratic systems and society. It is significant to look at how a distinctive form 
of regulatory system is developed to respond to marketisation, privatisation and state 
restructuring in a broad sense from a communist state to a socialist market economy.  
Meanwhile, while China has an authoritarian government, it has witnessed 
persistent and in some areas radical changes in recent decades since the opening-up 
policy in the late 1970s. Although it is a contested issue as to whether the Chinese 
political system is a form of ‘fragmented authoritarianism’ (Lieberthal & Lampton, 
1992; Mertha, 2009), recent decades have seen a changing policy-making process 
towards pluralisation. The rising pressure from non-governmental organisations and the 
media, for example, has prompted the Chinese state to respond to the diverse demands 
from society. Consequentially, these actors affect the policy making process and the 
implementation of policy. As argued by Mertha (2009), the Chinese policy-making 
process has become more pluralised because of the increasing abilities and power of 
policy entrepreneurs.  
Regulation, as a distinctive mode of policy making or of governance, has no 
exemption from facing the increasingly diverse demands from society. In other words, 
to understand regulation in China in a comprehensive way, it is essential to examine the 
general public policy process in China. One of the key questions is: how does the 
17 
 
changing external environment such as the introduction of commercialisation and 
competition in the media sector in China affect its regulation, in terms of both 
regulatory policy making and regulatory enforcement? And is there any other external 
or internal force contributing to the changing context of regulation in China? 
This study suggests that the framework for analysing regulation as a mode of 
public policy in China can be extended to include the perspective of international 
regulation by supranational mechanisms. Discussing state regulation in the context of 
international regulation is closely linked to the body of literature on ‘lesson-drawing’ 
(Rose, 1993), ‘policy transfer’ (Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996, 2000), ‘policy diffusion’ 
(Berry & Berry, 1999) and institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). This 
angle is highly significant when analysing regulation in the specific context of 
developing countries.  The reasons are threefold. 
First, the emergence of global regulatory convergence in terms of legal, 
institutional and economic harmonisation has profound implications for China, as a 
developing country that desires to compete in the international trade market and expand 
its export trade. As argued by Majone (2006) in his analysis of ‘spontaneous regulatory 
convergence’, regulatory models of politically and economically powerful countries are 
more likely emulated through the ‘push and pull’ force. This entails developing 
countries being increasingly influenced by regulatory models of developed countries 
and international institutions, and it is in the interest of developing countries to actively 
participate in the formulation of international standards and in general as an active 
member of these supranational institutions. In this sense, how the Chinese government 
reacts to the growing influence exerted by the international community is important to 
the understanding of public policy process in China.  
Second, recent empirical studies have shed light on the situation of ‘selective 
adaptation’ of international norms and practices in different industrialising and 
industrialised countries (Potter, 2003; Biukovic, 2008), although these countries are 
required by demands and obligations of international bilateral agreements to comply 
with international standards developed by global institutions. The reasons behind might 
be not only related to regulatory incapacity but also protectionism in order to benefit 
domestic producers of goods and services. But either way, such ‘selective adaptation’ 
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phenomenon signals that the discrepancy between global standards and domestic 
implementation remains an issue of concern for effective regulation at both national and 
supranational levels.  
Third, policy transfer can be problematic to developing countries (Minogue, 
2004). This is because developing countries are distinctively different from developed 
economies in terms of the complex economic, political, social and cultural spheres. 
Administrative incapacity arising from underdevelopment and corruption, for example, 
generates a considerable gap in the reality in governance reforms in developing 
countries. Exploring the reality gap in China can enhance our understanding of under 
what conditions and to what extent policies originated from developed countries are 
more successfully transferred to China than others. 
1.1.2 The significance of examining food safety regulation in the 
context of internationalisation of regulation  
In this study, food safety regulation serves as an ideal case for researching international 
regulation and how developing countries like China manage their global engagement. 
Two main reasons are identified. 
First, the nature of food risk being highly globalised makes it an important case 
for studying international regulation. Food risks, ranging from zoonoses, to 
microbiological risks, chemical risks, biotechnology and foodborne diseases, cross 
international borders or territories under the rapid globalisation of food production and 
trade. As argued by Schofield and Shaoul (2000), food safety has become an increasing 
problem all over the world as the technology of food production and social patterns 
have changed. This means that countries find it impossible to regulate risks induced by 
trading activities without cooperation from other countries. As claimed by the World 
Health Organisation (WHO), “Ensuring food safety must not only be tackled at the 
national level but also through closer linkages among food safety authorities at the 
international level” (World Health Organisation, n.d.). To this end, supranational 
organisations are established to regulate food risks. It is thus necessary for us to look 
beyond the national level and move upward to the international level to study its 
regulation. 
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Second, the export boom of Chinese food products makes food safety regulation 
in China under high exposure to an international concern. China’s food export volume 
has witnessed a rapid growth since its opening-up policy in the early 1980s and then its 
accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001. China becomes one of the 
largest food exporters in the world, and China is the world’s leading seafood producer 
and one of the world’s largest exporters of fruits, vegetables, and processed foods and 
ingredients (Agres, 2011). Under the context of export boom and the 
internationalisation of regulation, safeguarding the reputation of food ‘Made in China’ 
has become increasingly important. Being a state with growing power in the 
international world, leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) intend to portray 
the image that China is ‘rising peacefully’ as a responsible world leader (The State 
Council Information Office, 2005), that the country is internally committed to 
improving the welfare of its own people and externally acting as a responsible world 
leader. Having this official vision for the country’s future declared to the world, fatal 
food safety scandals have become a key concern and embarrassment to the Chinese 
government because this gives an impression to the world that China has weak 
governance and low legal and ethical standards. As China is one of the major 
commodity exporters in the world, scandals may also ruin the reputation of Chinese 
goods in the eye of consumers worldwide, which consequentially hit China’s profitable 
export trade in the competitive world market. Therefore, it is in the Chinese 
government’s interest to safeguard the reputation of food ‘Made in China’ while 
attention is focused on whether the government has the determination to tackle the 
problem and protect consumers in the country and throughout the world. 
In summary, given the feature of globalised food risk, the export boom of 
Chinese food and the key concern of the government to secure the reputation of food 
‘Made in China’, if internationalisation of regulation has an impact on regulation in 
China, food safety regulation is probably one of the most important cases for studying. 
1.1.3 The significance of examining the three control components and 
regulatory variations 
To understand regulation from a cybernetic angle, this study addresses the research 
inquiry by examining the three control components in different food regulatory regimes 
20 
 
in China, and comparing the regulatory variations between them. Hood et al. (1999; 
2001) advocates a comprehensive control theory perspective and suggests that the 
control system of a regulatory regime in art or nature must by definition contain a 
minimum of three components: 
There must be some capacity for standard-setting to allow a distinction to be 
made between more and less preferred states of the system. There must also be 
some capacity for information-gathering or monitoring to produce knowledge 
about current or changing states of the system. On top of that must be some 
capacity for behaviour-modification to change the state of the system (Hood et 
al., 2001, p. 23). 
Standard is the ‘director’ element of the control process, which varies widely in 
terms of explicitness (i.e. how far they were announced in advance and formula-
bounded), reflexivity (i.e. how far they were imposed uniformly from the top), and 
stability (i.e. how far they were revised). As a ‘detector’ in the control process, 
information has to be obtained in order to ensure the target is being controlled. 
Variations in the tool of information-gathering include inspection, audit, certification, 
authorisation, and mediation. The ‘effector’ component intends to influence the 
behaviour of the persons and institutions sought to be controlled, in order to ensure that 
the regulatory standard and target are accomplished. Tool kits range from naming and 
shaming, to prosecution, and to termination of licenses.  
The control theory perspective is valuable for exploring the research question: 
‘in what way and to what extent does internationalisation impact on regulation in 
China’. The reasons are twofold. First, this comprehensive angle can provide a broad 
picture of a regulatory regime as well as detailed variations inside the regime. The 
existing literature concerning the force of internationalisation on regulation in China 
mainly focuses on regulatory framework, institutional change and paradigm shift in the 
role of the state (e.g. Yeo & Painter, 2011). The control system inside the regulatory 
regime, however, is an under-researched area. For instance, it is important for us to 
understand how local standards are harmonised to international norms, and how these 
harmonised standards are enforced or partially enforced in practice. To put it another 
way, the significance of researching regulatory variations in the three control 
components is that it allows us to identify the driving force behind regime convergence 
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or divergence at both the policy-making and implementation levels, and assess the 
impacts of these factors accordingly. 
Second, looking at a regulatory regime from an angle of three control 
components offers some hints as to why an enforcement gap persists in less developed 
countries. Enforcement gaps resulting from information asymmetry is certainly different 
from those induced by intentional behaviour of regulators, and their implications for 
regulatory design are also distinctive. While the former may be attributed to incapacity 
of information-gathering and hence ignorance to the status of the regulated industries, 
the latter is closely linked to perceptions and values of local governments and regulators 
though they obtain adequate information on violations. The control components 
perspective can shed light on where an enforcement gap exists – in areas of gathering 
information and/or changing behaviours of the regulated entities. This is of particular 
importance to the understanding of regulatory enforcement in developing countries like 
China, where the incapacity of regulators and the pro-GDP growth value are both salient. 
Dividing regulatory enforcement into two elements of information-gathering and 
behaviour-modification can allow us to better understand where and why enforcement 
gaps are in place.  
In summary, the lens of analysing and comparing the three control components 
can provide a comprehensive perspective from which to assess the impact of 
internationalisation on regulation at both policy-making and implementation levels and 
distinguish the discrepancies between them (T. B. Smith, 1973). This is particularly 
advantageous to address the ‘to what extent’ question type. By narrowing down the 
level of analysis of regulatory regime to different elements inside it, the number of 
observations is increased and detailed regulatory variations are observed in a clearer 
way. 
1.2 Thesis structure and overview 
This thesis is organised into three parts. Part One (Chapters 1-4) introduces the 
background to the study, Part Two (Chapters 5-8) presents the empirical findings, then 
it is followed by a conclusion in Part Three (Chapter 9).  
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In Part One, Chapter 2 will first discuss the existing academic debates about 
regulation in China. Three bodies of literature are identified: China rising as a 
regulatory state, the impact of internationalisation of regulation on China, and the 
enforcement gap in practice. It will then be followed by setting the scene of the thesis, 
by introducing the historical, institutional and economic backgrounds of food regulation 
in China between 1949 and 2009
1
. Changes in the early period were induced by the 
evolution of the Chinese economic system transforming from a communist command 
economy to a market economy. On the other hand, regulatory changes in the period 
after 2002 were largely a response to international pressure and food scandals. The 
chapter will conclude by defining the scope of this research study. 
Chapter 3 will introduce the analytical framework of the study and review the 
related literatures. It will first illustrate Hood et al.’s (2001) control theory perspective 
of combining three control elements in a regulatory regime. Three bodies of literatures 
will then be considered – the internationalisation of regulation, the opinion-responsive 
government and interest-based theories. Theoretical expectations and research gaps will 
also be identified. The chapter will conclude by discussing the theoretical and empirical 
contributions of this analytical framework and research study in general. 
Chapter 4 will introduce the research design adopted in this study. It will first 
elaborate the rationales for choosing the comparative method of case study as the 
research methodology for the study. It will then present the landscape of the selected 
cases: the six food domains and their associated risks (i.e. domestic fruits/vegetables, 
exported fruits/vegetables, domestic meat/dairy products, exported meat/dairy products, 
domestic manufactured food products and exported manufactured food products), and 
the case study of Guangdong Province. Sources of data and methods of data collection 
used in this study will be discussed, including observation and interviews conducted in 
fieldwork. This chapter will conclude by a discussion of how data quality and 
availability poses challenges to empirical data collection in China.  
In Part Two, the empirical findings of the study will be presented. To provide a 
broad picture of the six food regulatory regimes, Chapter 5 will present the key 
empirical findings of the content and context of the regulatory regimes based on the 
                                                 
1
 The reforms are continuing but the fieldwork of this study stopped in 2010.   
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analytical framework. These include the institutional design of regulatory bodies, 
international pressure in terms of export trade and export bans imposed by foreign 
countries on Chinese food products, public opinion and media coverage on different 
food types, and organised interests of the industry, pressure groups and 
politicians/bureaucrats/regulators. The chapter concludes by a dimensional comparison 
which reveals similarities and differences among the six food regulatory regimes, and a 
discussion as to why examining variations in the identified aspects can enhance our 
understanding of how the international factors shape the Chinese food regulatory 
regimes, and how other domestic factors become less important.  
Chapters 6-8 will narrow down the empirical analysis to the three control 
components of standard-setting, information-gathering and behaviour-modification 
respectively. Chapter 6 will illustrate the element of standard-setting in various food 
regulatory regimes. To assess how the internationalisation of regulation impacts on 
standard-setting, it will illustrate types of food standards developed in different regimes, 
the international practice of food standard-setting and the domestic food development 
procedure, and the participants involved in the process. The chapter argues that the 
evolution of domestic food standards was largely driven by environmental protection 
concern, export opportunities, international obligations, food scandals, and pressures 
from the media and the public. While local business interest has been playing a role in 
developing domestic food standards, it has become less important under the context of 
internationalisation. As a result, there has been a gradual transformation of domestic 
food standards and the practice of standard-setting over the last decade, towards the 
convergence of international food standards. 
Chapters 7-8 will turn to discuss the enforcement work of food regulation, and 
in Chapter 7 the control component of information-gathering will be analysed. It will 
first present how information about food safety/quality issues are gathered in different 
food sectors in Guangdong Province. This chapter argues that regulators vary in how far 
information is collected in different food regulatory regimes, and also in how far the 
operation of information-gathering is based on direct ‘command and control’ 
approaches or other reactive and interactive methods. It is found that while a ‘police-
patrol’ oversight approach is adopted in gathering information about exported food 
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products, a mixed method of reactive and interactive approaches is used in the regimes 
for domestic food. To explain this pattern, the reasons of limited regulatory capacity and 
international pressure from other trading partners will be considered. In the meantime, 
the study suggests that under the context of internationalisation of regulation, the effects 
of food safety crises and the extensive international scrutiny on food ‘Made in China’ 
can bring about alterations to the pattern in information-gathering strategy. 
Chapter 8 will present another element of regulatory enforcement in different 
regulatory regimes, that is, behaviour-modification. It will first introduce tools of 
behaviour-modification deployed by regulators in Guangdong Province in different 
regimes. Empirical data suggest that deterrence-based approaches of behaviour-
modification are universally found across the three studied export regimes regardless of 
their export volume. In contrast, a mixed approach of enforcement action is applied on 
domestic food producers, depending on their size and financial conditions. This chapter 
argues that the variations are attributed to localised interests in domestic politics and 
global pressure. On the one hand, organised interests in the locality drive the regulators 
to consider situations of local economy, employment and tax revenue during making 
enforcement decisions. On the other hand, in the recent development under the context 
of internationalisation of regulation, food scandals and the determination of the Chinese 
government to maintain the image of products ‘Made in China’ have overcome local 
resistance and brought about regulatory changes.  
Part Three is the conclusion of the thesis. Based on the analysis in the previous 
empirical chapters, Chapter 9 will set forth the empirical findings of the study. It will 
assess in what way and to what extent internationalisation of regulation impacts on 
China, and relatedly, how other local factors become less important under the context of 
internationalisation in the recent development of food safety regulation in China. The 
chapter will conclude by discussing the theoretical and empirical contributions of the 
study. 
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Chapter 2 : Research issues in regulation in China and the 
development of food regulatory regime 
A helicopter view is helpful for capturing the essence of a regulatory regime and its 
changes in the overall historical, political, economic and social context. The main 
purpose of this chapter is to set the scene of research issues concerning regulation in 
China in general and food regulation in particular, and present the historical 
development of China’s food safety regulation since 1949. This serves the purpose of 
identifying research gaps, framing the analytical framework in the next chapter, and 
defining the period of study of the research. 
This chapter is organised into two sections. First, Section 2.1 will discuss three 
bodies of literature related to regulation in China in general and food regulation in 
particular. They include China’s emerging regulatory state, internationalisation of 
regulation in China, and regulatory enforcement in China. Research gaps of the existing 
literature will be identified. Section 2.2 will then discuss the historical, institutional and 
economic background of Chinese food regulation and its close ties with economic 
reforms. In exploring the development, it is shown that the instability of food regulatory 
regime in the 1980s and 1990s was mainly attributed to the reforms of the Chinese 
economic system, transforming it from a communist command economy towards an era 
of market transition, and further to a market economy and global economy. Internal 
food scandals, at the same time, began to emerge. The most recent period since the early 
2000s, however, has seen a shift: domestic food safety crises and international 
engagements such as compliance with the WTO norms become the main triggers for 
further regulatory reforms. The chapter finally concludes by explaining the choice of the 
period of study for this research. 
2.1 Research issues in regulation in China  
2.1.1 China’s emerging regulatory state 
The last decade has seen a scholarly debate over whether China is moving towards a 
regulatory state as in the West (D. Yang, 2004; S. Wang, 2006; P. Liu, 2010a, 2010b; 
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Hsueh, 2011; Collins & Gottwald, 2012). Some scholars deem China’s various 
economic and administrative reforms as signals indicating a paradigm shift towards a 
regulatory state. For example, Yang’s (2004) work analyses how the Chinese 
Communist Party leadership ‘remakes’ and transforms the state apparatus to become 
more capable and effective, in order to cope with the demands and challenges arising 
from a transition economy transforming from central planning to free market. Various 
regulatory reforms are identified, including the reconfiguration of the regulatory 
systems for bank, and the restructuring of regulatory agencies in areas of environmental 
protection, food and drug quality, coalmine and maritime safety. Yang suggests that 
these reforms on the one hand provide the foundations for a modern regulatory state, 
and on the other hand represent major steps in strengthening the central government’s 
fiscal prowess (D. Yang, 2004, p. 22). Yang further argues that despite regional 
variations, China has “made real progress toward making the Chinese state into a 
regulatory state suited to a functioning market economy” (D. Yang, 2004, p. 18). Three 
crucial factors are used to explain the pattern of growing state capacity, namely, 
changing economic conditions, internal politics/political leadership, and crises.  
Wang (2006) also holds a similar view that a new regulatory state is rising in 
China to replace the ‘totalistic state’. Based on a case study of coalmine regulation, 
Wang argues that China’s political-economy transition from state socialism has not 
resulted in a Hayekian night-watchman state but a new regulatory state (S. Wang, 2006, 
p. 1). Instead of hollowing out the state, decentralisation and liberalisation are 
accompanied by the rise of new state institutions which exert controls over a wide range 
of economic and social affairs, including utilities, banking, food and drug safety, 
workplace safety and environmental protection. Considerable efforts were devoted by 
the central government to adapting its regulatory system to the transformed economy. 
These involve the role of state intervention, nature and applicability of legal rules, 
creations of regulatory agencies, and measures of regulatory enforcement.  
In contrast, some scholars are sceptical of the interpretation that China has 
emerged as a regulatory state, as in the West, over the past decade (P. Liu, 2010b, 2010a; 
Collins & Gottwald, 2012). Their main argument mostly rests on the distinctive political 
and economic legacies of its communist past. For example, Liu (2010a, 2010b) argues 
27 
 
that the emerging Chinese regulatory state is very different from the U.S. or the EU 
model because of China’s unique historical background and political system. Based on 
case studies on drug regulation (P. Liu, 2010a) and food regulation (P. Liu, 2010b), Liu 
tries to interpret the rise of the Chinese regulatory state as a consequence of the collapse 
of ‘interest community’ formed among the government, enterprises and shiye danwei 
(i.e. professional units affiliated with the government, see Section 5.1); and against this 
backdrop, structural obstacles such as corruption and other rent-seeking behaviours 
have made regulatory state-building in China difficult. To distinguish the Chinese 
model of regulatory state from the Western counterparts, Liu uses the term 
‘authoritarian regulatory state’ and ‘transitional regulatory state’ to describe China’s 
route to regulation. 
Collins and Gottward (2012) also hold a similar view that China’s regulatory 
reform against the backdrop of economic opening-up policy is distinct from the 
regulatory state in capitalist economies. By conducting a comparative study between 
financial regulation and food safety regulation, Collins and Gottward (2012) describe 
the current Chinese regulatory model as a ‘regulatory autocracy’,  which is featured by 
one-party ruling, inadequate legislative oversight, state control of key sectors of the 
economy, co-opted new social elites, and tightly-controlled civil society.  
Similarly, in a recent study on China’s regulatory state, Hsueh (2011) 
demonstrates that China only appears to be a more liberal state in order to meet 
commitments made to the WTO. Although the state introduces competition and 
devolves economic decision-making, as a counterbalancing act it selectively imposes 
new regulations at the sectoral level to tighten its control over industries with strategic 
purpose. For strategic industries such as telecommunications, the state deliberately 
restricts the market entry in order to manage the competitions and the type of market 
players. In contrast, for non-strategic industries which are less important to national 
security such as textiles, the state relinquishes its control over the market by liberalising 
market entry to domestic players and foreign direct investment (FDI). The new 
regulatory state in China is featured by the bifurcated nature of China’s sectoral reform 
strategy. This logic of strategic value explains why China’s regulatory state is distinct 
from a liberal economic model in the West. 
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2.1.2 Internationalisation of regulation in China 
Notwithstanding the ideological contestation over China’s model of regulatory state, it 
is a less disputed issue that globalisation and internationalisation of regulation has a 
sweeping influence over regulation in China and its governance in general (Potter, 2003; 
D. Yang, 2004; Levi-Faur, 2005; Bach, Newman, & Weber, 2006; Biukovic, 2008; 
Hsueh, 2011; van Zwanenberg et al., 2011). 
In particular, regulatory solutions that are shaped in North America and Europe 
are increasingly internationalised and projected globally across developed and emerging 
economies. Also, this trend of ‘global diffusion’ (Levi-Faur, 2005) is further facilitated 
by supranational and global institutions as mediators. In explaining this trend of 
globalisation of regulation, Levi-Faur (2005) analyses the relationship between 
capitalism and regulation from a historical approach. He argues that the new order of 
regulatory capitalism goes beyond the traditional notion of privatisation but includes 
“an increase in delegation to autonomous agencies, formalisation of relationships, 
proliferation of new technologies of regulation in both public and private spheres, and 
the creation of new layers of both national and international regulation” (Levi-Faur, 
2005, p. 28). The role of ‘knowledge actors’ is important in the diffusion of this new 
order of regulatory capitalism from the North to the South, and from some monopolistic 
sectors to other sectors. 
In the context of China, its entry into the WTO in 2001 and the impacts it has on 
local governance has attracted wide attention from political leaders and scholars (D. 
Yang, 2004; Biukovic, 2008; Hsueh, 2011; van Zwanenberg et al., 2011; Shi, Markoczy, 
& Stan, 2014). For example, Yang’s (2004) study illustrates that under the changing 
economic conditions after the WTO entry and the increasing commitments of political 
leadership, China has strengthened its institutional framework and state capacity for 
economic governance over the past few decades. Reform measures include downsizing 
the government at all levels, strengthening the regulatory capacity, combating 
corruption and altering the state-business relation.  
Another body of literature has focused on the dynamics of international pressure 
exerted on China regarding its conformity to international norms (Potter, 2003; 
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Biukovic, 2008; van Zwanenberg et al., 2011). In this area, international harmonisation 
and standard harmonisation in particular, is a subject of concern (Holzinger, Knill, & 
Sommerer, 2008; van Zwanenberg et al., 2011). In van Zwanenberg et al.’s (2011) 
comparative case study of agricultural biotechnology in Argentina and China, for 
example, a state-centred approach to harmonisation is distinguished from a decentred 
one. Both approaches suffer from their own restrictions: while the former has a limited 
impact on enforcement because the regulatory framework is blind to some critical 
political and economic processes on the ground, the latter is deficient in situations 
where norms are disputed among different actors in local politics that make regulatory 
enforcement a contested issue.  
The term ‘selective adaptation’ was developed by some scholars to describe a 
process that foreign ideas are imported and conditioned into the local regulatory regimes 
(Potter, 2003, 2004; Biukovic, 2008). In the context of China, for example, Potter’s 
(2003) study on economic regulation describes the dynamics of China’s adoption of 
international norms and practices as ‘selective adaptation’. The study illustrates the 
challenges faced by the Chinese government when it confronts conflicting imperatives 
of compliance with the WTO norms and preservation of local interests. In order to 
balance local regulatory imperatives with the required compliance of international 
norms derived from the regimes of liberal democratic capitalism, foreign ideas are 
received and assimilated into local conditions (Potter, 2003, pp. 120-121). Potter 
suggests that the effectiveness of selective adaptation depends on the capacity to 
combine local and foreign regulatory norms in ways that address globally derived 
challenges while remaining contextualised to local conditions and the pursuit of closely-
held domestic imperatives. In particular, perception, complementarity, legitimacy 
(Potter, 2003) and the central-local governmental relationship (Biukovic, 2008) are 
critical factors in the success of selective adaptation. 
Other balancing measures are also introduced by the Chinese Central 
Government to avoid its extensive exposure to international norms and practices. For 
instance, Hsueh’s (2011) study examines the transformation of the Chinese economy in 
the decade since the country’s accession to the WTO. According to Hsueh (2011), 
China’s waves of liberalisation are followed by a countering trend of ‘reregulation’ – 
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the state deregulates at the macro level but at the same time reregulates at the micro 
level. The balancing act between regulatory ‘decentralisation’ and ‘centralisation’ is 
intended to give an impression to the international world that China complies with the 
WTO commitments in loosening its central state control on the economy, while at the 
same time selectively retaining its control over some strategic sectors related to national 
security.  
2.1.3 Regulatory enforcement  
Apart from ‘selective adaptation’ in terms of importing international norms and 
practices, in exploring the degree of international engagement, it is also crucial to 
examine regulatory enforcement at the implementation level. Prior regulatory 
enforcement studies recognise that law enforcement depends on a series of factors, 
including regulatory resources, regulatory capacity, political leadership and culture 
(Bardach & Kagan, 1982; Kagan, 1994), and the influence of external organisations and 
pressures on enforcement practice (Gunningham, Kagan, & Thornton, 2003; Hutter & 
O'Mahony, 2004; Hutter, 2006; Hutter & Jones, 2007). While prior literature is largely 
based on evidence in advanced economies with democratic governments, relatively little 
research effort has been spent on studying actual enforcement in authoritarian states 
such as China. This may be because of the fact that empirical data in China are not 
readily available, while investigating discrepancies between policy-making and policy-
implementation is still politically sensitive in some policy areas. 
Despite a limited number of empirical studies on regulatory enforcement in 
China, environmental protection is an area attracting the most scholarly attention (i.e. 
Palmer, 1998; Lo, Yip, Kwong, & Cheung, 2000; X. Ma & Ortolano, 2000; Christmann 
& Taylor, 2001; Van Rooij, 2010; Van Rooij & Lo, 2010; Van Rooij, Fryxell, Lo, & 
Wang, 2013). Alongside this, two other domains have emerged as a new focus of 
academic research in recent years. These include food and drug regulation (i.e. Tam & 
Yang, 2005; Thompson & Ying, 2007; Q. Zhou, 2007; D. Yang, 2009; Burns, Peters, 
Wang, & Li, 2010; P. Liu, 2010b; Li, 2011; Y. Liu, 2011; Pei et al., 2011; G. Yang, 
2013), and economic regulation and competition (i.e. Taplin, Zhao, & Brown, 2013; Shi 
et al., 2014). Given that food safety regulation is more similar to environmental 
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regulation in terms of risk nature and the design of regulatory framework, the literature 
of these two areas is reviewed here.   
Various empirical works on environmental protection regulation in China have 
identified an enforcement gap in the reality, and tried to explain the phenomenon by 
giving a detailed account of the relevant surrounding institutional and political factors 
(Palmer, 1998; Lo et al., 2000; X. Ma & Ortolano, 2000; Christmann & Taylor, 2001; 
Van Rooij, 2010; Van Rooij & Lo, 2010; Van Rooij et al., 2013). For instance, Ma and 
Ortolano’s (2000) work is one of the pioneers of enforcement study which examines the 
observed divergence between China’s pollution control targets and the actual 
deteriorating environment. Types of enforcement action taken largely depend on firm 
characteristics, economic conditions, form of ownership and vested stakes of the 
government. Ma and Ortolano (2000) use the term ‘Chinese regulatory pragmatism and 
parochialism’ to describe the practice of frontline enforcers. While some firms may 
make use of the flexibilities under regulatory pragmatism to improve the environmental 
conditions, others may simply ignore the statutory standards. The worst scenario is that 
regulatory pragmatism and parochialism may induce great opportunities for corruptions 
or other discriminatory measures. 
Notwithstanding discrepancies in regulatory enforcement, recent studies have 
revealed that other driving forces have emerged to bring about more effective 
enforcement in recent years. For example, Lo, Fryxell and Wong’s (2006) survey-based 
study suggests that stronger personal environmental values of enforcement officials, 
enhanced belief in the legitimacy of governmental policies, and greater support from 
government and society are factors that have positive effects on enforcement. With 
respect to societal forces, Van Rooij et al.’s (2010; 2010; 2013) series of studies on 
pollution regulation in China indicate that regulatory enforcement in China has been 
increasingly influenced by societal forces. However, contrary to earlier studies 
indicating that social activism has a positive effect on environmental law enforcement, 
the rise of civil society and increasing government support in China surprisingly have a 
double-edged impact on its enforcement. Van Rooij et al. (2013) explain that when 
government support is low, societal forces are developed to counterbalance the effect 
and positively influence enforcement. However, when governmental support is high, too 
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much societal support eventually becomes a form of pressure. As soon as public 
expectations are raised to the level that enforcement agencies are unable to meet, 
societal support starts to be an enforcement burden to regulators. 
Although Chinese food safety regulation has emerged as a prominent issue in 
China and the international world, its enforcement in practice remains an under-
researched area. Among the existing empirical studies on food safety regulation in 
China (i.e. Tam & Yang, 2005; Thompson & Ying, 2007; Q. Zhou, 2007; D. Yang, 
2009; Burns et al., 2010; P. Liu, 2010b; Li, 2011; Y. Liu, 2011; Pei et al., 2011; G. 
Yang, 2013), most of them mainly focus on the design of food regulatory system in 
general, or the institutional setting of regulatory bodies in particular. For example, 
Yang’s (2009) and Burns et al.’s (2010) studies have classified the Chinese food 
regulatory system as a fragmented one, while other places such as the U.S. and Hong 
Kong are having a centralised system. These studies primarily point to ‘fragmentation 
of regulatory authorities’ as the key challenge of food regulation in China, and presume 
that a centralised institutional design is more preferable. However, these studies may 
need to further consider other potential obstacles to enforcement such as the 
commitment and capacity of a single regulatory body in the Chinese context. 
Considering China as a large exporter in international food trade, some studies 
examine how the importing countries respond to incidents concerning Chinese exported 
food (Thompson & Ying, 2007). For example, Thompson and Ying’s (2007) study 
focuses on mutual agreements signed between China and other importing places such as 
the U.S. and Hong Kong, and suggests that the combined political attention from 
importing countries and the local Chinese communities can facilitate transnational 
cooperation. Drawing on a comparative case study of two cooperative mechanisms, 
Thompson and Ying (2007) argue that the success of Hong Kong’s provincial-focused 
strategy and the failure of the U.S.’s central-focused strategy reveal that the Chinese 
Central Government fails to adequately control provincial activities. In particular, the 
unwillingness of local governments to enforce dictates from the central government can 
be explained by local protectionism.  
The three bodies of literature discussed so far have reflected that China has 
undergone extensive regulatory reforms in different industries over the last two decades, 
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and these reforms are to a large extent impacted by global influence or framed by 
international engagements. Meanwhile, the extent to which globalised norms can 
influence practices in China will depend on the dynamics of selective adaptation 
according to conditions at the national level, and the enforcement of these international 
norms in practice relies on various political, economic and social features at the local 
levels.  
Some research gaps, however, remain. First, the existing pieces of research 
focus mainly on the evolution of food regulatory policy and regulatory design. However, 
there are very limited empirical studies on how food regulation in China is enforced at 
the local level, this leaves the determinants of monitoring and enforcement activities 
less considered. For example, the argument of local protectionism needs further 
empirical investigation because existing evidence is far from enough to show the 
internal ‘ecology’ of protectionism and explain how factors in local politics alter 
regulatory enforcement. More importantly, enforcement never remains static. It is 
essential to examine other factors which may be able to override local interests and 
bring about changes in enforcement activities.  International pressure and crisis, for 
instance, are the potential factors. Second, imitation of the West on regulation in China 
deserves a further exploration. In particular, the food safety issue is neither a strategic 
industry as utilities involving national securities, nor a completely nonstrategic industry 
because of its high international attention under global trade. In this marginal case, how 
the Chinese government manages to handle its regulatory approach to adapt to 
international norms deserves further examination. 
The above research issues provide the essential research background of the study. 
In the next section, it will go further to set the scene of the research by providing the 
historical, institutional and economic background of food regulation in China.    
2.2 Historical, institutional and economic background of food 
regulation in China  
The narrative of this section will be classified into five periods. First, in the socialist 
command economy from 1949 to 1977, an implicit food hygiene/safety control was in 
place. Second, a dual-track regulatory regime was formed during the initial market 
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transition era from 1978 to 1992. Third, alongside the market reform from 1993 to 2002, 
a consistent but fragmented regulatory regime was generated. Fourth, during the period 
of 2003-2008, the Chinese Central Government intended to alter the fragmented 
regulatory system by centralising regulatory power to a single state body (i.e. the State 
Food and Drug Administration, SFDA), and created a formal regulatory regime for 
agricultural food products. Finally, in early 2009, the new PRC Food Safety Law was 
legislated as a response to the Sanlu milk scandal, which broke in 2008.  
Figure 2-1 shows a timeline summarising the legislation of major laws, rules and 
directive relevant to food hygiene/safety regulation in China. Due to space limitations 
and interest of readers, the narrative here does not cover all items listed here but 
selectively explains some of them that have high importance.   
 
  
Figure 2-1: Major food safety law and rule legislation in China 
Year Law and rule legislation 
1982 Legislation of the PRC Food Hygiene Law (Trial Implementation) 
1992 The introduction of green food standards 
1993 Legislation of the PRC Product Quality Law 
1994 The introduction of organic food standards 
1995 Legislation of the PRC Food Hygiene Law 
2000 The introduction of the ‘QS’ certification for manufactured food products 
(not mandatory) 
2002 The introduction of pollution-free food standards (not mandatory) 
2004 The issue of the State Council’s directive Decision on Further Strengthening Food 
Safety 
2006 Legislation of the PRC Agricultural Product Quality Safety Law 
Pollution-free food standards become mandatory standards for agricultural food  
2008 The ‘QS’ certification becomes mandatory for all manufactured food product 
2009 Legislation of the PRC Food Safety Law 
Source: author’s compilation, from previous literature 
Becomes 
mandatory 
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2.2.1 1949-1977: An implicit food hygiene/safety control in a socialist 
command economy 
In 1949, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was established as a communist state, 
and immediately turned to the former Soviet Union as its primary model for its 
economic and political systems. After that, the country was characterised by a direct and 
strong government control in the political, economic and social spheres during the 
whole socialist period until 1977 (Naughton, 2007). What needs to be emphasised here 
is that not food safety but food security was the key concern during this period (Xu, 
2003). For example, the 1958-1961 widespread Chinese famine was the largest in 
human history, causing about 30 million premature deaths during the period 1958-1962 
(Ashton, Hill, Piazza, & Zeitz, 1984, p. 614).  
Despite the relatively unimportance of food hygiene and safety when compared 
with food security, food hygiene/safety regulation was still existent. The responsibility 
rested on the Health and Anti-epidemic Stations (Weisheng Fangyi Zhan, WFZs) across 
the country. The WFZs were local offices of the Ministry of Health (MoH) and the first 
WFZ was established in the early 1950s; since then the WFZs witnessed a rapid 
expansion. In 1952, there were only 147 WFZs across the country, employing 20,504 
officers (Wuhan Medicine College, 1981). In 1956, the WFZs basically had their offices 
in all prefectures and counties; in 1959, the WFZs further expanded, reaching to the 
township level. There were 2,499 WFZs across the country by 1965, employing 77,179 
officers (P. Liu, 2010b). However, this needs to take account of the fact that food 
hygiene/safety regulation only constituted part of WFZs’ mandates. Other major duties 
of WFZs covered epidemic prevention, vaccination, body check, medical test, hygiene 
control of public areas and health education. As defined by the MoH in 1954, the WFZs 
were units charged with the tasks of “preventive health care, routine health supervision 
and infectious disease control” (Zhang, 1991). It reflected that food hygiene/safety 
regulation was placed as relatively low priority among WFZs’ various mandates.  
A closer examination of the food production model in the socialist age, however, 
can offer a different understanding of the food hygiene/safety control during the period. 
Instead of relying on the WFZs as an external source of regulatory power, a primary 
food hygiene/safety control was in fact embedded in the hierarchical state bureaucracy 
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through its direct control of food production. This was closely related to the central 
command economy at the time, which merits a brief discussion here given its impact on 
food hygiene/safety control. 
The Chinese economy in the socialist era incorporated the following three 
fundamental characteristics: central economic planning, collective ownership of 
agricultural lands, and state ownership of industries. In the countryside, a radical land 
reform was pushed through by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) between 1950 and 
1952, distributing lands from landlords to poor peasant households. A further radical 
mass campaign in the mid-1950s led to the organisation of all peasants into agricultural 
cooperatives. By the end of 1956, 98% of farming households were enrolled in 
cooperatives or collectives (Naughton, 2007, pp. 65-67). Forms of collectives varied, 
but typically communes, brigades and production teams were shaped as a three-level 
hierarchy to structure the organisation of agriculture. Alongside land reforms in 
countryside was the ownership shift of private properties in cities. In 1956, private 
factories and shops in cities were converted into cooperatives with substantial control 
exercised by the state. After that, private ownership was virtually extinguished, while 
the state had a full monopolistic control over economic decision-making. For 
agriculture, a compulsory procurement of grain was imposed on agricultural collectives 
or communes, and farmers in the production teams were forced to meet the procurement 
quotas set by the state. Agricultural products were sold to the state at very low fixed 
prices, meaning that the procurement was virtually a compulsory delivery of food to the 
state. For industries, the government owned all factories, while specific production 
decisions were made and executed by the central planning system. Planners assigned 
targeted output quantities to firms and directly transferred resources to them. Finished 
goods were purchased by the state at state-fixed prices. The pricing system ultimately 
lost its significance, while monetary rewards and other material incentives were 
discarded. 
Under all the plans, commands and controls, a typical state-owned enterprise 
had very little autonomy – it could not adjust its labour force and did not retain any of 
its profit. Marketplace was also replaced in the command economy. The retail and sales 
sector shrank because a rationing system was imposed to limit demand and distribute 
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goods. From 1955 to the 1980s, ration coupons were required for the purchase of grain 
and some other food items. As a result, no real competition existed in the market. In the 
countryside, private consumption was simply abstained. Free markets were shut down, 
with all goods allocated by communes and staple food provided by large communal 
dining halls in the collectives.  
There were profound implications of the command economy for food 
hygiene/safety control in China during the period. One of them was that the state 
oversaw all the activities of food production, and by extension so did the area of food 
hygiene/safety control. In terms of agricultural food production, brigade cadres or 
commune leaders, who were also state actors under the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA), 
assigned precise farming activities to each farming household every morning. Basically, 
all inputs and processes were centrally controlled. While the use of chemical fertilisers, 
pesticides and additives was uncommon, it was under the control of the MoA. In regard 
to food manufacturing, all production activities were performed under the supervision 
of the Ministry of Light Industry (MoLI) or the Ministry of Food (MoF), depending on 
food types. Having the decision-making on production centrally determined, the MoLI 
and MoF would then direct their enterprises at the lower levels to produce the assigned 
food commodities. Similar to agriculture, all input resources came from the state, while 
finished food products were procured by the state at state-set prices. With no exemption, 
manufacturing and storage of pesticides, fertilisers and other food chemicals were fully 
controlled by the state under the Ministry of Chemical Industry. Meanwhile, food 
transportation, storage, and distribution were governed by the Ministry of Commerce 
(MoC).  
Overall, the first period of food regulation in China was characterised by three 
facets: first, the WFZs were created to control diseases, while they were also assigned 
the task of regulating food hygiene/safety. Notably the genuine control of food 
hygiene/safety did not reside in the WFZs due to the production model in the socialist 
era. Second, by virtue of all the production means being state-owned, food production 
including agriculture was under direct control of the state. The organisation of 
agricultural collectives and the subordination of food enterprises to the state 
bureaucracy made food hygiene/safety regulation implicit. The state itself became the 
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monopolistic supplier as well as regulator of food. Hence, the precise power of food 
regulation primarily resided in the MoA, MoLI and MoF but not the MoH. Food 
hygiene/safety control was entirely embedded in the state hierarchical bureaucracy by 
its control on all production activities. Third, food safety issue was not a key concern of 
the period. Instead, the state has a great desire to manage the problem of food security 
by increasing grain production. 
2.2.2 1978-1992: A dual-track food regulatory regime in the market 
transition period 
After thirty years of centrally planned economy, the Chinese economic opening-up 
policies in 1978 brought a departure of the state from a command economy towards a 
market-based economy. The economic revolution was uneasy and gradual, especially 
since there were no blueprints or theoretical guides for doing so before the 1990s. It was 
not until the mid-1990s that a market economy was basically formed in China. During 
the process of market transition between 1978 and 1992, the food industry in China 
witnessed dramatic changes in both structure and scale. Correspondingly a primitive 
food regulatory regime was created in 1982 as a response. 
Three measures in the successive waves of economic reform from 1978 were 
largely relevant to the food industry in China: first, there was a policy of contracting 
lands to households, in the form of a household responsibility system. Under the new 
system, agricultural production was no longer based on the three-level hierarchy of 
communes, brigades and production teams but relied on family households. This meant 
that peasants were allowed to take over the management of the agricultural production 
cycle on a specific plot of land, and retain their surplus to sell in the market after 
meeting the procurement amount set by the state. The agricultural collectives or 
communes no longer possessed significant control of agricultural production; instead, 
they were reduced to become little more than a landlord (Naughton, 2007, p. 89). 
Second, the food processing sector became open to individual investments and foreign 
investments. Individuals were hence given opportunities to act as entrepreneurs to meet 
the demand at market price. As a result, small food workshops as well as large food 
enterprises developed rapidly in a short period of time to exploit market niches (Collins 
& Gottwald, 2012, p. 147). Third, the food rationing system in cities was gradually 
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abolished. Free markets were formed and the food retail and sales sector developed very 
quickly as a consequence. Food outputs were under the control of household farmers 
and managers of individual food enterprises, and were sold at the best prices they could 
obtain. This unquestionably brought increasing competition to the food market. 
The direct consequences of the economic reform to food hygiene/safety control 
were twofold. First, the pure form of state ownership in the food sector was wiped out 
and replaced by a diverse ownership structure. These widespread privately-owned small 
food workshops, Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs) and some larger food 
manufacturing plants made the food processing sector highly fragmented in a short 
period of time. Similar situation occurred in the retail and sales sector, where street-
sellers and mobile food stalls were wide-ranging in newly established marketplaces. 
The decision-making of these new privately-owned units was not under the control of 
the state, and so were the hygiene/safety conditions of their food products. Therefore, 
the regulatory regime in the socialist era having food hygiene/safety control embedded 
in the state bureaucracy of the MoA, MoLI and MoF no longer functioned in this 
market transition period. Another consequence was that substandard food products 
appeared as a negative externality of market failure. Since activities of agriculture and 
food production became profit-based, farmers and food manufacturers maintained a 
strong incentive to lower their production costs and maximise their production 
quantities. Scientific production skills such as the use of pesticides, fertilisers, and 
preservatives were applied. An extensive range of food risks emerged as a result in the 
forms of pesticide and veterinary drug residues and unapproved chemicals.  
Against this backdrop of changing ownership structure and the incentive of 
maximising profit, internal food scandals started to emerge. According to Liu’s (2010b) 
study, in Zhejiang Province, there were 132 incidents of food poisoning in 1979, 3,464 
persons having been involved, and 0.49% of which died. Three years later in 1982, the 
reported number of incident reached 273, affecting 3,946 persons and 0.71% dying 
(Cong, 1990). In Guangzhou City, the capital of Guangdong Province, there were 46 
incidents of food poisoning in 1979, with 302 persons involved; in 1982, the number of 
food incidents rose to 132, with 1,097 persons affected (Ding, 1988). In summary, the 
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issue of food safety and hygiene started to emerge as a concern in China rather than 
only food security.  
Given that the regulatory regime developed in the socialist era was unable to 
cope with the rapid marketisation process, these internal scandals in turn triggered the 
formation of a food regulatory regime. One of the remedies was the legislation of the 
PRC Food Hygiene Law (Trial Implementation) in 1982 ("The PRC Food Hygiene Law 
(Trial Implementation)," 1982). Its nature of ‘trial implementation’ entailed that the law 
was legislated without a clear assurance if it would work. As the CCP leader Deng 
Xiaoping put it, the government managed to “cross the river by feeling the stones”, 
representing the state wanting to move ahead with economic reforms pragmatically, 
alongside building up a legal infrastructure. The breakthrough of the PRC Food 
Hygiene Law (Trial Implementation) was its introduction of a food hygiene licensing 
system to the food manufacturing sector as well as the food retail and sales sector 
(Article 26). Although the mandate was loosely enforced and the gain of licence was 
easy in the period (P. Liu, 2010b, pp. 249-250), it was the first attempt by the state to 
place a barrier on market entry based on criteria of food hygiene/safety standards. While 
hygiene licences were issued and managed by the MoH, this empowerment implied that 
the scope of the MoH on food regulation was formally confirmed by a written law. 
Another remark on the new law was the adoption of sanctions to modify law-
violating behaviours. There were a wide range of penalties, including warnings, orders 
of product withdrawal, confiscation of products, fines, suspension of work, and 
revocation of hygiene licences. Judicial arbitration was also put into place, with 
violators liable to criminal offences if their illegal activities were directly linked to 
serious accidents of food poisoning or disease which caused death or disability (Article 
41). However, along with the list of penalties, there was a clear provision that 
revocation of a hygiene licence or a fine exceeding RMB 5,000 (approximately USD 
730
2
) were subject to the approval by local government at county level or above (Article 
37).  
A further attempt to establish a food regulatory regime was the institutional 
arrangement of regulatory agencies. The PRC Food Hygiene Law (Trial Implementation) 
                                                 
2
 In 2010, 1 Chinese Yuan Renminbi (RMB) equalled 0.146 US Dollar (USD), the same as below. 
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first stipulated that the authorities of the MoH at all levels shall lead the work of food 
hygiene supervision (Article 30). Meanwhile, the law also affirmed that the WFZs at the 
county level and above were the chief agencies for food hygiene supervision (Article 
31); although in practice the WFZs were constrained by the absence of sufficient 
resources to cope with the increasing regulatory work. The State Administration of 
Industry and Commerce (SAIC) was in charge of regulating market activities in local 
wet markets and retail stores; while the MoA was responsible for the inspection of 
livestock and poultry in terms of disease control (Article 27). At the same time, the role 
of the MoLI in the socialist era remained, constantly controlling all food production 
activities of the state-owned enterprises (SOEs). This setting was closely related to the 
path of state-sector reform adopted by the Chinese government: in the market transition 
period, rather than privatising the SOEs, incremental managerial reforms were 
undertaken to the sector. While the SOEs were still given production plans to fulfil, 
profitability gradually became their indicator of performance. In other words, the MoLI 
still kept their control of the SOEs’ food production, similar to the socialist era; for 
these SOEs, the MoH had no clear roles in monitoring their products’ hygiene/safety. A 
dual-track system of regulation – one for the SOEs and another for privately-owned 
food production units – coexisted.  
Overall, the food regulatory regime in China in the second period between 1978 
and 1992 can be summarised by three observations. First, within a very short period of 
time, there was an intense reduction in state monopoly on agriculture and food 
manufacturing. As a consequence, there was simultaneously a rapid expansion of the 
food industry, a diverse form of food enterprise ownerships, and an emergence of a 
competitive market. Profit-maximisation replaced state command as the goal of running 
the food business. Internal food scandals such as food poisoning cases started to emerge 
as a concern instead of merely food security. However, the transformation from a 
planned economy to a market economy did not come with a corresponding food 
regulatory regime at the very early stage in late 1970s. Second, to manage the 
discrepancies between the control system and the fast-changing food industry structure, 
the Chinese government attempted to establish a regulatory regime by the legislation of 
the PRC Food Hygiene Law (Trial implementation). Remarkably a market access 
system in the form of food hygiene licence was first introduced. There was also the use 
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of sanctions and judicial arbitrations to modify law-violating behaviours. Third, a 
complex of regulatory bodies was first formed to take the responsibility of regulating 
food hygiene. The MoH and local WFZs were legally empowered to food hygiene 
regulation, with the MoLI retaining their power on controlling the SOEs’ production 
activities. A dual-track system of food hygiene/safety control remained as a result. 
2.2.3 1993-2002: A consistent but fragmented regulatory regime in the 
second phase of market reform 
After fifteen years of market transition, China had moved away from a command 
economy and adopted a market economy in the 1990s (Naughton, 2007, p. 85). 
Specifically, a new wave of economic reforms began in 1993, which brought two 
significant impacts on the food industry in China: first, a dramatic downsizing of the 
state-owned food sector; second, the abolishment of the MoLI in 1993 as a consequence 
of the reform. These two episodes together implied that food production activities of the 
shrinking SOE food sector were no longer under state control. This formally put an end 
to the dual-track control system prevailing in the transition period. The launch of the 
new system meant that in principle rules of the game on food hygiene/safety control 
were first applied apparently equally to all actors in the food industry. Meanwhile, the 
source of control was external, rather than embedded in the process of production. 
Having the role of the state shifted from intervening in all economic activities to 
providing an environment for market competition, the government made several 
changes to improve its legal and regulatory infrastructures. In particular, the PRC 
Product Quality Law was enacted in 1993 (amended in 2000) ("The PRC Product 
Quality Law," 1993; "The PRC Product Quality Law," 2000), delegating the newly 
established State Administration of Quality Supervision (SAQS) to take the leading role 
in regulating product quality. In fact, this law was not exclusively applied to foodstuffs 
but extensively to all processed or manufactured products (Article 2). This was the very 
beginning of the SAQS being formally involved in food regulation in China, and 
specifically in manufactured food quality regulation. Further, after thirteen years of 
‘trial implementation’, the PRC Food Hygiene Law was enacted in 1995 ("The PRC 
Food Hygiene Law," 1995). The law reaffirmed MoH’s authority in food hygiene 
regulation (Article 32), and it moved forward to grant WFZs a legal status as official 
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units for food hygiene inspection, and authorise WFZs the right to issue inspection 
reports (Article 36). The legislations of the two laws on product quality and food 
hygiene, however, did not embrace any coordination. This was largely attributed to the 
fact that the PRC Product Quality Law was not intended to regulate food commodities 
exclusively. As a consequence, two control systems were established in food regulation, 
one for food hygiene by the MoH, another for food product quality by the SAQS. 
Whereas the SAIC retained its authority in regulating market activities in the retail and 
sales sector, the MoA was responsible for the inspection of livestock and poultry, 
specifically the aspect of disease control. The assignment of numerous authorities in 
regulating food hygiene/safety caused coordination challenges.  
A formal regulatory regime for exported food was first put into place in the 
period. In 1998, a government restructuring programme was carried out, having 
preparation for its possible entry into the WTO as part of the drive (D. Yang, 2004, pp. 
37-39). Regarding exported food safety regulation, the border management was 
improved to facilitate China’s investment environment. The State Council reorganised 
and centralised the exist-entry administration by the set-up of the China Entry-Exist 
Inspection and Quarantine Bureau (CIQ), which merged the previous three separate 
institutions for health quarantines, animal and plant quarantines, and commodity 
inspection. Thereafter, food exporters and importers only needed to go through the CIQ 
for sampling, inspection or quarantine once. Similarly, alongside China’s entry into the 
WTO in 2001, the Standardisation Administration of China (SAC) was established in 
2001. The SAC represents China within the International Organisation for 
Standardisation (ISO), the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) and other 
international and regional standardisation organisations. It undertakes unified 
management, supervision and overall coordination of standardisation work in China 
(International Organisation for Standardisation, n.d.-a).  
In summary, the food regulatory regime in the third period was characterised by 
four facets. First, the dual-track system of food control in the market transition period 
was replaced by a consistent control regime, equally covering all of the SOEs, TVEs 
and privately-owned enterprises. Second, the PRC Product Quality Law was legislated, 
covering the category of processed foodstuffs. The PRC Food Hygiene Law was further 
44 
 
legislated, replacing the ‘trial implementation’ version which had been enacted for 
thirteen years. The apparent problem was that no clear coordination or communication 
had taken place between the two laws. As a result, two control systems were developed 
on food regulation – one on food hygiene by the MoH, and another on food product 
quality by the SAQS. Third, a fragmented food regulatory regime was created as a 
consequence, with a number of state agencies delegated with regulatory power. 
Struggles in coordination, regulatory turf and blame-shifting between various regulatory 
bodies began to emerge in this fragmented regime (Tam & Yang, 2005; D. Yang, 2009).  
Finally, a formal regulatory regime for exported food was first put into place in the late 
1990s and early 2000s, as a preparation for the possible entry into the WTO. These 
include the set-up of the CIQs and SAC.  
2.2.4 2003-2008: An attempt to re-centralise the regulatory authority 
and the formation of a regulatory regime for agricultural food 
products  
In the early 2000s, China witnessed a series of food incidents: in November 2001, 484 
persons in Heyuan City of Guangdong Province suffered from food poisoning after 
consuming pork contaminated by toxic chemical ractopamine. In 2003, ham factories in 
Jinhua City of Zhejiang Province were discovered to be using a toxic chemical 
dichlorvos as a preservative to control pests. In 2004, fake formula milk of little 
nutritional value was found in Fuyang City of Anhui Province, causing at least twelve 
infants to die because of malnutrition. 
As a regulatory response to the emerging food safety crises, the State Council 
issued a directive titled Decision on Further Strengthening Food Safety in 2004 (The 
State Council, 2004), bringing in a new model of food regulation. The purpose of this 
directive was to divide regulatory work into different points along the food production 
chain (i.e. production, processing, distribution and preparation), and correspondingly 
assign a regulatory agency to regulate each point. Following this principle, several state 
agencies were designated authorities of food hygiene/safety regulation. In detail, the 
MoA continued as the regulator of all farming activities; the newly established General 
Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine (AQSIQ) (formerly 
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the SAQS) was delegated to oversee food manufacturing; the MoC to food trade and 
foreign investment in the food industry; the SAIC to market activities; and the MoH to 
food hospitality and catering. The State Food and Drug Administration (SFDA) 
(formerly the State Drug Administration) was established under the State Council in 
2003 to coordinate overall food safety regulation among various regulatory agencies, as 
well as to investigate serious food incidents. This regulatory change was to remediate 
the overlapping and underlapping of fragmented authorities as revealed by the scandals. 
Notably the establishment of the SFDA was officially regarded as mimicking the U.S. 
Food and Drug Administration ("Premier Zhu admits," 2003). This was the first signal 
indicating that as a response to domestic demand, policy learning from the West 
appeared to be one of the directions for the Chinese Central Government.  
Two key movements were found in the new model. First, the Chinese Central 
Government attempted to clarify the roles of the MoH and AQSIQ, with the 
responsibility of manufactured food regulation having entirely shifted from the MoH to 
the AQSIQ, whereas the MoH only retained the regulatory power on food hospitality 
and catering. Another movement was the establishment of the SFDA as an attempt to 
re-centralise food control to a state administration directly under the State Council, 
although the significance was in doubt because of the resistance from various regulatory 
bodies inside the segmented model (Burns et al., 2010). This regulatory reform was 
ineffective because the original regulatory authorities tended to maximise and/or 
safeguard their vested interests in terms of regulatory power such as fine collection. 
Therefore, they were conceivably reluctant to transfer the power to the new SFDA. 
Regulatory changes in the form of new instruments were also introduced during 
this period, including the food recall procedures, the tracking system, and the use of 
scientific risk assessment. The market access system was also put forward by the 
AQSIQ in 2005, under a regulation titled the PRC Regulation on Production Licence of 
Industrial Products (2005, Article 2.1). Under this administrative rule, a production 
licensing system was adopted in the food manufacturing sector. Since then, market 
entry of food processing activities required three permits as prerequisites: a hygiene 
licence, a business licence and a production licence.  
46 
 
Another modification took place in the aspect of agricultural food regulation 
during this period. In 2006, the first law in China on agricultural product quality and 
safety, namely, the PRC Agricultural Product Quality Safety Law, was legislated ("The 
PRC Agricultural Product Quality Safety Law," 2006). Before this legislation, 
regulation of agricultural food was basically premised on the PRC Law on Agriculture 
legislated in 1993 (amended in 2002) ("The PRC Law on Agriculture," 1993). Instead 
of agricultural product quality and safety, this law was in general more concerned with 
rural reforms, systems of rural economy and the development of the agricultural 
industry. The new PRC Agricultural Product Quality Safety Law, in contrast, formally 
granted MoA an explicit legal status to regulate agricultural activities, based on the 
criteria of agricultural product safety. It also introduced some compulsory requirements 
on agribusiness, farmer cooperatives and cooperative economic organisations, including 
the installation of examination and quarantine facilities and the execution of a record-
keeping system. Sanctions were also introduced in order to modify law-violating 
behaviours though they were not imposed on individual farmers and farming 
households. Further details will be discussed in Chapters 6-8, on standard-setting, 
information-gathering and behaviour-modification respectively.  
In general, food regulatory regime in the period between 2003 and 2008 can be 
summarised by three observations. First, the role and authority of MoH were formally 
weakened by the shift of power over food manufacturing to the AQSIQ. 
Consequentially the segmented regime was consolidated. Second, while acknowledging 
the coordination problems in a fragmented regulatory regime, the Chinese Central 
Government attempted to re-centralise the regulatory authority to the State Council, by 
policy learning from the U.S. (D. Yang, 2009) and setting up the SFDA under it as a 
response to food scandals in the early 2000s. Third, agricultural food quality and safety 
were officially under regulation, by the legislation of the PRC Agricultural Product 
Quality Safety Law. However, the coverage of this regulatory change is incomplete. 
Many parts of the law were applicable only to agribusiness, farmer cooperatives and 
cooperative economic organisations while individual farmers and farming households 
were exempt.
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2.2.5 2009-ongoing: Legislation of the PRC Food Safety Law after the 
tainted milk scandal  
In recent years, food safety in China has remained a national and international issue of 
concern. According to the official figures of the Ministry of Health (MoH), in China, 
there were 2,305 cases of serious food poisoning in 2004, in which 42,876 people were 
involved and 255 people died (W. Chen, Li, Yang, & Deng, 2010, p. 96). In 2012, 6,685 
people suffered from food poisoning, with 146 of the victims consequently dying 
("China reports more deaths," 2013). The continuous reports of food scandals have 
caught public awareness within the country and also around the world. Restoring public 
trust and consumer confidence around the world towards food ‘Made in China’ has 
emerged as an important issue for the Chinese government. This has become even more 
prominent after the tainted milk scandal in 2008, which caught sweeping international 
attention and doubt about efficacy of food regulation in China ("Has there been a cover-
up," 2008; G. Yang, 2013). 
The incident of tainted milk merits a further elaboration given its importance 
and implications for food regulation in China. Melamine is an industrial chemical that is 
used to make plastics. It was, however, added into watered-down milk to give the 
appearance of higher protein levels in order to pass protein level tests. At least 22 
Chinese dairy companies, including dairy giants Sanlu, Yili and Mengniu, had been 
widely adding melamine to their products for many years, but food safety supervision 
bodies at every level were simply blind to what was going on ("More Chinese officials 
punished," 2009). It was not until 2008 that the scandal came to light. 
The Sanlu Group was the first dairy producer found to have sold products with 
melamine in 2008 ("Five sentences upheld," 2009). It was a state-owned company based 
in Shijiazhuang City of Hebei Province, with a minority New Zealand stake owned by 
Fonterra. Early warning signs of Sanlu milk contaminated with melamine were ignored 
and covered up. As early as December 2007, there had been intermittent reports of 
babies having a rare kidney disease, all causally traced to the Sanlu milk formula. 
Sixteen babies were hospitalised in the first half of 2008. Many parents of sick infants 
had complained to their local inspection administrations but they were told that the milk 
formula met national safety standards ("Food cover-up fatal," 2008). 
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On 2 August 2008, when Fonterra first knew about the problem, it started to 
press for a public recall of tainted products by approaching the Shijiazhuang City 
Government. However, the local authorities did not respond to the request. Six days 
later, the Prime Minister of New Zealand blew the whistle and alerted the Chinese 
Central Government directly to the tainted milk products ("Food cover-up fatal," 2008). 
On 11 September 2008, Sanlu recalled hundreds of tonnes of baby formula ("Tainted-
milk parents warned," 2009). The incident finally caused at least six children to die 
from drinking the tainted products and 300,000 were made ill (Lai, 2009). 
The scandal ended with the bankruptcy of the Sanlu Group, the removal of 
Mayor of Shijiazhuang City from his post, eight high-ranking central government 
officials involved in the melamine milk scandal being sacked or punished by authorities, 
the resignation of the Director of the AQSIQ, the death penalty for three men involved 
in producing and selling the tainted milk power and a life sentence for the Chairwoman 
of Sanlu ("Former chairwoman of Sanlu," 2009). The Shijiazhuang City Government 
was accused of covering up the scandal and failing to take appropriate action ("Hebei 
job lost," 2009). However, none of the punished officials or any tainted milk 
manufacturers except Sanlu were prosecuted or took any legal responsibility ("More 
Chinese officials punished," 2009). 
The milk scandal directly triggered the legislation of the PRC Food Safety Law 
("The PRC Food Safety Law," 2009) to replace the PRC Food Hygiene Law (1995). 
The new PRC Food Safety Law was enacted in February 2009 and took effect from June 
2009. The new law aims to improve coordination among the authorities (central and 
provincial authorities in particular), increase the information-gathering capacity through 
certified laboratories and set up a food recall mechanism based on the European model 
(Pei et al., 2011). Under the new law, another Food Safety Committee was established 
under the State Council. The MoH is responsible for dissemination and accreditation of 
testing laboratories while the AQSIA, SAIC and SFDA continue to look after food 
production, circulation and catering services respectively ("The PRC Food Safety Law," 
2009, Article 4). Similar to the EU, the principle of food producer/operator’s primary 
responsibility is emphasised ("The PRC Food Safety Law," 2009, Article 3), and a food 
recall mechanism is established correspondingly.  
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In summary, the radical reform in food regulatory regime in 2009 – the 
legislation of the PRC Food Safety Law – was directly triggered by the tainted milk 
scandal, which caught extensive domestic and global attention. The Chinese Central 
Government has been under high pressure to restore public trust and consumer 
confidence around the world towards food ‘Made in China’.  
2.3 Summary 
To summarise, food hygiene/safety regulation in China has witnessed several 
transformations in the past three decades since the economic opening-up policies in 
1978. The revolution was largely a shift from a centrally-controlled regime in the 
communist era, to a gradual build-up of a regulatory regime in a market economy. 
Sources of regulation were moved from an embedded state bureaucracy involved in all 
food production activities to external state regulators. Regulatory changes initially 
responded to domestic food incidents, and then increasingly to scandals of global 
concern, international engagement and pressure. These changes range from the 
establishment of the SFDA based on the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, to the set-
up of SAC, a food recall mechanism based on the EU embedded in the PRC Food 
Safety Law and the introduction of the PRC Food Safety Law itself. 
Table 2-1 summarises key features of the five periods. The general pattern of 
reform mainly centred on the institutional design, particularly in the earlier period the 
involvement of additional state regulatory agencies, and in the most recent period the re-
centralisation of the regulatory authority under the State Council. The table also 
indicates that in the first three periods, reforms in economic systems and the process of 
marketisation transformed the role of the state and hence the regulatory regime. 
However, the fourth and fifth period are barely explained by changes in economic 
systems. 
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During the socialist era (1949-1977), all the production means of the country 
were monopolistically state-owned. This placed all food production activities including 
agriculture under the direct control of the planner of the state. Food hygiene/safety 
control was in this sense, embedded in state bureaucracy. In 1978, the economic 
opening-up policies led to a dramatic expansion of the food industry in China. In 
addition to the existing SOEs, there were widespread new entries of the TVEs and 
privately-owned food productions units into a free consumer market. To cope with the 
discrepancies between the market and the regulatory model, the government attempted 
to build up a regulatory regime with a gradual approach. A dual-track system was in 
effect during the market transition period until 1992, with the system on state-owned 
food enterprises separated from the one on the TVEs and privately-owned food 
production units. In 1993, another wave of reforms wiped out the intervening role of the 
state on food market activities. This brought in a consistent regime which equally 
enclosed all actors in the market. Meanwhile, with the legislations of two laws, the PRC 
Product Quality Law and the PRC Food Hygiene Law, a fragmented regime came into 
effect. Despite its failure because of strong bureaucratic resistance, the Chinese Central 
Government attempted to re-centralise its control on the food regulatory system by 
Table 2-1: The transformation of the food regulatory regime in China 
Periods Economic systems Roles of the state in the food industry 
First period: 
1949-1977 
A socialist command 
economy 
Planner of all production activities; 
owner of all production means 
Second period: 
1978-1992 
Transition from a 
command economy to 
a market economy 
Planners of the SOEs; external regulator for privately-
owned units 
Third period: 
1993-2002 
A market economy External regulator 
Fourth period: 
2003-2008 
A market economy External regulator 
Fifth period:  
2009-ongoing 
A market economy External regulator 
Source: author’s compilation, from previous literature 
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setting up the SFDA under the State Council. In 2009, the PRC Food Hygiene Law was 
replaced by the PRC Food Safety Law in response to the melamine milk scandal.  
The scope of this research study covers the period between 2000 and 2010, 
while fieldwork was conducted between 2008 and 2010. In other words, the scope of 
the research coincides with the late stage of the third period, the fourth period, and the 
very early stage of the fifth period discussed above. The aim of this study is to facilitate 
the examination of how internationalisation of regulation impacts on China, and how 
other local factors become less important in the recent development of food safety 
regulation in China. The selected research period is extensive enough to cover China’s 
entry into the WTO in 2001 and the tainted milk scandal in 2008, allowing us to assess 
how the international source of pressure cuts through obstacles in the localities to bring 
about food regulatory changes. 
In summary, based on the identified research issues in regulation in China 
discussed above, it can be seen that regulation in China is increasingly impacted on by 
global influence, although regulatory enforcement in practice has been constrained by 
the lack of capacity and commitment of regulators. In the meantime, the evolution of 
China’s food regulation has also shown that previous regulatory reforms were triggered 
by domestic food scandals. On the basis of these identified research issues and 
observations, the next chapter will propose an analytical framework for the study, which 
encompasses the key perspective of regulation as a product of the internationalisation of 
regulation, and is supplemented by two other perspectives whereby regulation is a 
response to opinions and as an outcome of utility-maximising interest group interaction.  
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Chapter 3 : Theoretical considerations and analytical 
framework 
The purpose of this chapter is to set out the analytical framework of the study. As 
discussed in the previous two chapters, the internationalisation of regulation has had an 
increasing influence over regulation in China and its governance. The existing literature 
has also suggested that regulatory enforcement in practice in China has been impeded 
by the lack of capacity and commitment of regulators (Palmer, 1998; Lo et al., 2000; X. 
Ma & Ortolano, 2000; Christmann & Taylor, 2001; Van Rooij, 2010; Van Rooij & Lo, 
2010; Van Rooij et al., 2013), while domestic food scandals were the trigger for 
regulatory reform along the historical evolution of food regulation in China (Tam & 
Yang, 2005; D. Yang, 2009; Liu, 2010b). On the basis of these considerations and 
building upon Hood et al.’s (2001) established framework consisting of three essential 
elements of any regulatory regime, this chapter constructs an analytical approach for 
researching practices and variations in food regulatory regimes in China. This thesis, as 
noted, is about regulation as a product of the internationalisation of regulation. This 
approach is illustrated further below. It is further contrasted with two other dominant 
accounts in the literature – regulation as a response to opinions and regulation as an 
outcome of interest interaction. Chapter 5 in particular will highlight the different 
contributions of these analytical approaches. Chapters 6-8 will explore the 
internationalisation of regulation in more detail, using Hood et al.’s (2001) framework. 
What has to be clarified here is that the aim of the study is neither to test different 
competing theories nor to prove the validity of a theory. Instead, it intends to explore 
the development, practices and changes of food safety regulation in China, and find out 
the potential factors and their impacts on policy-making and implementation at local 
levels. 
The chapter is organised into two parts. Section 3.1 will first introduce the 
analytical framework of Hood et al.’s (2001) regime perspective of a control system. 
The literature on internationalisation will then be discussed, followed by two other 
dominant accounts in the literature about opinion-responsive government and interest-
based theories. Expectations for food safety regulatory regimes derived from each 
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perspective are mapped out. In Section 3.2, it will highlight the theoretical and 
empirical contributions of this analytical framework for studying regulation in China 
and developing countries in general.  
3.1 Analytical framework: Theoretical considerations and 
expectations 
This section will set out the analytical framework of the study for analysis, by using 
concepts from Hood et al.’s (2001) work on risk regulatory regimes. According to Hood 
et al. (2001), the idea of risk regulatory regimes denotes the “complex of institutional 
geography, rules, practice, and animating ideas that are associated with the regulation of 
a particular risk or hazard” (2001, p.9). They view risk regulatory regimes as systems – 
sets of interacting and related parts rather than as ‘single-cell’ phenomena. In this sense, 
studying what frontline people do on the ground is of identical value with studying what 
standard-setters and policy-makers decide at the centre of the government (and the 
relationship between them).  
Hood et al.’s (2001) work further distinguishes between the context and content 
of regulatory regimes. While regime context denotes “the background of regulation” 
(2001, p. 28) such as type of risk, public preferences and attitudes and organised 
interests, regime content denotes “regulatory objectives, the way regulatory 
responsibilities are organised, and operating styles of regulators” (2001, p. 28). In 
exploring the regime context, this study will consider three elements which are most 
discussed in the regulation literature:  (i) regulation as a product of internationalisation 
of regulation, (ii) regulation as a response to public opinions, and (iii) regulation as an 
outcome of interest interaction. These elements are built upon Hood et al.’s (2001) 
approach to explaining what shapes policy design, which incorporates a trio of accounts 
of “functional and market failure, populist or opinion-responsive, and corporatist or 
interest-driven answers to the question of what shapes regime content” (Hood et al., 
2001, p. 61). To take forward this well-established approach by Hood et al.’s (2001), 
this study includes the perspective of internationalisation of regulation. These accounts 
of what shapes regulatory policy do not only link to the empirical evidence gathered in 
interviews and observation, but also to the classical explanations and literature on public 
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policy. In other words, the three types of explanation are closely linked to the research 
puzzles, providing an answer to how and why regulatory designs become similar around 
the world, how public opinions act as a shaper of policy choice, and how public/private 
interests determine regulatory enforcement. 
The remaining part of this section will discuss the control theory perspective of 
regimes as combinations of three control components. It will then be followed by the 
accounts of internationalisation, opinion-responsiveness and interest-theories.  
3.1.1 Regimes as combinations of three control components 
To address the research inquiry about regulatory variations, this study applies Hood et 
al.’s (2001) control framework consisting of three essential elements of any regulatory 
regime – standard-setting, information-gathering and behaviour-modification (see 
Section 1.1.3 in Chapter 1). Standard-setting refers to the setting of regulatory goals 
through standards and targets (Hutter, 2006, p.3), with the aim of providing a ‘director’ 
of the preferred state of the system that one wants to achieve. It establishes an 
infrastructure that provides directions on what type of performance requires what type 
of measurement, as well as the underlying motivation at the heart of the ‘target-setting’ 
(Lodge, 2007). Information-gathering is the collation and provision of information 
about the status quo of the controlled policy area and its changes, with the aim of 
finding out whether the regulatory goals are reached. While in general ‘more’ 
information is required to reduce the uncertainty of the regulatory system, information 
‘overload’ may also paralyse any system of control (Lodge, 2007). Behaviour-
modification refers to ways of adjusting behaviours of individuals and organisations to 
ensure that the regulatory standards are reached and the overall regulatory goals are 
attained (Hood et al., 2001). If there are no pressures to adjust behaviours such as non-
compliance, a control system will fail to achieve its objectives.  
The regime perspective is valuable to address the ‘in what way and to what 
extent’ type research question raised in this study. As discussed in Section 1.1.3 in 
Chapter 1, the significance of this regime perspective is that it offers a comprehensive 
angle to look at the details of a regulatory regime, and provides a systematic way to 
analyse and compare different regulatory designs and practices. This cybernetic angle 
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also allows us to narrow down the level of analysis to identify similarities or variations 
within a single regime (i.e. between different components) and across different regimes. 
This can facilitate a structured examination of why a regulatory regime fails – at the 
point of setting gaols and standards, collecting information, or adjusting the behaviours 
of individuals or organisations. China’s food safety regulation and its failure have 
attracted wide attention from scholars and policy-makers, this regime perspective can 
put the discussion forward and improve our understanding of why discrepancies 
between regulatory goals and outcome come about.   
Chapters 6-8 will analyse the three control elements in different regulatory 
regimes in more detail, through the lens of the internationalisation of regulation.  
3.1.2 Regulation as a product of internationalisation of regulation 
In exploring global regulation, one of the key concerns of political scientists is: do 
global factors promote convergence, divergence or stability in regulatory policies, 
outcomes and standards (Koenig-Archibugi, 2010)? To answer this question, it is 
necessary to sort out what these global factors include, and the mechanism they operate 
such as international pressure, policy learning, policy transfer, diffusion and other 
related phenomena on convergence. Global factors, which play an important role in 
accounting for cross-national policy convergence, can be classified in many different 
ways. This section focuses on three related areas – globalisation and economic 
liberalisation of world markets, international harmonisation and transnational 
communication. These issues serve as the main foci of this study, that is, the effects of 
the desire of the Chinese government to safeguard the reputation of products ‘Made in 
China’ in the highly liberalised world markets, the effects of harmonisation of national 
policies through international or supranational law (i.e. compliance with the WTO 
norms), and the effects of transnational communication and information exchange 
within institutionalised networks (Holzinger et al., 2008).  
Globalisation implies connectivity and institutionalisation (Axford, 2013). In a 
broad sense, globalisation is the process of international integration that the world is 
becoming increasingly interconnected as a result of the interchange of goods, ideas, 
worldviews and cultural exchange. Economic globalisation is defined by the 
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International Monetary Fund (IMF) as a historical process and a result of human 
innovation and technological progress: 
It refers to the increasing integration of economies around the world, particularly 
through the movement of goods, services, and capital across borders. The term 
sometimes also refers to the movement of people (labour) and knowledge 
(technology) across international borders (International Monetary Fund, 2008). 
Certainly, globalisation is not just the liberation of markets. It also involves the 
diffusion of thoughts, practices and technologies. Globalisation, thus, has powerful 
economic, political, cultural and social dimensions. For example, Giddens (1990) 
describes globalisation as “the intensification of worldwide social relations which link 
distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring 
many miles away and vice versa” (Giddens, 1990, p. 64). Globalisation also changes the 
way people understand geography and the experience localness. Effects of globalisation 
have attracted the attention of many scholars. For example, Beck (2000) argues that 
there is a boomerang effect in globalisation that risks have become globalised in a ‘risk 
society’:  
A universalisation of hazards accompanies industrial production, independent of 
the place where they are produced: food chains connect practically everyone on 
earth to everyone else. They dip under borders (Beck, 1992, p.39). 
To cope with the increased connectivity of the world, international and 
intergovernmental organisations are established accordingly. Notable examples of these 
institutions include the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), the World 
Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the 
World Health Organisation (WHO). These institutions take the roles of promoting 
foreign investment and international trade, facilitating economic development and 
adjustment, constructing global regulatory frameworks, and providing platforms for 
bargaining and conflict resolutions etc. These global institutions also provide a platform 
to harmonise national policies through mutual agreements between member countries, 
as well as transnational communication and policy transfer. Impacts of international 
organisations on nations will be further discussed below, on the subjects of international 
harmonisation and transnational communication.  
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In addition to the creation of global institutions, the expansion of 
multinational/global corporations and branding is another product of globalisation and 
the liberalisation of world markets. As early as three decades ago, Levitt (1983) 
predicted that under the trend of economic globalisation, national or regional differences 
in tastes and preferences in consumption patterns and business transactions would 
disappear. This would then bring about the homogenisation or standardisation of 
manufacturing, products and services around the world. Global corporations were also 
predicted to undertake reforms to the system of production – shifting from customising 
their products according to national and regional preferences, to offering standardised 
consumer products. 
Related to the expansion of global corporations is the increased importance of 
branding. In a highly globalised market, brand building is essential to the success of a 
company. In recent decades, both companies and governments across the world have 
undertaken corresponding strategies to shape the perceptions of their brand or national 
brand (Kronick, 2002a). Together with the prediction of homogenisation of products, 
the marketing message given by Levitt (1983) was that careful planning, effective 
execution and efficient troubleshooting have to be assured in order for a brand to 
manage across broader in the international marketing arena. A brand is more than a 
simple name. From a consumer-based perspective, a brand represents identification, a 
promise of quality and a confirmation of self-image and image to others (Kapferer, 
2012, pp. 7-8). On the other hand, for companies, brands are intangible assets, an image 
for their internal and external publics and a symbol that holds their core values together 
(Kapferer, 2012, pp. 8-9). Branding can also be in connection to the image and 
influence of a nation. As argued by Potter (2009), ‘nation brand’ is a form of national 
soft power; the support of nation brand has become a strategic exercise of public 
diplomacy in its home country and abroad. Similarly, according to Anholt’s (2007) 
concept of ‘competitive identity’, brands convey the national identity of the country of 
origin; it also involves the politics and economics of competitiveness of a nation. In the 
opposite direction, the national identity or the reputation of a country also influences 
one brand’s image and credibility. In this sense, planning for competitive identity, crisis 
communications and issues management are fundamental qualities for the coalition of 
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the three major forces within a country, comprising the government, business and civil 
society. 
Globalisation has also triggered the idea of global governance, which refers to 
“the attempts to build institutions that order some common aspects of world affairs 
without state control, or, more accurately, without direct and routine control” (Axford, 
2013, p. 137). This is associated with the second strand of internationalisation literature 
on international harmonisation. International harmonisation is a specific outcome of 
international cooperation whereby governments resolve common problems within 
international institutions. It refers to a situation where national governments sacrifice 
some independence and become legally binding to adopt policies that are in line with 
international legal requirements (Holzinger et al., 2008). Causes of cooperation can be 
attributable to transnational interdependencies and externalities. Two types of 
harmonisation effects are distinguished by Holzinger et al. (2008) – accession and 
membership. The former refers to the situation that members ratify a treaty and have to 
comply with the respective requirements. This implies that convergence effects occur 
only once. On the other hand, with harmonisation effects through membership, that 
institution has the competence and authority to produce regulatory output for its 
members, which leads to enduring and steadily renewed harmonisation effects over 
time.  
The mechanism of international harmonisation, however, does not imply that the 
legally binding international provisions will be adopted consistently at the national 
level. For example, there is much room for manoeuvre in international treaties; 
moreover, countries can also apply a ‘selective adaptation’ approach (Potter, 2003, 
2004; Biukovic, 2008), which is a process whereby international norms and practices 
are contextualised to local conditions. Hsueh’s (2011) ‘counterbalancing act’ argument 
echoes with the idea of selective adaptation. He suggests that China only appears to be a 
more liberal state in order to meet commitments made to the WTO. The state has 
selectively imposed a counterbalancing act at the sectoral level in order to tighten its 
control over strategic industries. In contrast, the state has relinquished its control over 
the market of non-strategic industries. 
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Koenig-Archibugi (2010) classifies cooperation as one of the families of 
mechanisms involved in policy transfer in global regulation, referring to the 
commitment of governments to implement certain regulatory policies in the context of 
agreements with other governments and/or international organisations. International 
cooperation often consists of reciprocal commitments to harmonise policies across 
countries, but it can also consist of highly asymmetrical agreement which is dominated 
by one member state (Sherov-Ignatiev & Sutyrin, n.d.). Institutional theory explains 
delegation of regulatory authority to international institutions by collaboration and 
coordination problems (Martin & Simmons, 1998). First, international institutions 
contribute to solving coordination game problems between states by providing an 
environment for bargaining and constructing focal points, reducing state-to-state 
negotiation about the choice of a particular pattern of outcomes. Second, international 
institutions can help states to deal with collaboration problems by building trust and 
binding relationships among states, such as defining obligations, monitoring compliance 
and enforcement. Under these conditions, states are willing to handle common 
regulatory problems by creating and joining international institutions, or by delegating 
regulatory authority to supranational organisations. 
Closely related to the international harmonisation perspective is ‘coercive 
isomorphism’ in DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) institutional model of isomorphism.  
To explain the homogeneity of organisational forms and practices, coercive 
isomorphism suggests that pressures and influence from legal mandates or external 
organisations are sources of powerful force. Organisational change is sometimes simply 
a direct consequence of mandate, legal and technical requirements derived from 
coercive authority. For example, direct coercion can come from international treaties 
which create obligations for states, and the existence of a common legal environment 
also affects organisational behaviour and structure.  
In addition to legally binding requirements derived from coercive authority, 
transnational communication can also bring about cross-national policy convergence. 
This is in relation to the third strand of internationalisation literature on transnational 
communication. Transnational communication refers to a number of mechanisms, 
including policy transfer and policy diffusion by lesson-drawing or policy learning. For 
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example, Levi-Faur et al. (Levi-Faur, 2005, 2006; Jordana, Levi-Faur, & i Marin, 2011; 
Levi-Faur, 2011) analyse the rise of regulatory capitalism from a perspective of policy 
diffusion. In an increasingly interdependent world, the regulatory order that was shaped 
in some advanced capitalist countries and sectors is diffused to the rest of the world. In 
the diffusion process, international networks of experts and ‘knowledge actors’ in 
general play an important role in exporting and importing institutions and knowledge.  
Meseguer and Gilardi (Meseguer, 2005, 2006; Meseguer & Gilardi, 2009) 
suggest that policy diffusion is the process whereby policy choices in one country affect 
policy choices in other countries. Policy diffusion can take two forms, namely ‘policy 
emulation’ and ‘policy learning’. Policy emulation is a ‘blind’ action and is simply 
copying what seems to work with no or little enhanced reflection about the mapping of 
policies and evaluation of outcomes. In contrast, policy learning is learning from the 
experience of others, in particular in assessing the effects of a particular policy in the 
light of the past experience of other countries that adopted this policy. Whilst failed 
experience provides information about what not to do, successful experience offers an 
alternative or inspiration to policy makers. Learning can be rational or bounded 
although both involve a purposeful search for information to resolve a problem 
involving significant costs. Based on Meseguer’s (2006) arguments, learning is rational 
if policy makers have full analytical capacities to scan all available information and 
interpret all of it in the same manner. In contrast, bonded learning entails that policy 
makers only look at the relevant information available and near to hand. In other words, 
policy makers do not put the same weight to all information. However, bounded 
learning and rational learning yield the same results as long as there are significant costs 
to gather new information.  
Similar to policy learning, Rose’s (1991b, 1993) concept of lesson-drawing 
argues that politicians and civil servants facing policy problems would look for 
immediate practical solutions or new ideas across time and space. A lesson is “a 
programme for action based on a programme or programmes undertaken in another city, 
state, or nation, or by the same organisation in its own past” (Rose, 1993, p. 21). The 
process of lesson-drawing starts with an initial stage of searching experiences of 
satisfactory programmes in effect elsewhere, followed by abstracting the cause-and-
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effect model and creating a lesson for action, and ends with a final stage of evaluating 
the prospective consequences of transferring the programme locally. However, whether 
lesson-drawing is technically practical or politically desirable is a contested issue in 
decision making, especially under the situation of unstable and uncertain values and 
knowledge.   
Koenig-Archibugi (2010) further defines three modes of communications and 
information transmission in terms of intensity, regularity and formalisation. At one 
extreme policy diffusion is merely the result of imitating the policies of others and their 
fads and fashions. Officials in national administrations may learn about foreign 
experiences by means of publicly available source and have no or little interaction with 
policy makers of the countries where those experiences originated. At another extreme 
are the more institutionalised communications through formalised transnational 
benchmarking and peer review exercises. At the intermediate level of transnational 
communication in terms of intensity, regularity and formalisation, communication flows 
within epistemic communities, playing an important role in policy diffusion. According 
to Adler and Hass (Adler & Haas, 1992; Haas, 1992), epistemic communities are 
networks of knowledge-based experts who share common normative beliefs in the 
cause-and-effect relationships of complex problems. They support states by identifying 
their interests, framing the issues for collective debate, proposing specific policies, and 
identifying salient points for negotiation (Haas, 1992). Their control over knowledge, 
information and new ideas is an important source of power which determines 
international policy coordination. 
In DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) institutional theory which addresses the 
central question of why all organisations in a field tend to look and act similarly, 
‘mimetic isomorphism’ and ‘normative isomorphism’ are two forms of process which 
are closely linked to transnational communication. First, mimetic isomorphism refers to 
the copying or mimicking behaviours as a consequence of organisational response to 
uncertainty. As argued by DiMaggio and Powell, “uncertainty is a powerful force that 
encourages imitation” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 151), especially when causes of 
problem are ambiguous, solutions are unclear, and the environment is uncertain. Under 
these circumstances, organisations may model themselves on other organisations as a 
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solution because there is little expense. On the other hand, the organisations being 
modelled may be unaware of the copying but merely serve as a convenient source of 
practices that the borrowing organisation may use. Ways of modelling may vary: it can 
be diffused unintentionally and indirectly through employee transfer or turnover, or 
explicitly by other organisations such as consulting firms or industry trade associations. 
The pattern of modelling is interesting. Basically organisations tend to model 
themselves after similar organisations in their field that they perceive to be more 
legitimate or successful. 
Normative isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), in contrast, rests on 
professionalisation and is closely related to what Adler and Hass (Adler & Haas, 1992; 
Haas, 1992) describe as epistemic communities. Sources of professional values can rest 
on formal education such as universities, and also on professional networks such as 
professional training institutes. These organisations serve as an important origin for the 
development of normative rules and professional behaviours. Alongside this setting, the 
filtering of personnel at both the entry level and throughout the career progression also 
serves as a mechanism for encouraging normative isomorphism. This is mainly because 
people from the same educational backgrounds tend to approach problems in similar 
way. For example, Galaskiewicz and Wasserman’s (1989) study suggests that 
organisations mimic peers with whom they are directly tied. This socialisation process 
reinforces conformities to common norms.  
Given the above discussions, the next question is: how would the global factors 
of globalisation and economic liberalisation of world markets, international 
harmonisation, and transnational communication explain China’s food regulatory 
regimes? After China’s entry into the WTO in 2001, the Chinese food market has 
become more integrated into the global economy; meanwhile, Chinese enterprises are 
growing as a strong competitor in world markets. Unavoidably, issues concerning 
China’s food safety are subject to great scrutiny and pressure, at both the domestic and 
international levels. Locally, as the domestic market in China is increasingly open to 
foreign direct investment, Chinese companies are urged to build their brands quickly 
before foreign competition becomes a threat. In particular, domestic customers, who 
have witnessed increased connections to the international market, have a rising demand 
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on quality product. Domestic consumers would expect that the quality of local products 
is comparable to foreign products. Internationally, quality assurance of exported goods 
has become a vital measure for the government and the business sector to enhance the 
competitiveness of Chinese-made products in international trade and improve China’s 
share of global export market. From the perspective of Kapferer (2012) and Potter 
(2009), safeguarding the reputation of products ‘Made in China’ is deemed essential, 
while crisis management is one of the most important strategies to build the Chinese 
brands for long-term viability. Anholt (2007) would further suggest that managing 
China’s national brand is a form of public diplomacy and a matter of international 
relations for the Chinese government, conveying a message to the world that China is a 
committed trade partner and responsible world leader. In the long run, if China’s quality 
standards rise, global markets will witness the emergence of China as an exporter of 
branded products rather than mere commodities (Kronick, 2002b, p. 29). 
Second, from the point of view of DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) coercive 
isomorphism, China, as a member of the WTO, is under coercive force to comply with 
the international food standards, especially for its exported food products. International 
harmonisation is, therefore, expected. However, degrees of internationalisation remain 
uncertain. Based on Biukovic (2008) and Potter’s (2004) idea of ‘selective adaptation’ 
and Hsueh’s (2011) notion of a ‘counterbalancing act’, international standards, norms 
and practices are expected to be contextualised to local conditions, and standard-setting 
and enforcement are expected to be inconsistent, especially for food sectors with 
strategic purposes such as those having important roles in local economy and social 
stability. Finally, in terms of modes of transnational communication and information 
transmission, for Meseguer (2006) and DiMaggio and Powell (1983), ‘policy emulation’ 
or mimicking behaviours are expected when problems of regulatory failure and food 
incidents emerge in an uncertain environment. In Adler and Hass’s (1992) view, 
China’s participation in epistemic communities would increase the degree of policy 
diffusion from other countries and facilitate international policy coordination. 
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3.1.3 Regulation as a response to opinions 
The approach of internationalisation of regulation is further contrasted with two other 
dominant accounts of regulation in the literature. This section will first focus on the 
literature on public opinions and risk events, and their connections with public policy.  
The responsiveness of government policies to public opinions or preferences is a 
central concern of normative democratic theory (Dahl, 1956; Sen, 1970). Dahl (1989) 
suggests that democracy allows citizens to induce the government to do what they want 
and creates a congruence of citizen preferences and public policies. On the other hand, 
under representative democracy and electoral competition, elected politicians are 
expected to formulate policies according to public opinions; otherwise, voters will vote 
for other candidates in the next election (Downs, 1957; Shapiro & Jacobs, 2001; Manza 
& Cook, 2002).  
Empirically, there is a large volume of studies investigating the connection 
between public opinions/preferences and public policy, and providing a variety of 
theoretical perspectives on how public opinions bring about policy changes (Page & 
Shapiro, 1983, 1992; L. R. Jacobs, 1993; Stimson, MacKuen, & Erikson, 1994, 1995; 
Wlezien, 1995; Geer, 1996; Sharp, 1999; M. A. Smith, 1999; Wlezien, 2004). For 
example, Page and Shapiro (1983) discuss effects of public opinion on policy, and find 
considerable congruence between changes in preferences and in policies. They argue 
that opinion changes are causes of policy change, rather than vice versa. This causal 
relationship is particularly clear when opinion changes are large and sustained, and 
issues are salient. Similarly, Wlezien (1995) suggests that the public acts like a 
thermostat – when the actual policy ‘temperature’ is not the same as the preferred one, 
the public sends out a signal to policymakers for policy adjustment. To put forward for 
consideration, scholars have attempted to sort out whether policymakers respond to 
public preferences within particular areas (Geer, 1996), or respond to a general 
preference across various policy areas (Stimson et al., 1994, 1995). For example, 
Wlezien (2004) researches into the extent to which policy behaviour represents opinion, 
arguing that the nature of relationship and representation varies across policy domains. 
According to Wood and Andersson (1998), the link between public attitude and public 
policy depends on many conditions, ranging from the strength of the representative’s 
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ideology, to global and constituent preferences, to the efficiency of the constituency. As 
a result, effects of public opinions on public policy can be large, significant and 
enduring; or small, insignificant and declining.  
Despite these debates, there is a consensus among researchers that measuring 
public opinions is challenging. Gallup (Gallup & Rae, 1940), a pioneer of survey 
sampling techniques and inventor of the Gallup poll, argues that only opinions of well-
organised business and professional groups can be listened without a poll (Page & 
Shapiro, 1983). Therefore, the will of the general public may be obstructed (see Section 
3.1.4 below on private interest theories). Under these circumstances, Gallup suggests 
that it is necessary to conduct polls to determine people’s opinions in an objective 
manner. However, one of the key concerns is that surveys and polls cannot cover the 
full set of policy alternatives but focus on a small subset. Moreover, instead of 
reflecting opinions, surveys and polls may also influence public opinions to a certain 
extent (Manza & Cook, 2002). The lack of a true measure of public opinion remains an 
issue of concern.  
Referring to literature on regulation, a large and growing body of study has 
developed to examine ‘risk perception’ by the public and by experts, and its 
corresponding effects on regulatory strategies (Slovic, 1987; Kasperson et al., 1988; 
Sjöberg, 1999, 2000; Slovic, 2000). Kasperson et al.’s (1988) framework on social 
amplification of risk, for example, maps out different dynamic social processes 
underlying risk perception and regulatory response. Risk events are portrayed through 
various risk signals such as the media, and then interact with a wide range of 
psychological, social, institutional, or cultural processes that intensify or attenuate 
perceptions of risk, and finally ‘ripple’ effects such as demands for regulatory 
constraints are produced. Hill (2001) further argues that the relationship between media 
coverage, public perception and ripples of secondary consequences are complex, 
depending on the interactive effect with other components of the amplification process, 
while Breakwell and Barnett (2003) suggest that several factors such as media coverage 
plus the attention of a local interest group have to take place together to generate the 
‘take-off’ of an issue. 
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The ‘take-off’ of a policy issue, on the other hand, is closely linked to the policy 
agenda-building theory such as Kingdon’s (1995, 2002) idea of a ‘policy window’. It 
argues that to create a possibility for policy initiation or change, three streams, namely, 
problems, political and policy, are coupled and this results in an opening of a policy 
window. The convergence of three streams is a politically feasible moment to 
implement policy change, during which problems are met with policy solutions. 
However, while policy windows can appear predictable or unpredictable, the role of the 
policy entrepreneur is critical, in terms of their capability to exploit windows of 
opportunity and drive through changes in public policies. Howlett (1998) sets forth 
Kingdon’s model by identifying four types of policy window. These include “routine 
political windows, in which institutionalised procedural events dictate predictable 
window openings; discretionary political windows, in which the behaviour of individual 
political actors lead to less predictable window openings; spillover problem windows, in 
which related issues are drawn into an already open window; and random problem 
windows, in which random events or crises open unpredictable windows” (Howlett, 
1998, p. 500).  
The above discussion so far has shown the link between public opinions, risk 
events and public policy changes. For example, when a risk event emerges, public 
opinions or perceptions are formed and further interact with other social actors such as 
the media. A responsive government would then adjust the policy accordingly based on 
public preferences. Then the next key question is: how do these theories or concepts 
predict and explain regulatory variations in this study about food regulatory regimes in 
China? The perspective of regulation as a response to opinions predicts that food 
incidents will raise public attention on the issue of food safety. Public opinions and risk 
perception may then be further magnified by media coverage (Kasperson et al., 1988). 
In Page and Shapiro’s (1983) view, to meet public demands, the Chinese government is 
expected to adjust its regulatory strategies accordingly, such as strengthening 
enforcement measures in specific food sectors affected by food scandals. Following 
Kingdon’s (1995, 2002) model, if food safety crises appear as policy problems and 
couple with policy solutions during a politically feasible moment, this can further open 
a ‘policy window’ for regulatory change or reform.  
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3.1.4 Regulation as an outcome of interest interaction 
Another account of regulation in the literature is the interest-based theories which 
explain the origin of regulation and its development. The interest-based theories are 
mainly classified into two groups: public interest approach and interest group approach. 
Public interest theories, the traditional normative theories of regulation, suggest that 
state regulation is developed under the rationale of ‘market failure’. ‘Market failure’ 
emerges because of monopolies, imperfect competition, externalities or spillovers, 
information asymmetry, continuity and availability of service, public goods and moral 
hazard and so on (Baldwin, Cave, & Lodge, 2011). To protect the public from the 
negative impacts arising from market failure and to achieve certain policy desired 
results that the market would fail to yield, state intervention by disinterested regulators 
and experts is developed as a result. 
A contrasting view of public interest theories is private interest theories or the 
economic theory of regulation (Stigler, 1971; Peltzman, 1976), suggesting that 
regulation is designed and operated primarily for the private benefits of the regulated 
industry, in the form of direct subsidy of money, control over entry by new rivals and 
delay in the rate of growth of new firm. In general, the economic theory of regulation 
assumes that all actors involved in regulation are self-interest maximising. Based on this 
assumption, it argues that regulation is supplied by utility-maximising regulators and 
politicians in response to the demand for regulation by interest groups. While regulators 
wish to be re-elected, interest groups offer political support to regulators in the forms of 
campaign contributions. 
Stigler (1971) advocates the economic theory of regulation by suggesting that 
regulation is ‘captured’ by the leading industry interests that are supposed to be 
disciplined. Interest groups, who are on the demand side, and politicians, who are on the 
supply side, shape regulation in a way that is beneficial to their self-interests. Stigler’s 
argument echoes with Olson’s (1965) collective action problem, which suggests that 
collective action by individuals in the pursuit of a common goal is obstructed because 
large groups will face relatively high costs when attempting to organise collective action. 
This is because individuals in any group will have incentives to ‘free-ride’ on the efforts 
of others (Hardin, 1982). On the other hand, concentrated industries with smaller group 
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sizes bear a lower cost of collaboration and hence, are better organised. If they have 
large stakes in regulation, they will have an incentive to invest resources in lobbying 
with politicians and regulators for favourable regulation. Peltzman (1976) expands on 
Stigler’s approach by incorporating other groups interests such as industry associations 
and consumer groups involved in regulation into the analysis. These groups compete 
with each other to shape regulatory initiatives in a way that maximise their own 
interests. To explain regulatory capture, Bernstein’s (1955) analysis of the life cycle of 
independent regulatory commissions has identified a general pattern of evolution: 
gestation, youth, maturity, and old age, representing a regulatory trajectory of pursuing 
public interests at the beginning to being captured at the end. 
Further elaborations of regulatory capture have been developed by scholars, one 
of them being ‘political capture’, which  is a form of regulatory capture under which 
regulation is designed and promoted to meet the needs of the political elite and to 
preserve its power (Cook et al., 2004, p. 13). From this perspective, regulation and 
regulatory strategies are developed to further the political interests of members of the 
government. For example, governments may have an incentive to overlook regulatory 
infringement, especially if regulatory interventions have an adverse impact on local 
employment and tax revenue. As suggested by Beck (1992), the protection of economic 
growth and employment enjoys unchallenged top priority in some less developed 
nations, and this is the rationale for keeping the loopholes in prescribed regulations 
wide and their enforcement lax. Discrepancies in regulatory enforcement or 
enforcement gaps thus emerge as a result (Lo et al., 2000; X. Ma & Ortolano, 2000; 
Van Rooij, 2010; Van Rooij & Lo, 2010; Van Rooij et al., 2013). Related to the 
argument of political capture is the rational choice model of bureaucracy. One classic 
public choice approach is the budget-maximising model, which suggests that rational 
bureaucrats will always seek to increase their budgets and hence their own power, salary 
and prestige (Niskanen, 1994). In contrast, the bureau-shaping model of bureaucracy 
argues that instead of merely maximising their budgets, rational civil servants also seek 
to shape their bureau in a way which maximise their personal utilities such as job 
satisfaction from their work (Dunleavy, 1991). 
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Given the above discussions, the next question is: what are the predictions of the 
interest-based theories to the study? From the public interest theory perspective, 
regulation tends to focus on food products facing a higher degree of negative impacts 
arising from market failure. In contrast, private interest theories would predict that food 
regulation is designed and operated primarily for the private benefits of the regulated 
food industry (Stigler, 1971; Peltzman, 1976). Following Olson’s (1965) predictions, 
regulatory agencies tend to be captured by concentrated large food industries which are 
easier to get organised and have higher stakes, rather than diffused small household 
food workshops and individual farmers which face higher collaboration costs in 
lobbying with regulators for favourable regulation. Regarding ‘political capture’, self-
maximising political elites, bureaucrats and regulators would shape regulation in a way 
that promote their own needs and power. They are also expected to maximise their 
budget and other resources, and protect their regulatory turf, especially for regulatory 
areas involving profit-making such as fine collection. Meanwhile, in the 
political/administrative system in China, the two indicators of GDP growth and 
employment rate of the governing region are closely linked to the career prospect of 
local party leaders and bureaucracies (Cheng & Li, 2012). It is, therefore, predicted that 
regulatory agencies will consider the regulated industry’s contributions to local 
employment, economic development, tax revenue and social stability during making 
enforcement decisions.  
3.2 Theoretical and empirical contributions 
The discussed concepts and theories in the analytical framework so far have provided a 
comprehensive angle to study regulatory regimes in depth as control systems, 
comprising three main sets of control instruments – standard-setting, information-
gathering and behaviour-modification (Hood et al., 2001). They have also offered 
multiple explanations as to how and when regulatory changes occur, as well as why 
certain regulatory models or measures are selected. Overall, for Kapferer (2012) and 
Potter (2009), building the reputation of China’s national brand overseas is crucial to 
China’s export performance and competitiveness, especially in the food area where the 
world market is highly liberalised under the trend of economic globalisation. From the 
point of view of Anholt (2007), the built-up of Chinese national brands is also a matter 
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of public diplomacy and it is associated with the identity of China. Therefore, there has 
been high international pressure for the Chinese government to respond to food safety 
crises and adjust its regulatory regimes and practices. In terms of international 
harmonisation, for DiMaggio and Powell (1983), food regulatory regimes in China are 
shaped by an isomorphism process that creates convergence in organisation design, 
structure and culture, whether it be coercive, mimicking or normative. On the other 
hand, from the point of view of Gallup (1940), regulatory choice is more likely to be a 
response to public opinions and preferences. Kingdon (1995, 2002) may further argue 
that food safety crisis can create an opportunity for regulatory change or reform. Finally, 
Stigler (1971) and Peltzman (1976) would view food safety regulation in China from 
the angle of serving the interests of food business and politicians/bureaucrats/regulators. 
This analytical framework contributes to the existing theories and empirical 
studies in three ways. First, it bridges global and local factors in a single framework for 
analysis and puts forward the academic debate of how different regulatory outcomes are 
generated by different combination of global and national/local factors. In Hood et al.’s 
(2001) work, for example, its approach does not explicitly consider internationalisation 
of regulation as a factor contributing to regulatory variations. This study intends to fill 
the gap by adding a value-added perspective of internationalisation in a well-established 
framework, and it sheds light on how the state breaks through local political obstacles 
and responds to domestic and international sources of pressure. 
Second, it provides an integrated approach to analyse how different explanations 
in the literature explain different control elements in a regime. By narrowing down the 
level of analysis into different control components in a control system, it portrays a 
comprehensive picture of a regulatory regime and provides a more solid basis for 
assessing different theories in the context of China as a developing country.   
Third, while most previous theories of regulation are developed on the basis of 
affluent Western democracies, this analytical framework extends the applicability of 
existing theories to different political, economic and social context. For example, some 
critical features of Western democracies may not exist in a developing country or in an 
authoritarian political regime. Or even if they exist, they can differ to a considerably 
large extent. These features include freedom of communication and expression in the 
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opinion-responsiveness literature, freedom of association in public and private interest 
theories, active state participation in international communities in the globalisation 
literature, as well as regulatory capacity in the enforcement literature. Under these 
circumstances, a refinement of ‘Western’ theories is necessary in order to make them 
applicable in a context with distinct socio-political environment, economic level and 
culture; moreover, omitted variables in explaining regulation can be explored.  
In summary, the analytical framework of applying Hood et al.’s (2001) regime 
perspective and combining the accounts of internationalisation, opinion-responsiveness 
and interest-based theories can allow us to understand the dynamics of how national 
regulation is shaped under the context of globalisation.  
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Chapter 4 : Research design 
The main purpose of this chapter is to consider the research design of this thesis. To 
answer the research question about how food safety regulation works in China, and in 
what way and to what extent internationalisation influences it, a comparative case study 
analysis is selected as the research method. This chapter will provide an explanation of 
the rationales for the research design and present the landscape of the selected cases. 
These include the six food domains and Guangdong Province, the region where this 
study examines food safety regulatory enforcement at the level of implementation.  
The plan of this chapter is as follows: first, Section 4.1 will begin with a 
discussion as to why a comparative case study is being used as the research method. 
This will then be followed by an introduction to the six selected cases of food domains 
in Section 4.2. Section 4.3 will portray the case study of Guangdong Province, where 
this study examines the situation of regulatory enforcement. Section 4.4 will depict the 
data collection process and discuss the limitations of data gathered, including both data 
availability and quality.  
4.1 The comparative method of case study 
The inquiry of this research ‘in what way and to what extent does internationalisation 
impact on food safety regulation in China?’ is pursued through a comparative case 
study of different food regulatory regimes in China. What needs to be stressed here is 
that the purpose of this research is neither to develop an integrative framework of causal 
inference, nor to find out the causality of phenomenon. Given the constraints of limited 
available data and scholarly works, this study pursues to find out a relatively general 
pattern of factors that can explain regulatory changes in China and its choice of 
regulatory tools. Serving this purpose, the method of comparative case study is suitable 
for the research question of this study, with the following rationales.  
First, a case study is a valid tool with which to examine the complex process of 
public policy changes. As suggested by Yin (2003), as an empirical inquiry the case 
study is a valid research method to investigate a contemporary phenomenon within its 
real-life context. This is particularly useful when the boundaries between phenomenon 
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and context are not clearly evident. In other words, a case study allows us to understand 
a complex issue and the process it evolves. In this study about how international force 
impacts regulation in China, by using a single country approach, detailed contextual 
analysis of food regulatory policy/regime changes, the phenomena and its relationship 
with the wider context can be distinguished and assessed (Yin, 2003).  
Second, on the basis of J. S. Mill’s logic of ‘method of agreement’ and ‘method 
of difference’ (Lijphart, 1971), a non-statistical comparative analysis of a small number 
of cases is helpful to identify underlying causal relations. Despite considerable 
controversy among specialists in comparative politics regarding Mill’s method (Skocpol, 
1979; Nichols, 1986), as Rose (1991a) argues, the main advantage of the comparative 
method is that it allows researchers to produce generalisations and draw conclusions 
about a possible cause of a phenomenon. For example, the logic of comparison is 
helpful in identifying how similarities and dissimilarities in the context shape the 
content of different regulatory regimes. On the other hand, the number of observations 
can also be increased when looking into different food domains within the same 
regulatory regime (King, Keohane, & Verba, 2001). In this way detailed similarities and 
variations across different observations can be identified and examined.  
In this study, process-tracing is also used as a method for researching into 
regulatory policy-making and other regulatory changes. George and Bennett (2005) 
suggest that the method of ‘process-tracing’ is attempted to trace the links between 
possible causes and observed outcomes. Various sources of data are examined to see 
whether the causal process a theory hypothesises or implies in a case is in fact evident 
in the sequence and values of the intervening variables in that case (George & Bennett, 
2005, p. 6). For example, process-tracing can be used to test whether the residual 
differences between two similar cases were causal or spurious in producing a difference 
in these cases’ outcomes. It can be also used in analysing a single ‘deviant’ case study 
to see if any significant theoretical insights are identified. It is also helpful to figure out 
the combination effects of different factors. 
In summary, the features of comparative methods of the case study fit the nature 
of the research question of ‘how’ food regulatory policy evolves, and ‘why’ the path of 
changes and the choice of regulatory tools diverge between different food domains. 
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Comparative case studies have the advantage of increasing the number of observations, 
while holding other factors constant within a single country, including political, 
administrative, economic and legal systems, culture, history, and development level. 
Again, what needs to be stressed here is that the comparative method of case study may 
not offer solid grounds for establishing reliability or generality of findings, but as 
discussed above, these are not the aim and scope of the study. 
4.2 Case study of six food domains 
To address the inquiry of how international force and local force identified in the 
analytical framework bring about variations in regulatory regimes, the case selection 
process aims to ensure that similarities and differences in terms of degree of 
internationalisation, opinions, and private interests are covered across different cases. 
Criteria for case selection include: food domains with different degrees or levels of 
international scrutiny, export volume, export ban imposed by importing countries, 
public opinion, media attention, food incidents, industrial concentration, organised 
groups including industry associations and regulatory agencies. 
According to these criteria, six food domains are selected, namely:   
 Domestic fruits/vegetables 
 Exported fruits/vegetables  
 Domestic meat/dairy products 
 Exported meat/dairy products 
 Domestic manufactured food products 
 Exported manufactured food products 
The selection of the six food domains intends to reflect a variation-oriented 
strategy. The distinguishing features make them suitable for researching how the factors 
of internationalisation of regulation and other local factors shape food regulation in 
China. Table 4-1 is a summary showing the key variations among the six food domains, 
in terms of levels of international pressure, media coverage, organised groups, industrial 
concentration and fragmentation of regulatory authorities. For example, there are cases 
having low levels of industrial concentration and less organised business groups such as 
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domestic vegetables/fruits and domestic meat/dairy products. There are also cases with 
a relatively concentrated industry dominated by a smaller number of firms such as 
exported vegetables/fruits, exported domestic meat/dairy products and exported 
manufactured food products. While details of these variations will be further elaborated 
upon and discussed in the empirical chapter in Chapter 5 on the regime content such as 
the institutional setting of regulatory bodies and the regulatory context under which the 
regimes operate, what needs to be emphasised here is that variations depicted in Table 
4-1 are on a relative basis, that the six food domains are weighted with each other. In 
other words, these are the relative differences.  
 
 
Table 4-1: The six food domains and their features 
Food domains 
Level of 
international 
pressure 
Level of 
public 
opinion/ 
media 
coverage 
Number of 
organised 
groups 
Level of 
industrial 
concentration 
Fragmentation 
of regulatory 
authorities 
1. Domestic 
vegetables/fruits 
Low Low Low Low Low 
2. Exported 
vegetables/fruits 
Medium Medium High High Low 
3. Domestic 
meat/dairy 
products 
High High Low Low Medium 
4. Exported 
meat/dairy 
products 
High Medium High High Low 
5. Domestic 
manufactured 
food products 
Medium High Medium Medium High 
6. Exported 
manufactured 
food products 
High High High High Low 
Source: author’s compilation, from previous literature and interviews conducted by the author 
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Risks associated with these food domains in China will be introduced below. And 
because sources of risk are not significantly different between domestic and exported 
food, the following description will combine domestic and exported food in the same 
sector.  
4.2.1 Domestic and exported fruits/vegetables 
Regarding fruits and vegetables in China, pesticide residue, fertiliser, unapproved 
chemical and environmental contamination are the four main sources of food risk. 
Pesticide is any substance or mixture of substances intended for preventing, 
destroying, repelling or mitigating pests which cause damages to crops and animals 
(The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2012b). In China, the dose of pesticides 
applied ranked very high globally, at an application rate of 10.3 kg per hectare arable 
land in 2005-2009, while it was 3 kg per hectare in the United Kingdom, 2.2 kg per 
hectare in the United States, and 1 kg per hectare in Canada ("Infographic: Pesticide 
planet," 2013). 
Excessive pesticide residues can impose an adverse impact on humans, ranging 
from acute fatal or non-fatal poisoning, to accumulated chronic diseases such as cancer, 
adverse reproductive outcome, and immunological effects (Economy and Environment 
Programme for Southeast Asia, 2001). Some pesticides are more hazardous than others. 
For example, traditional chemical pesticides are less safe than biologically-based 
pesticides. Training on organic farming techniques and integrated pest management 
which rely less on pesticides can be also provided as an alternative to modern farming 
practice (Economy and Environment Programme for Southeast Asia, 2001). In China, 
pesticides are divided into four categories based on the acute level of hazard, having 
Category I as the most toxic and Category IV as the least. However, scientists have 
argued that pesticides under Categories III and IV can also cause chronic diseases that 
are not visually observable; therefore, they urge that equal attention should be paid to 
pesticides in all categories in China (Qiao, Huang, Zhang, & Rozelle, 2012).  
To increase food production and crop yield, fertiliser, an organic or inorganic 
material of natural or synthetic origin, is added to soil to supply plant nutrients (Soil 
Science Society of America, n.d.). World figures estimate that 30-50% of crop yield in 
77 
 
the world is attributable to the application of fertilisers (Stewart, Dibb, Johnston, & 
Smyth, 2005). In China, the figure is remarkably high – its fertiliser’s contribution to 
crop yield has reached 45-50% in the past thirty to forty years (Portch & Jin, 2009). 
Meanwhile, fertiliser consumption in China has witnessed a remarkable increasing trend 
over the past few decades (see Figure 4-1) (Z. Zhu & Jin, 2013, p. 261). Hazardous 
effects of chemical fertilisers on human health can come out in a number of ways. 
However, one of the most long-lasting harms is its effects upon the environment, 
including contamination of soil, surface water and groundwater (see below). The 
chemicals in turn get into the food chain and are finally absorbed by humans. 
Figure 4-1: Fertiliser consumption in China (1985-2010) 
 
Source: author’s compilation, from statistics released by the National Bureau of Statistics and the 
Ministry of Agriculture (Z. Zhu & Jin, 2013, p. 261)  
In China, unapproved chemicals and substances are another key source of risk in 
food, which are added to food intentionally or sometimes accidentally. In the domain of 
fruits and vegetables, for example, bean sprouts in China were discovered to have been 
treated with sodium nitrite, urea, antibiotics and a plant hormone called 6-benzyladenine. 
These substances were added to make bean sprouts grow faster and look ‘shinier’ (Xin, 
2011). Other cases included inferior rice being made to look normal by bleaching, 
polishing and adding mineral oil, a distillate of petroleum ("Five ways to identify," 
2009), and cabbages sprayed with formaldehyde to keep them fresh in transit ("Cabbage 
with formaldehyde," 2012). The toxicity of the unapproved substances can be very high 
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and the potential risk from consumption tends to be severe, including poisoning, 
breathing and digestive problems and cancer.  
Environmental contamination resulting from an accumulation of toxins from 
factories, mining and agriculture is another prevailing source of risk in agricultural food 
in China. Toxic pollutants such as cadmium in phosphate fertiliser and other heavy 
metals including lead and mercury are deposited onto soil or irrigation water, where 
they are in turn absorbed by plants or ingested by animals. As the toxins move up the 
food chain, they become concentrated through the process of ‘biomagnification’ (Gobas 
& Morrison, 2000, p. 195). According to a soil pollution report published by the 
Chinese government in 2013, nearly one-fifth of the nation’s soil is polluted, including 
19.4% of the nation’s crop-growing farmland ("'Toxic' soil pollution," 2014). Worst-hit 
regions are those industrialised areas such as the Yangtze and Pearl River deltas of 
southern China. Potential risks of these pollutants to humans include damage to the 
immune system and various neurological, reproductive, developmental and respiratory 
health problems (The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2012a). For example, in 
2009-2013, tens of thousands of tons of cadmium-tainted rice was sold in southern 
China, although it was only fit for the production of non-food commodities. In 2013, 
44% of rice tested in Guangzhou City was contaminated with cadmium (Xiao, Wang, 
Feng, & Huang, 2013), a carcinogen which is especially harmful to the kidneys, lungs 
and can cause bone disease. 
4.2.2 Domestic and exported meat/dairy products 
As with fruits and vegetables, environmental contamination is one of the main sources 
of risk in meat and dairy products in China. For example, milk and milk products may 
contain heavy metals because livestock are fed with contaminated fodder or water 
during the rearing process. On top of that, zoonosis, veterinary residue and unapproved 
chemical also impose severe adverse effects on human health.  
According to the World Health Organisation (WHO), zoonosis is “any disease 
or infection that is naturally transmissible from vertebrate animals to humans and vice-
versa” (World Health Organisation, 2014). Bacteria, parasites, fungi, viruses and other 
unconventional agents are some typical causative agents. Best known examples include 
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Salmonella, E. coli, bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) and H5N1 bird flu. The 
WHO notifies that over the past decades, health threats at the human-animal-ecosystem 
interface have increased (Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations, 
World Organisation for Animal Health, World Health Organisation, & United Nations 
System Influenza Coordination, 2012). To treat animal diseases and protect animal 
health, a veterinary drug is applied with animals. In China, it is also often applied for 
the purpose of speeding animal growth and increasing feed efficiency. However, the use 
of bulk drugs or unapproved drugs, and an inadequate pre-slaughter withdrawal period 
can leave excessive level of veterinary drug residue in meat and poultry (The U.S. Food 
and Drug Administration, 2005). Meanwhile, veterinary drugs can also lead to soil 
pollution because they are excreted by animals as waste, which is often untreated and 
directly applied as a supplement to fertiliser in China (Sarmah, Meyer, & Boxall, 2006). 
The potential human health effects of residues of veterinary range from allergic 
reactions, to resistance to antimicrobial drugs, to direct toxic effects. 
The use of unapproved chemicals and substances and other food adulteration 
activities in the Chinese meat and dairy industries have raised public concern in the past 
decade. Multiple incidents were reported. For instance, there was a widespread use of 
‘lean meat powder’3 in cattle rearing to inhibit the fat growth of cattle ("Seventy people 
poisoned," 2009). There were also milk adulterated with melamine to make it to appear 
to have a higher protein content ("Sanlu continued its sale," 2009), and cat meat and rat 
meat sold as beef/pork/lamb after it was soaked in borax (i.e. a detergent additive) 
("Lamb skew made," 2013). Adulterated food can bring a wide range of potential 
effects on health such as malnutrition, illnesses and death. For example, ‘lean meat 
powder’ can induce dizziness, heart palpitations and diarrhoea, while melamine 
poisoning can cause some severe health damages to infants, ranging from kidney stones 
and kidney failure to death.  
4.2.3 Domestic and exported manufactured food products 
Compared with the agricultural food products introduced above, risks of manufactured 
food are relatively more complex because food processing typically embraces numerous 
procedures including cleaning, pasteurisation, cooking, sanitising, drying, canning and 
                                                 
3
 This chemical is known as steroid clenbuterol. 
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freezing. In China, risk of manufactured food mainly comes from the use of unapproved 
food additives and the deliberate adulteration of food.  
Food additives and artificial ingredients serve a function in preserving, 
flavouring, blending and colouring food. However, excessive levels of use may impose 
adverse effects on human health, such as allergic reactions. In China, the illegal practice 
of adding unapproved food additives in food production is one of the most well-known 
risks in the manufactured food industry. A considerably broad range of cases have been 
reported in recent years. For instance, melamine was found in infant formula, candies 
and instant coffee (J. Zhang, 2008); Sudan Red dye, a banned chemical, was discovered 
in chilli sauce and oil (C. Zhu & Wang, 2011); sodium bisulfoxylate formaldehyde, a 
bleaching agent, was added to vermicelli, flour and bean curd sheets to make them 
smoother and whiter ("Ten types of food," 2009). Adverse health effects of these illegal 
ingredients and additives can be fatal. In less extreme cases, for example, Sudan Red is 
identified as cancer-causing; sodium bisulfoxylate formaldehyde can cause stomach 
ache, vomiting, breathing difficulties as well as long-term damages to liver, kidney and 
the neurological system. 
Food adulteration in the form of using inappropriate raw materials has emerged 
as a new source of risk in Chinese manufactured food over the past decade. For example, 
there was a re-sale of ‘gutter oil’ as normal cooking oil (H. Wang & Liu, 2012), by 
recycling used oil collected from restaurant garbage, drains, sewers and slaughterhouse 
waste. There was also soybean sauce made from human hairs collected from salons and 
hospitals ("Soy sauce made," 2008), by extracting amino acid (i.e. an essential 
substance in soybean sauce) from hairs by a treatment in a special container.  
4.3 Case study of Guangdong Province 
Given policy-making and policy implementation in China do not work at the same level 
of government, the unit of analysis of the study lies in both central and local levels of 
government. In the Chinese state structure, there are five levels of government: central, 
provincial, prefectural, county and district, and township levels (see Figure 4-2) (J. B. 
Jacobs, 1991, p. 172). Referring to food regulation, while the design of the food 
regulatory system and formulation of food standards are decided by the Chinese Central 
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Government, regulatory enforcement is dedicated to the local governments. Therefore, 
throughout the study, when researching into policy-making and standard-setting (i.e. 
Chapter 6), the unit of analysis is mostly based on the central government level; on the 
other hand, it is lowered to the level of local government when regulatory enforcement 
including information-gathering (i.e. Chapter 7) and behaviour-modification (i.e. 
Chapter 8) are studied.  
Figure 4-2: The Chinese state structure 
 
Source: author’s compilation, in reference to Jacobs’s ‘Elections in China’ (J. B. Jacobs, 1991, p. 172)  
Specifically, Guangdong Province, a municipality and a district is selected as 
case study in this research. In consideration of the issue of anonymity of research 
participants, names of the selected municipality and district will not be disclosed. 
Instead, ‘City A’ and ‘District B’ will be termed to represent the two regions. City A is 
one of the 21 municipalities in Guangdong Province, while District B is one of the 
districts in City A. The hierarchical affiliation relationship between Centre, Guangdong 
Province, City A and District B is shown in the shaded area in Figure 4-2.  
Guangdong Province presents an ideal case for learning about the dynamics of 
internationalisation of regulation in China, and examining how other local factors have 
become less important in determining regulatory enforcement. The reasons are twofold. 
First, Guangdong is a province neighbouring Hong Kong on the South China Sea coast 
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of China, the special advantage of its access to the ocean and proximity to Hong Kong 
makes Guangdong a suitable case for studying the impact of internationalisation on 
regulation in China, given that the volume of international trade of Guangdong is 
highest among all provinces. Second, Guangdong has topped the total GDP rankings 
among all provincial-level divisions in China. Being the richest province in China, if the 
incapacity of regulators arising from inadequate resources is pervasive in impeding 
regulatory enforcement in Guangdong, it is expected that the influence of this factor is 
more prevailing in other provinces with lower level of GDP. 
The section below will explore Guangdong’s geography, demographics and 
economy, and their significance to the food sector and implications for food safety 
regulation are the main focus of interest. Notably in the empirical chapter in Chapter 5, 
details of different regulatory regimes and the context under which these regimes 
operate in Guangdong Province will be further elaborated upon and discussed.  
4.3.1 Geography 
Guangdong is a province in South China on the South China Sea Coast (see Figure 4-3), 
with a land area of 179,800 square kilometres which accounts for 1.87% of the total 
land area in China
4
. Its coastal resources and location favour commercial and trading 
activities. Many agricultural and manufactured food products in China are shipped 
through the ports in Guangdong to foreign countries. Although farmlands in Guangdong 
are scattered because of the extensive mountainous regions, weather conditions enable 
Guangdong to become a main exporter of fruits and vegetables to overseas markets. 
Some strategies were driven by the local governments to seize opportunities to extend 
global trade (The Division of Foreign Affairs and Economy of the Guangdong 
Department of Agriculture, 2005), such as guiding farmers to specialise their production 
in cash crops for exportation. For instance, Maoming City specialises in growing 
banana, cinnamon, lychee and longan; Jieyang City in greengage and green olive; and 
Shaoguan City in bamboo. Species on demand overseas are also introduced, including 
Japanese chestnut pumpkins, Holland cucumbers and Taiwanese cherry tomatoes. Data 
                                                 
4
 Guangdong ranks fifteenth in terms of total land area among 33 provinces, autonomous regions, special 
administrative regions and municipalities in China. 
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about the food export volume of Guangdong will be further illustrated below when 
introducing the economy of the province. 
Figure 4-3: Map of China 
 
Source: Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (Wikipedia, 2011) 
 
4.3.2 Demographics 
In terms of the population profile, Guangdong has been the province with the highest 
population in China since 2007. Its total population hit 104 million in 2010, equivalent 
to 7.8% of the population in China (see Table 4-2) (The Statistics Bureau of Guangdong 
Province, 2011). 
The rural-urban disparity in Guangdong, however, remains severe. In 2011, the 
per capita disposable income of urban residents was RMB 26,897 (approximately USD 
3,927), whereas it was only RMB 9,372 (approximately USD 1,368) for rural residents 
(The Statistics Bureau of Guangdong Province, 2012).  
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Source: author’s compilation, from statistics released in the ‘2011 Guangdong Economic and Social 
Development Statistics Bulletin’ and the ‘2010 Guangdong 6th National Census Statistics Bulletin’ 
(The Statistics Bureau of Guangdong Province, 2011, 2012) 
Of the 104 million total population in Guangdong, 31 million (30%) were 
temporary residents, and 10 million (9%) had their origin of household registration 
outside Guangdong (see Table 4-2). The facets of the temporary resident population 
deserve further exploration given their importance. In China, residents without their 
origin of household registration in the same domicile are regarded as the temporary 
population of a region. These temporary residents are mainly from rural areas going to 
cities for employment. Since the Chinese economic reform in the 1980s, the secondary 
industry in different municipalities of Guangdong has hired a large number of migrant 
workers from rural Guangdong and other provinces. The key characteristic of this 
floating population or circular population is their high mobility – they work in cities to 
make instant cash and normally keep their families in rural areas (Shen, 2002). They are 
precluded from household registration (the hukou system) in Guangdong and are 
recorded as temporary residents instead. Without household registration in the place 
where they are employed, these migrant workers suffer from a relatively low socio-
Table 4-2: Demographic data of Guangdong Province 
 Population (million) Percentage 
Total habitual residents in 2010 104 -- 
Location Urban area 69 66.2% 
Rural area 35 33.8% 
Sex Male 54 52.2% 
Female 50 47.9% 
Age 0-14 18 16.9% 
15-65 80 76.4% 
Over 65 7 6.8% 
Household 
registration 
(the hukou 
system) 
 
Permanent residents (origin of household 
registration in the same domicile) 
73 70% 
Temporary residents (origin of household 
registration different from their domicile) 
31 30% 
Origin of 
household 
registration  
Guangdong 21 21% 
Outside Guangdong 10 9% 
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economic status and lack the entitlement to healthcare and other social care services in 
cities
5
. 
This unusually large temporary population in the whole population structure has 
two main political implications. First, the Guangdong Provincial Government and its 
lower level of government are under high pressure to ensure adequate job supply in 
order to keep their governing societies stable and ‘harmonious’ (hexie), which is a 
discourse that was introduced by President Hu Jintao as a vision for the country’s future 
direction of socioeconomic development (Zheng & Tok, 2007; Chan, 2009). Since the 
floating population mainly comes from rural regions without career opportunities, these 
migrant workers usually stay in cities in Guangdong rather than returning home, even if 
they lose their jobs. High unemployment can also cause social problems such as crime 
and induce public dissatisfaction with government. Second, the performance of local 
employment rate is an indicator linked to the promotion, demotion and rotation of local 
party leaders and bureaucracies (Cheng & Li, 2012). This implies that local 
governments have a personal interest and incentive to ensure adequate job supply and 
keep the unemployment rate low. These considerations become a dilemma when 
enforcing food safety regulation has a strong negative impact on local employment.  
4.3.3 Economy 
Guangdong has the highest GDP among all provincial-level areas in China since 1989. 
According to the 2011 Guangdong Economic and Social Development Statistics 
Bulletin, Guangdong’s GDP reached RMB 5.27 trillion (approximately USD 769 billion) 
in 2011, representing a growth rate of 10.0% (The Statistics Bureau of Guangdong 
Province, 2012). This thereby contributed 11.1% to the total national economic output. 
In terms of GDP per capita, it was RMB 47,000 (approximately USD 6,862) in 2010, 
entailing an annual growth rate of 14.2%. 
The economic boom of Guangdong Province was largely attributed to its export-
oriented strategy of economic development. In fact, Guangdong was the first province 
in China to open up its economy to foreign investments since 1978. The reform and 
                                                 
5
 In China, social welfare is linked up with the household registration system. Temporary residents can 
only enjoy social welfare in the original place they registered their household. Moreover, changing one’s 
household from rural to city is, in general, very difficult. 
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opening-up policy mainly consisted of the following content: opening-up trade to the 
outside world; implementing a household responsibility system in agriculture rather 
than farming for the collective; allowing farmers to sell their surplus in the market; 
establishing the market-oriented Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs) running 
under the leaderships of township governments. These reform measures have 
consequentially shaped a direction towards a reliance on the manufacturing and service 
sectors to maintain economic growth. In 2011, proportions of agriculture, industry and 
services were 5.0%, 49.8% and 45.2% respectively in Guangdong’s economic structure 
(see Figure 4-4) (The Statistics Bureau of Guangdong Province, 2012). This indicates 
that agriculture is not a key sector of the Guangdong economy. 
Figure 4-4: GDP ratio of Guangdong Province 
 
Source: author’s compilation, from statistics released in the ‘2011 Guangdong Economic and Social 
Development Statistics Bulletin’ (The Statistics Bureau of Guangdong Province, 2012) 
As the first province to open-up its economy, Guangdong has been China’s 
largest exporter as well as importer of commodities. In 2011, total imports and exports 
of Guangdong were USD 914 billion, of which, total exports were USD 532 billion and 
total imports were USD 382 billion, representing a trade surplus of USD 150 billion 
(see Figure 4-5) (The Statistics Bureau of Guangdong Province, 2012). In 2010, 
Guangdong accounted for 26.3% of the total national imports and 29.6% of the total 
national exports. Hong Kong is the largest export market of Guangdong, while other 
major markets include the U.S., Japan, Germany, Korea and the UK. Given that export 
plays a significant role in Guangdong’s economy, this makes the protection of the 
Agriculture 
5.0% 
Industry 
49.8% 
Services 
45.2% 
GDP ratio of Guangdong in 2011 
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reputation of products ‘Made in China’ particularly important to the Guangdong 
government.  
Figure 4-5: International trade of Guangdong Province 
 
Source: author’s compilation, from statistics released in the ‘2011 Guangdong Economic and Social 
Development Statistics Bulletin’ (The Statistics Bureau of Guangdong Province, 2012) 
Regarding food trade, Table 4-3 shows the growing trend of the export value of 
Guangdong’s agricultural products. In 2000, the export value was USD 1.71 billion; but 
in 2012, it reached USD 7.51 billion, indicating at least a fourfold increase. 
Guangdong’s agricultural export has a high share in the nation. In 2012, Guangdong 
accounted for 11.9% of the total national agricultural food exports. Similarly, there has 
been an upward trend for Guangdong manufactured food exports (see Table 4-4), 
although the trend of growth is slower than agricultural products. In 2004, the export 
value of manufactured food was USD 1.74 billion; in 2012, the figure reached USD 
4.00 billion. Guangdong accounted for 9.7% of the total national manufactured food 
exports in 2012. While Asia is Guangdong’s main export market, there is a growing 
expansion in North America (The Division of Foreign Affairs and Economy of the 
Guangdong Department of Agriculture, 2005, p. 20). Again, since food export of 
Guangdong Province accounted for a significantly high amount of the total national 
share, there is pressure for the Guangdong government to safeguard the reputation of 
food ‘Made in China’.  
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Source: author’s compilation, from statistics released in the ‘Guangdong Statistics Yearbooks’ and the ‘Agricultural Statistical Yearbooks of Guangdong’ (Editorial 
Board of Rural Statistical Yearbook of Guangdong, 2000-2012; The Statistics Bureau of Guangdong Province & The Survey Office of National Bureau of Statistics in 
Guangdong, 2000-2012) 
Source: author’s compilation, from statistics released in the ‘Guangdong Statistics Yearbooks’ (The Statistics Bureau of Guangdong Province & The Survey Office of 
National Bureau of Statistics in Guangdong, 2000-2012)
                                                 
6
 The following key manufactured food products are included: canned meat, canned mushroom, sugar, tea, cooking oil, and manufactured products with milk content. 
Table 4-3: Export value of agricultural food products of Guangdong  
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Export Value 
(Billion USD) 
1.71 1.81 1.93 1.94 2.28 2.40 3.85 4.14 4.63 4.86 5.67 6.97 7.51 
Percentage 
share in the 
country 
11.5% 11.3% 10.7% 9.1% 9.9% 8.9% 12.4% 11.3% 11.5% 12.4% 11.6% 11.5% 11.9% 
Table 4-4: Export value of manufactured food products of Guangdong6 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Export Value (Billion 
USD) 
1.74 1.92 2.29 2.50 2.78 2.50 2.86 3.67 4.00 
Percentage share in the 
country 
7.6% 7.9% 8.0% 7.2% 9.8% 8.3% 9.2% 9.6% 9.7% 
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On the other hand, Guangdong’s economy has various challenges which may 
impact on its food safety regulation. First, competition between Guangdong Province 
and other regions across China is keen. For example, in some inland provinces such as 
Guangxi and Sichuan and emerging clusters such as the Yangtze River Delta and the 
Bohai-Rim Region, there are comparatively low production costs including labour, land, 
water, electricity and other resources. Therefore, many manufacturing businesses in 
Guangdong are being attracted to relocate their production firms to these areas. Under 
the context of regulatory competition, the Guangdong government may be prompted to 
adjust its regulatory policies or strategies. 
 Second, whereas Guangdong’s previous economy growth largely relied on 
export, the potential adverse effect is that the economy is overwhelmingly vulnerable to 
the fluctuating global market. For example, during the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, the 
growth rate of total exports and imports of Guangdong endured a sharp decline (see 
Figure 4-6). In 2008, there was a 7.8% year-on-year increase in total value of exports 
and imports in Guangdong; however, in 2009, there was a 10.6% year-on-year decrease 
instead. Provided that reputation is a crucial factor in the success of international trade, 
this makes securing the international image of products ‘Made in China’ particularly 
important to the Guangdong government. 
Figure 4-6: Growth rate of total exports and imports of Guangdong Province 
 
Source: author’s compilation, from statistics released in the ‘2011 Guangdong Economic and Social 
Development Statistics Bulletin’ (The Statistics Bureau of Guangdong Province, 2012) 
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Third, developmental disparities between the Pearl River Delta and the 
remaining parts of Guangdong have brought some socio-economic problems to the 
Guangdong government (see Table 4-5), and they may consequentially influence the 
work of the local government. Similarly to employment, GDP growth is an indicator 
directly linked to the career prospects of local party leaders and bureaucracies (Cheng & 
Li, 2012). Under these circumstances, local leaders and bureaucrats have a strong 
incentive to maintain a high GDP growth in their regions, particularly for areas with a 
low level of development. In the meantime, widening regional disparities in Guangdong 
Province become a threat to the building of a ‘harmonious socialist society’ and social 
stability, the vision of President Hu’s administration (Zheng & Tok, 2007; Chan, 2009). 
The question of how these social disparities and conﬂicts induced by rapid economic 
development can be solved becomes a political issue for party leaders (Chan, 2009). 
These considerations may impede the enforcement of food safety regulation, especially 
if it is in a deep conflict with the growth of local economy.  
Source: author’s compilation, from statistics released in the ‘2011 Guangdong Economic and Social 
Development Statistics Bulletin’ (The Statistics Bureau of Guangdong Province, 2012) 
4.4 Data collection 
To answer the queries of this research project, fieldwork was conducted between 2008 
and 2010 to collect information and data from primary and secondary sources by a 
range of methods, including observation, interview and archival research (see Table 4-
6). All sources in Chinese used or directly quoted in this thesis were then translated into 
English.  
Table 4-5: GDP distribution across different regions in Guangdong  
Regions in Guangdong GDP (RMB/100m) in 2011 
Pearl River Delta – mainly coastal cities near the south 43,966.18 
East 3,828.88 
West 4,262.07 
Mountainous area 3,897.34 
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Primary sources of data include statues, legal regulations, official statistics, 
yearbooks, reports, archival documents, and information obtained in observation and 
interviews. These official documents mainly come from the central, provincial and local 
governments and their regulatory agencies, including the Ministry of Health, the 
Ministry of Agriculture, the General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection 
and Quarantine, the Ministry of Commerce, the State Administration of Industry and 
Commerce, the State Food and Drug Administration and the Standardisation 
Administration of China. Official statistics are mostly released by the National Bureau 
of Statistics of China. Secondary sources of data used in this study include scholarly 
works on food regulation in China, such as Burns, Peters, Wang, and Li (2010), Li 
(2011), Liu (2010, 2011), Pei et al. (2011), Tam and Yang (2005), Thompson and Ying 
(2007), Yang (2009), Yang (2013) and Zhou (2007). To have a broader picture on 
regulatory development in China, studies on other regulatory areas especially 
environmental regulation are also reviewed, including Christmann and Taylor (2001), 
Lo, Yip, Kwong, and Cheung (2000), Ma and Ortolano (2000), Palmer (1998), Van 
Table 4-6: Observation, interview and archival research of this study 
Observation 
Observed bodies Duration 
 A government regulatory body in Guangdong (with two branches) Two months 
(i.e. one month 
for each branch) 
 A food business with around forty workers in Guangdong Two weeks 
 A food business with two workers in Guangdong One week 
Semi-structured and unstructured interviews 
Interviewees Number 
 Officials/regulators/inspectors at the central and local government 
levels 
13 
 Experts and scientists 5 
 Food businesses: 
o Farmers 
o Food manufacturers 
o Food wholesalers and retailers 
13 
 Journalist 1 
Archival research Duration 
Archive repository of a regulatory body in Guangdong One week 
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Rooij (2010), Van Rooij, Fryxell, Lo, and Wang (2013) and Van Rooij and Lo (2010). 
In addition, reports issued by scientific research institutes or laboratories, news articles 
and commentaries from the press and other form of new media are studied in order to 
discover new information.  
Two stages of fieldwork were conducted in China between 2008 and 2010, 
having 2008 to 2009 as the first stage, and 2009 to 2010 as the second stage. The 
process of fieldwork merits further illustrations given that at both stages approaching 
interviewees and obtaining information from them was challenging. At the initial stage, 
the researcher was affiliated with a university in China as a visiting associate. When 
approaching targeted interviewees, official letters issued by the university were attached, 
explaining the aim and nature of the research study, confidentiality of information and 
anonymity of respondents. Being affiliated with a university in China was helpful in the 
sense that the interviewees had a higher degree of familiarity and trust towards a 
national university rather than a university located in the United Kingdom. However, 
given the political sensitivity of the issue of food safety in China and the nature of non-
transparent Chinese government in general, government officials at different levels were 
not willing to be studied as a subject. As a result, many invitations to interview at the 
initial stage of fieldwork were rejected or ignored, and this was particularly common at 
the central government level in Beijing. In 2008, more than thirty invitation letters and 
emails were sent to the targeted ministries or administrations; however, none of these 
were responded. Meanwhile, all telephone calls made were answered with refusals. The 
researcher also visited the targeted ministries or administrations by person without 
making a prior appointment. However, the researcher was refused access to the 
buildings. 
In the face of great challenges in approaching government officials, the 
researcher changed her strategies to orientate her fieldwork towards the provincial 
government level and below. The researcher successfully reached a number of 
government regulatory bodies at the Guangdong provincial level in early 2009. 
Meanwhile, at the end of every interview, the researcher invited the interviewee to 
recommend relevant parties for conducting further interviews. If feasible, the contact 
details of the recommended parties were obtained. For example, the researcher 
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requested the interviewed officials to contact the regulatory bodies under their 
supervision or guidance. In this way a wide range of officials and inspectorates in City 
A and District B was in touch. On one occasion an official of a provincial department 
assisted the researcher to successfully approach a ministry at the central government 
level; an interview was finally conducted with this ministry. Relatively speaking, 
approaching the regulated businesses was less complicated. Throughout the two phases 
of fieldwork, a total of thirty-two interviews were conducted between 2008 and 2010 
with officials, regulators and inspectors at the central and local government levels, 
experts and scientists, representatives of food businesses such as farmers, owners, 
managers and workers of food businesses including food manufacturers, wholesalers 
and retailers, and journalist. A summary of interviews conducted in the study is 
presented in Appendix A. To ensure confidentiality in research ethics, information 
about interviewees is kept to a minimum. 
Interviews conducted at the first stage of fieldwork were mostly unstructured, 
with the aim of capturing a general picture of regulatory institutions and their main 
responsibilities. Alongside interviews, observation was also used at the first stage as a 
qualitative data collection method with the aim of gaining first-hand observation of the 
practices of people in the regulatory bodies and food producers. Through informal 
interviews and conversations, direct observation, and in some cases participation in their 
work over a period of time, more detailed and accurate information was obtained from 
the individuals under study. Three institutions were observed in mid-2009, one being a 
regulatory body while the remaining two were food businesses. A summary of 
observation conducted in the study is presented in Appendix B. Again, information 
about the observed organisations is kept to a minimum in order to ensure confidentiality 
in research ethics. While two months were spent on observing and sometimes 
participating in the work of the regulatory body, one and two weeks were spent with the 
regulated businesses respectively. When staying with the regulatory body, the 
researcher participated in the inspection work; this included taking pictures of the 
hygiene environment of the regulated businesses, checking the temperature of the 
storage facilities, checking the log books completed by the regulatees, and filling in the 
inspection checklists and forms. The researcher also provided clerical support in the 
office, such as typing the reports of rectification and sanctions, based on the decisions 
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made by the inspectorates. When staying with the regulated food businesses, the main 
task of the researcher was to package the finished food products.  
Given the scope of this project and the specific research inquiries about 
regulatory enforcement in the localities, two-month was a long enough period to have a 
sufficient range of experiences, conversations, and relatively unstructured interviews 
with different regulators for analysis. It was also long enough for the researcher to 
spend time interacting with members in the observed organisations and building rapport. 
Similarly, spending two weeks in a medium-sized food factory and one week in a small 
food workshop was long enough given that a shorter period of time was necessary for 
building rapport. 
The focus of observation was based on Hood et al.’s (2001) control theory 
perspective of combining three control elements in a regulatory regime (see Section 
3.1.1 in Chapter 3), and the three broad theories in the literature and their predictions 
(i.e. regulation as a product of internationalisation of regulation, regulation as a 
response to opinions, and regulation as an outcome of interest interaction; see Sections 
3.1.2, 3.1.3 and 3.1.4 in Chapter 3). It centred on the following areas:  
 Measures of information-gathering such as inspection and record keeping 
deployed by regulators 
 Measures of behaviour-modification such as warning and penalty 
deployed by regulators 
 Food production activities and compliance with standards 
 Values of regulators and workers in the food industry 
 Interaction between regulators and the regulated entities  
Alongside observation in regulatory bodies and the regulated businesses, 
interviews were sometimes conducted with individuals in the observed bodies, mainly 
based on what had been observed by the researcher. For example, the researcher asked 
an inspectorate why a particular enforcement decision was made in this particular case, 
and in some cases why a blind eye was turned to non-compliance behaviours. This 
strategy was useful to consolidate the validity of the evidence gathered. 
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After the first stage of fieldwork, the researcher was able to form a concrete 
basis for further researching different regulatory tools and strategies of different food 
regulatory regimes in Guangdong Province, City A and Township B. At the second 
stage of fieldwork from late 2009 until mid-2010, semi-structured interviews were 
relied on to collect primary data. In many cases repeated interviews were conducted 
with the same respondents as at the first stage. This practice could help investigate the 
enforcement details and sort out the underlying motivations. In one exceptional case the 
same respondent was interviewed for three times. Returning to the same interviewed 
official at the provincial level after observation could help the researcher to enhance her 
understanding of where disparate views between frontline inspectors and policy officials 
existed and the underlying reasons. Similar to observation, questions raised at the 
second stage were based on Hood et al.’s (2001) control theory perspective of 
combining three control elements in a regulatory regime (see Section 3.1.1 in Chapter 3), 
and the three broad theories in the established analytical framework and their 
predictions (i.e. regulation as a product of internationalisation of regulation, regulation 
as a response to opinions, and regulation as an outcome of interest interaction; ; see 
Sections 3.1.2, 3.1.3 and 3.1.4 in Chapter 3). They centred on the following areas:  
 The process and dynamics of food standard formulation  
 Measures of information-gathering and the determinants  
 Measures of behaviour-modification and the determinants  
 Inspection frequency and the determinants  
 Adjustment of enforcement force and the determinants  
 Relationship between regulators and the regulated industries 
 The role of industry associations and their relationship with regulators  
 Interaction between regulators and the media 
 Food incidents and regulatory response 
 Vertical administration vs. dual-head leadership of regulatory bodies  
 Local government’s interference in regulatory enforcement  
 Regulatory resources and regulatory incapacity 
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 Other factors for considerations when making enforcement judgement: 
local employment, GDP growth, tax revenue and other income, and 
harmonious socialist society  
The dynamics between observation and interviews were beneficial to digging 
into the details. At the second stage of interviews, the researcher was able to ask for 
clarifications when contradictory or inconsistent findings were observed in observation. 
This allowed the researcher to consolidate the data gathered by triangulation, and 
discover new findings given that the interviewed inspectorates would not take the 
initiative to disclose any details about the ‘dark side’ of regulation such as the 
enforcement gap and the practice of bribery.  
During the interview process, some interviewees raised doubts about the nature 
of the interview. Some compromises were made accordingly. First, since the 
interviewees were suspicious of being recorded, detailed notes were taken during the 
interviews instead. Similarly, because the interviewees seemed hesitant about filling in 
interview consent forms, oral consent was given instead, indicating that: 
 They can review, comment and ask any questions during the interview 
and have these answered satisfactorily 
 Their participation is voluntary and they are free to withdraw at any time, 
without giving any reason 
 All data gathered are confidential 
 Their provided information may be used in future reports, articles or 
presentations by the researcher 
 Their names and organisations will not appear in any reports, articles or 
presentation 
Other reflections on ethical concerns were considered when making the decision 
of using observation as a method for data collection. To ensure the ethical boundaries 
are never crossed, informed consent was gained by the individuals being observed. In 
the case of observation in the government regulatory body, informed consent was 
gained from the head, while every individual in the regulatory body was informed about 
the role of the researcher and the purpose of the study. Regarding the medium-sized 
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food factory with about forty workers, informed consent was obtained from its owner 
and manager only but not all workers. A serious and careful reflection was made with 
the owner and the manager before reaching this decision, with the main rationale behind 
it being the possibility of influencing the attitudes and practice of workers if they were 
informed. This was of particular importance provided that workers would consider the 
researcher as a person having a close relationship with their seniors so the researcher 
could not be viewed as a complete insider. As for the small food workshop, informed 
consent was obtained from the two shop owners. 
In general, the above interactive approach of conducting interviews, observation 
and repeated interviews should generate enough dimensions and indicators which allow 
the researcher to ensure a reliable evidence gathering. The rich account of qualitative 
evidence also made an important contribution to this research, given that there was little 
information about regulatory enforcement in China in the existing literature. In terms of 
data analysis, information collected in interviews and observation was mainly be used in 
the empirical chapters of the thesis (i.e. Chapters 5-8). Data analysis and coding work 
undertaken in the empirical chapters was based on a ‘two-man rule’. For example, in the 
construction of tables of comparison (i.e. Tables 5-3, 5-4, 5-5, 5-6, 7-1, 8-1, 8-2, 9-1), 
qualitative empirical data was distributed to a researcher not involved in this research 
for manual coding. Two sets of coding were made correspondingly, one by the 
researcher of this study while another by a researcher not involved in this study. In 
several occurrences that discrepancies between the two coded results were found, 
debates were made to reach a consensus on the coding and manual tabulation of data. 
This practice aimed to ensure that the evidence is strong enough to sustain the 
conclusions drawn, and the interpretation of the evidence is valid and reliable. 
Finally, questions about the availability, quality and accuracy of Chinese data 
deserve some illustration. In terms of data availability, despite the Regulations of the 
PRC on Open Government Information enacted in 2008 (The State Council, 2008), 
access to information in China was not straightforward. On the one hand, Chinese 
government agencies in general have been reluctant to provide information on 
government operations and policies (Horsley, 2010); on the other hand, they have 
inadequate resources, skills and knowledge to meet the requirements for archives and 
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records management (Interviewee 30). As a result, official Chinese data is not always 
available. 
Second, to a significantly large extent, released Chinese official data such as 
macroeconomic data have been considered unreliable, with a long-standing criticism 
that official statistics have overstated economic growth and understated inflation (Koch-
Weser, 2013). It is questionable whether China as a developing country and 
authoritarian state has the institutional capacity and political will to publish accurate 
statistics. The reasons are twofold. First, there are serious deficiencies in the way the 
Chinese government gathers, measures, and presents its data. For example, survey 
coverage remains incomplete and a Soviet-style reporting system is still in use for many 
industrial enterprises who report their output directly to the government. Second, the 
problem of manipulation of data is deeply rooted in both the public and private sectors. 
For instance, party leaders and government officials tend to overstate economic output, 
tax revenue, corporate profits and employment in order to show improvements in local 
economic and social performance. Overstating economic results is motivated by the fact 
that local economic performance is closely associated with officials’ promotion, 
demotion and rotation (Cheng & Li, 2012). In the business sector, both private and 
state-owned enterprises also have incentives to misreport income and output in order to 
avoid taxes or appease officials (Koch-Weser, 2013). 
While data availability and quality has been recognised as a key challenge to 
data collection in China, in this study, a careful selection of data source was necessary 
in order to build a solid ground for analysis. Other efforts such as triangulations were 
made in order to strengthen the validity of data. For instance, to ascertain export data, 
national data released by the Chinese government was compared with export data based 
on the FAOSTAT database released by the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the 
United Nations (FAO) (Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations, 2013). 
Nevertheless, these efforts may not be able to remove all doubts, especially when data 
availability is a larger constraint so that a compromise with data reliability may be 
necessary. To show the concern, throughout the thesis, special emphasis will be given if 
there is potential scepticism over the reliability of data. What needs to be emphasised 
here is that this compromise does not affect the findings and discussions of this study, 
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provided that the major arguments are not developed on the basis of particular set of 
data.  
Having set the scene of this research, the next four chapters (Chapters 5-8) will 
now present the empirical findings of the study. In Chapter 9, there will be an overall 
comparison and discussion of how far the internationalisation of regulation impacts on 
China’s food safety regulation. 
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Part Two: Empirical Findings  
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Chapter 5 : Comparing the six food regulatory regimes 
The main purpose of this chapter and the subsequent three chapters is to present the 
empirical findings of the study. In particular, a comparative approach will be used to 
describe the landscape of the six regulatory regimes, namely regimes for domestic 
fruits/vegetables, exported fruits/vegetables, domestic meat/dairy products, exported 
meat/dairy product, domestic manufactured food products, and exported manufactured 
food products. 
While associated risks in the six food domains and some background 
information about Guangdong Province have been introduced in Chapter 4, in this 
chapter, the discussion will centre on the empirical findings of four aspects – one on the 
institutional design of regulatory bodies, and the remaining three on the regulatory 
context derived from the analytical framework. These include international pressure 
with respect to export trade and export bans imposed by foreign countries on particular 
Chinese food products, public opinions and media coverage on different food types, and 
organised interests embedded in the food industry, pressure groups and local politicians 
or regulators. This chapter argues that the four aspects vary widely between the six food 
regulatory regimes (for an overall summary, see Table 4-1), and these variations in turn 
have profound implications for regulation and the three control components (see 
Chapters 6-8).  
The plan of this chapter is as follows: first, Section 5.1 will present the empirical 
findings of the institutional design of the state regulatory bodies in different food 
regulatory regimes, at both the state and local levels. This will then be followed by a 
discussion of the context under which the regulatory regimes operate. These include 
international pressure and export (Section 5.2), public opinions and media coverage 
(Section 5.3), and organised interests inside the ‘regulatory space’ (Section 5.4). The 
chapter concludes by a dimensional comparison which reveals similarities and 
differences among the six food regulatory regimes, and discussing why examining 
variations in the identified aspects can enhance our understanding of how different 
international and local factors shape the Chinese food regulatory regimes. 
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5.1 Institutional design of regulatory bodies 
In China, different food domains are regulated by different groups of regulatory bodies 
(see Table 5-1). While some food domains are regulated by a single regulatory agency, 
some are regulated by multiple regulatory agencies. More complicatedly, these 
regulatory bodies have different administrative structures at the lower level of 
government. At the provincial, city and county levels, there are regulatory bodies which 
have a vertical administration directly supervised by the central government, there are 
also regulatory agencies having the traditional horizontal administration supervised by 
the local governments; and in more extreme cases, there are regulatory agencies 
affiliated with the government but not embedded in the public administration. In turn 
these variations in terms of structural complexity and fragmentation of regulatory 
authority have different implications for food safety regulation in different food 
domains. What needs further clarification here is that the construction of an account of 
the regulatory institutions in China is far from straightforward, in particular for those at 
the local levels. For example, although the legal or government documents designate a 
particular government body as the regulatory agency responsible for enforcement, 
fieldwork findings indicate that at the local levels the tasks could be performed by 
another institution(s). This can be for the reason that the designated regulatory body did 
not have an adequate regulatory capacity to exercise the responsibility, and hence its 
work was taken over by other regulatory agencies. It can be also an outcome of 
bureaucratic reforms or government restructuring at the local levels that were not 
piloted through the Chinese Central Government. For example, at the county/district 
level in Township B, the precise divisions regulating agricultural product safety are 
some ‘professional units’ affiliated with the government but not the government body 
designated in written laws. It was only by conducting fieldwork that the researcher 
could gather exact information about the infrastructure of different regulatory systems.  
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Source: author’s compilation, from laws and regulations of the PRC 
Referring to Table 5-1, at the central government level, fruits and vegetables for 
domestic consumption in China are regulated by the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA). 
Regarding meat and dairy products for domestic consumption, in addition to the MoA, 
the State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC) and the Ministry of Health 
(MoH) are also involved in regulating animal slaughtering. In comparison, 
manufactured food products for domestic consumption have a much more complex 
institutional structure. Having regulatory authority divided into different points along 
Table 5-1: Regulatory bodies for the six food regulatory regimes 
Food regulatory regimes Regulatory bodies at the central level 
Regulatory bodies at the 
Guangdong provincial level 
1. Domestic 
vegetables/fruits 
 Ministry of Agriculture  Guangdong Department of 
Agriculture 
2. Exported 
vegetables/fruits 
 General Administration of Quality 
Supervision, Inspection and 
Quarantine  
 China Entry-Exit Inspection and 
Quarantine Bureaux 
(* Vertically under the central 
government) 
3. Domestic meat/dairy 
products 
 Ministry of Agriculture 
 Ministry of Health 
 State Administration for Industry and 
Commerce 
 Guangdong Department of 
Agriculture 
 Guangdong Department of Health 
 Guangdong Administration for 
Industry and Commerce 
4. Exported meat/dairy 
products 
 General Administration of Quality 
Supervision, Inspection and 
Quarantine 
 China Entry-Exit Inspection and 
Quarantine Bureaux 
(* Vertically under the central 
government) 
5. Domestic 
manufactured food 
products 
 General Administration of Quality 
Supervision, Inspection and 
Quarantine  
 Ministry of Commerce  
 State Administration for Industry and 
Commerce  
 Ministry of Health 
 State Food and Drug Administration 
 Guangdong  Bureau of Quality and 
Technical Supervision 
 Guangdong Department of Foreign 
Trade and Economic Cooperation  
 Guangdong Administration for 
Industry and Commerce 
 Guangdong Department of Health 
 Guangdong Food and Drug 
Administration 
6. Exported 
manufactured food 
products 
 General Administration of Quality 
Supervision, Inspection and 
Quarantine 
 China Entry-Exit Inspection and 
Quarantine Bureaux 
(* Vertically under the central 
government) 
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the food production chain (i.e. production, processing, distribution and preparation), a 
number of governmental bodies are designated authorities in regulating manufactured 
food. To go into more detail, the General Administration of Quality Supervision, 
Inspection and Quarantine (AQSIQ) is delegated to oversee the food manufacturing 
process; the Ministry of Commerce (MoC) to food trading; the State Administration for 
Industry and Commerce (SAIC) to food circulation; the Ministry of Health (MoH) to 
food catering; the State Food and Drug Administration (SFDA) to overall food safety 
regulation. At the other extreme, exported food products have a simple design of 
regulatory structure. Instead of having multiple regulatory bodies, only a single 
organisation, AQSIQ, is delegated to regulate all exported food products, covering both 
agricultural and manufactured food.  
At the provincial level and below, the MoA, MoH, AQSIQ, MoC, SAIC and 
SFDA have their own local authorities taking similar responsibilities. In other words, 
for instance, in regulating domestically consumed food products at Guangdong 
provincial level, a number of regulatory agencies are involved (see Table 5-1), including 
Guangdong Department of Agriculture, Guangdong Department of Health, Guangdong 
Administration for Industry and Commerce, Guangdong Bureau of Quality and 
Technical Supervision, Guangdong Department of Foreign Trade and Economic 
Cooperation, and Guangdong Food and Drug Administration. Similarly, at the City A 
level, correspondingly local authorities are set up, including City A Bureau of 
Agriculture, City A Bureau of Health, City A Administration for Industry and 
Commerce, City A Bureau of Quality and Technical Supervision, City A Bureau of 
Foreign Economic Relations and Trade Bureau. Notably the Food and Drug 
Administration is not established at the city level and below. 
However, the institutional design of these local (i.e. non-central) regulatory 
bodies is getting much more complicated in terms of leadership, attributed to the 
Chinese political/administrative system. As explained in Chapter 4, in the Chinese 
administrative system, the Central Government is responsible for policy-making while 
policy implementation is delegated to their respective local bureaux. Referring to Figure 
4-2 in Chapter 4, in the Chinese state structure, there is a five-level administrative 
network comprising centre, provinces, prefectures, counties and districts, and townships. 
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Referring to Figure 5-1, at the central level, the State Council is the highest executive 
organ of state power and the highest organ of state administration. It is composed of a 
premier (as in the chairman), vice-premiers, state councillors, ministers and chairs of 
ministries and commissions, the auditor-general and the secretary-general (The Central 
People's Government of the PRC, 2012). The State Council is formally responsible to 
the National People’s Congress (NPC) and nominally acts by virtue of NPC’s authority. 
Similar to the central level, governments at the local levels including provinces, cities 
and counties are the executive and administrative organs. The local government is 
responsible to both the Congress on its own level and the organs of state administration 
at the next higher level, and is in turn under the supervision of the State Council (Saich, 
2011). As shown in Figure 5-1, the Chinese provincial governments are responsible to 
the State Council; in the same vein, the city governments are responsible to the 
provincial governments (D. Yang, 2004, p. 28).  
Figure 5-1: The executive branch of the Chinese government 
 
Source: author’s compilation, in reference to Yang’s ‘Remaking the Chinese leviathan: Market transition 
and the politics of governance in China’ (D. Yang, 2004, p. 28) 
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With respect to departments and bureaux of provincial and city governments, 
they experience a dual-head leadership as illustrated in Figure 5-1. For example, while 
the Provincial Department of Agriculture is a constituent part of the Provincial 
Government and is under its direct supervision, the Ministry of Agriculture only has a 
‘guidance’ role towards it. In the same vein, whereas the City Bureau of Agriculture is a 
constituent part of the City Government and is under its direct supervision, the 
Provincial Department of Agriculture has a ‘guidance’ relationship with it only. Forms 
of direct supervision from the Provincial Government and City Government vary, 
ranging from direction of policy-making and policy implementation, to budgeting and 
personnel of the administration. This dual-head leadership structure is not only 
applicable to the Department of Agriculture but also other regulatory agencies such as 
the Provincial Department of Health, the Department of Foreign Trade and Economic 
Cooperation, and the Administration for Industry and Commerce. Notably the setting of 
AQSIQ and its CIQs is an exception, which will be discussed below. 
This dual-head leadership of the central and the local has direct impacts on food 
safety regulation, and they are closely related to discrepancies between central level 
regulatory policy-making and local regulatory enforcement. Given the crucial 
differences between supervisory and ‘guidance’ roles, local protectionism which 
compromises regulatory enforcement is highly possible. While province leaders have 
top priority to push up the province’s GDP which is taken to reflect their own 
performance, central policies may not be thoroughly implemented or enforced if there 
are conflicts with the province leaders’ top priority and local interests. For example, the 
local government may not have strong incentives to combat fake and shoddy products in 
its market given that strict enforcement may negatively affect GDP growth. 
Another special institutional design observed in fieldwork deserving further 
elaboration is several ‘professional units’ (shiye danwei) affiliated with the government. 
At the county/district level, the precise divisions regulating agricultural product safety 
are several ‘professional units’ (Guangdong Department of Agriculture, 2006). To use 
District B as an example, professional units involved in food safety regulation include 
the District B Health Inspection Institute
7
, the District B Pollution-free Food Inspection 
                                                 
7
 In Chinese, Weisheng Jiandusuo. 
 107 
 
Station,
8
 and District B Animal Health Inspection Institute
9
. In terms of organisational 
status, these professional units do not belong to the internal structure of the government 
– they are not included in the establishment of the civil service and are partially 
government funded and partially self-financing (Y. Zhou, 2009). Professional units are 
not-for-profit government-funded organisations or institutions, and their emergence was 
a result of the broad reform trend towards the marketisation of nonessential service 
operations in the late 1990s in China. In the 1998 government restructuring programme, 
streamlining, downsizing and reintegration of the administration were carried out 
against the backdrop of market transition. One of the measures of reducing the size and 
scale of the civil service within a short period of time was to transfer some government 
functions and personnel to government-affiliated professional units (D. Yang, 2004, pp. 
49-53). Such lateral transfers occurred in different aspects of the public sector. Those 
related to food safety regulation included three areas: institutions that carry out 
regulatory and law enforcement (in our case, the District B Pollution-free Food 
Inspection Station, and the District B Animal Health Inspection Institute), institutions 
that provide health care services (in our case, the District B Health Inspection Institute), 
food testing centres and research institutes, and industry associations (for further 
discussion, see Section 5.4.1 below). In District B, only a small number of professional 
units are partly funded by the government, many of them having to generate significant 
revenue to maintain existing levels of personnel and operations (Interviewee 30). 
On the other hand, a marked contrast comes with exported food regulation, 
which has an institutional design of hierarchical control via vertical administration from 
the Chinese Central Government. At the provincial level, China Entry-Exit Inspection 
and Quarantine Bureaux (CIQs) are the regulatory bodies responsible for exported food 
regulation. There are 35 CIQs in China’s 31 provinces (including autonomous regions 
and municipalities), plus several hundred local offices in shipping ports across the 
country (MPR GmbH, 2014). Unlike other regulatory bodies which have a dual-head 
leadership structure as discussed above, all CIQs across the country are under central 
government’s direct leadership and supervision through AQSIQ. In contrast to the 
‘guidance’ relationship between national ministries and provincial departments, the 
                                                 
8
 In Chinese, Wuguanhai Nongchanpin Zhiliang Jiandu Jianyanzhan. 
9
 In Chinese, Dungwu Weishen Jiandusuo. 
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adoption of vertical administration empowers the AQSIQ to be the sole leadership 
directly supervising its CIQ offices in provinces and cities. 
This vertical administration design for exported food regulation brings about 
some impacts. First, given that local governments do not play any roles in supervising 
or guiding CIQs, they cannot exert any form of influence on regulatory enforcement 
performed by CIQs. Local protectionism resulting from the divergence of interests 
between central and local authorities is thus less likely to happen. Second, provided that 
vertical command is fully adopted in every CIQ across the country, regional variations 
in terms of enforcement measures are unlikely to occur.  
In summary, variations in terms of structural complexity and fragmentation of 
regulatory authority among different food domains have different implications for food 
safety regulation in China. For example, blame-shifting between different regulators is 
more prominent in the domestic manufactured food regime than the exported food 
regime. Moreover, these regulatory variations will have a further impact on the three 
control components of standard-setting, information-gathering and behaviour-
modification. For instance, regulatory turf in enforcement is more likely to emerge in a 
fragmented institutional design than with a single agency for regulation. The self-
financing professional units may also desire to collect fines and other fees as revenue to 
sustain its personnel and operations. These will be further discussed in the subsequent 
three chapters.  
5.2 International pressure and export 
The discussion so far has compared the institutional design of regulatory agencies in 
different regimes and suggested the implications of the variations. As derived from 
theories in the analytical framework introduced in Chapter 3, three types of global and 
local force in the regulatory context may also impact on food regulatory regimes in 
China. The aim of this section and the subsequent two sections is to compare the three 
aspects in different regulatory regimes and present the findings. These aspects include 
international pressure and export, public opinions and media attention, and organised 
interests. This section will focus on the first aspect. Here, direct measurement of 
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international pressure is difficult, but looking into the number of export bans imposed 
by importing countries and export values can offer some hints.  
Table 5-2: Major export bans imposed on meat and dairy products from China 
Scope of import 
ban 
Causes Sectors affected Importing 
countries 
Start End 
Poultry meat, rabbit 
meat, farmed fish, 
honey, royal jelly 
and frozen shrimps 
and prawns 
Excessive 
veterinarian 
drug residue 
level 
Meat product 
sector 
 
EU 2002 2004* 
and 2008 
Products 
originating from 
China containing 
any percentage of 
milk 
Milk with 
melamine 
Dairy product 
sector 
 
EU, U.S, 
Bangladesh, 
Brunei, Japan, 
Malaysia, 
Philippines, 
Singapore, 
Taiwan, Africa 
2008 Until now 
(except 
Singapore) 
* Ended in 2004 except the ban on chicken and other poultry products, which was active due to the 
outbreak of bird flu until 2008 
Source: author’s compilation, from newspaper articles "EU lifts ban" (2004), "EU eases Chinese food" 
(2004), "EU ban on Chinese food" (2002), "Singapore lifts ban" (2008), and Marquez  (2008) 
First, different degrees of trade restrictions on Chinese food export are imposed 
by foreign countries such as Japan, the United States, and the European Union for 
health risk reasons (Dong & Jensen, 2007). Specific concerns are associated with 
excessive pesticides and veterinary drug residues, illegal use of chemical substances, 
and contaminated food with heavy metals. Export ban variations in terms of scale and 
duration are found between different food domains. In particular, more export bans have 
been imposed on meat and dairy products than on other foodstuffs (see Table 5-2). 
From 2008 until now, dairy products and all products containing milk content from 
China have encountered strict and extensive export bans around the world following the 
melamine milk scandal occurring in 2008 (see Section 2.2.5 in Chapter 2). Countries 
imposing bans on Chinese food products containing milk content cover most of the 
overseas markets including the EU, the U.S., Japan and other Asian countries. On the 
other hand, meat products including fresh meat, frozen meat and canned meat were 
banned by the EU for export from 2002 to 2008, because of excessive veterinarian drug 
residue levels. Comparatively, fruits/vegetables and other manufactured food products 
without meat or milk content have encountered less food export bans.  
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Second, partly because of the variations in terms of scale and duration of food 
export bans, export value and volume varies widely between different domains. To 
ascertain the export value of each food domain, this section applies export data based on 
the FAOSTAT database released by the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the 
United Nations (FAO) (Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations, 2013) 
if available, it also being supplemented by national data released by the Chinese 
government.  
As shown in Figure 5-2, in general, Chinese agricultural product export has 
witnessed a recurring growth trend in the past two decades (Food and Agriculture 
Organisation of the United Nations, 2013); in particular, the growth trend has 
accelerated since China’s entry into the WTO in 2001. In 1990, the export value was 
USD 10.2 billion; however, in 2010, it reached USD 36.2 billion, indicating at least a 
3.5-fold increase. A similar finding is observed in Guangdong Province. Referring to 
Table 4-3 in Chapter 4, at least a fourfold increase in value of Guangdong’s agricultural 
exports was observed during the period between 2000 and 2012, rising from USD 1.71 
billion in 2000 to USD 7.51 billion in 2012.   
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Figure 5-2: Export value of total agricultural products of China 
 
Source: author’s compilation, from the FAOSTAT database (Food and Agriculture Organisation of the 
United Nations, 2013) 
Notwithstanding the growing trend in agricultural food exports, different 
subsectors of agricultural food have witnessed different degrees of growth, and this is 
inevitably linked to the food export bans discussed above. A comparison of the export 
figures between fruits/vegetables, meat (fresh, frozen and chilled) and dairy products 
illustrates well the variations (see Figure 5-3). First, the export value of fruits and 
vegetables (i.e. USD 15.9 billion in 2010) was much higher than that of meat (i.e. USD 
1.0 billion in 2010) and dairy products (i.e. USD 195.9 million in 2010). Second, while 
there has been a rapid growth in export value for fruits/vegetables over the past ten 
years, export values of meat (fresh, frozen and chilled) and dairy products have 
remained constantly low and very low respectively. After the melamine milk scandal, 
dairy products (including eggs) exported from China witnessed a sharp drop from USD 
446.0 million in 2008 to USD 185.1 million in 2009 (Food and Agriculture 
Organisation of the United Nations, 2013). The 2.5-fold reduction in export value (i.e. 
USD 260.9 million) inevitably hit the milk industry in China severely, including both 
dairy products and manufactured food products with milk content such as milk powder 
(D. Cui, 2012). As of today, the industry has not yet recovered, and there has been 
persistent demand from the industry to rebuild the reputation of Chinese dairy products 
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(China Export and Credit Insurance Corporation, 2012), and the image of food ‘Made in 
China’ in general.  
Figure 5-3: Export value of different subsectors of agricultural food of China 
 
Source: author’s compilation, from the FAOSTAT database (Food and Agriculture Organisation of the 
United Nations, 2013) 
Regarding Guangdong Province, it has also seen a wide range of variations in 
terms of degrees of export growth across different agricultural subsectors. Figure 5-4 
has shown the variations in growth trend between exported fruits and vegetables, meat 
and dairy products. Similar to the national pattern, fruits and vegetables have seen the 
most rapid growth (i.e. from USD 171.9 million in 2000 to USD 683.8 million in 2012), 
while dairy products have remained steadily low (i.e. from USD 36.6 million in 2000 to 
USD 78.1 million in 2012). Notably a slight difference is observed in the meat sector of 
Guangdong Province. Whereas total export value of meat has been stable over time 
between 2000 and 2010 at the national level, Guangdong has seen a rapid growth, rising 
from USD 291.1 million in 2000 to USD 641.9 million in 2012.  
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Figure 5-4: Export value of different subsectors of agricultural food of Guangdong 
Province 
 
Source: author’s compilation, from statistics released in the ‘Guangdong Statistics Yearbooks’ and the 
‘Agricultural Statistical Yearbooks of Guangdong’ (Editorial Board of Rural Statistical Yearbook of 
Guangdong, 2000-2012; The Statistics Bureau of Guangdong Province & The Survey Office of National 
Bureau of Statistics in Guangdong, 2000-2012) 
With respect to manufactured food products, as shown in Table 4-4 in Chapter 4 
and in Figure 5-5, there has been an upward trend for Guangdong manufactured food 
exports
10
. During the period between 2004 and 2012, at least a 2.3-fold increase in value 
of Guangdong’s manufactured food exports was observed, rising from USD 1.74 billion 
in 2004 to USD 4.00 billion in 2012.  
 
 
 
  
                                                 
10
 The following key manufactured food products are included: canned meat, canned mushroom, sugar, 
tea, cooking oil, and manufactured products with milk content. 
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Figure 5-5: Export value of manufactured food products of Guangdong Province 
 
Sources: author’s compilation, from the statistics released in the Guangdong Statistics Yearbooks (The 
Statistics Bureau of Guangdong Province & The Survey Office of the National Bureau of Statistics in 
Guangdong, 2004-2012) 
In summary, different food domains have seen different degrees of international 
pressure. International pressure in terms of export bans imposed is most prominent in 
the dairy product sector, less on meat and the least on fruits/vegetables and 
manufactured food products without milk and meat content. These export bans have 
mainly resulted from food incidents with Chinese exported food. Notwithstanding the 
food export bans and overall scrutiny of Chinese food safety, China has seen an 
expansion in international food trade over the last two decades. In terms of export 
amount and value, there has been an outstanding export growth trend for 
fruits/vegetables; on the other hand, growth rate of meat and dairy products has stayed 
at a very low level. While the findings of Guangdong Province are mostly equivalent to 
this pattern, a slight difference is observed in Guangdong’s meat export which has seen 
a rapid growth in recent years. In general, an expectation of varying degrees of 
international pressure between different food domains is that efforts of (re)building 
reputation of food ‘Made in China’ may differ. For example, adjustments on standards 
and enforcement force may be put into place to avoid non-compliance with international 
food standards, or show the commitment of the Chinese government as a responsible 
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international trading partner. Detailed analysis will be further discussed in the 
subsequent three chapters. 
5.3 Public opinions and media coverage  
As derived from the analytical framework in Chapter 3, local factors including public 
opinions/preferences and private interests shape a regulatory regime in various ways. In 
exploring public opinions and preferences in this section, looking into poll results may 
be helpful for providing a picture of the public view and preferences toward food safety. 
However, as explained in Section 4.5 in Chapter 4, data availability and data reliability 
are the key challenges to data collection in China; for example, results of privately 
commissioned polls on food safety are not made public. There were also no ongoing 
opinion polls on food safety between 2000 and 2010. Under the constraint, media 
coverage will be examined in this section to obtain some hints. A general trend 
observed is that the issue of regulating unsafe, contaminated and fake food has come 
into the public agenda over the past decade and witnessed an upward trend. Meanwhile, 
variations across domains are perceived (see Table 5-3), which are largely attributed to 
the occurrence of fatal or nonfatal food poisoning incidents. In comparison, the public 
has the most prominent concern towards meat/dairy products, and moderate concern 
towards manufactured food products; relatively speaking, the public is least concerned 
about fruits/vegetables.  
Table 5-3: Public opinions and media coverage on different food domains 
Food domains Media coverage 
Fruits/vegetables Low 
Meat/dairy products High 
Manufactured food products Medium 
Source: author’s compilation, from the WiseSearch database 
Media awareness of contaminated food or fake food has increased in recent years. In 
recent years, the Chinese government has loosened its grip on the reporting of food 
contamination issues, and the government’s universal condemnation of deliberate food 
tampering implies its support of the media’s investigative reports. There are national, 
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provincial and municipal/regional print media and broadcasting rendering high profile 
attention on food scandals. For example, in recent years, more articles and news on food 
safety have been published in newspapers. Figures 5-6 and 5-7 reflect the media profile 
analysis of food safety concern in the nation and Guangdong Province respectively, 
having data compiled by the author of this study by using the ‘WiseSearch’ database 
from 2000 to 2010 (Wisers, 2000-2010), with the search keywords as ‘shipin anquan’ 
(food safety) and similar words. The People’s Daily was chosen to represent the 
national press because it is an official press of China. The Southern Metropolis Daily, a 
daily tabloid newspaper published in Guangzhou City, the capital of Guangdong 
Province, was chosen to reflect the press in Guangdong Province because its circulation 
is the highest in the region. From the two figures, it can be seen that there has been a 
growing trend of media salience of food safety concern across the nation and in 
Guangdong Province over the past decade. Comparatively, the growth rate of media 
concern in Guangdong Province is higher than that of the nation. 
Figure 5-6: Media profile analysis of food safety concerns in the People’s Daily 
 
Source: author’s compilation, from the WiseSearch database (Wisers, 2000-2010) 
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Figure 5-7: Media profile analysis of food safety concerns in the Southern 
Metropolis Daily 
 
Source: author’s compilation, from the WiseSearch database (Wisers, 2000-2010) 
Regarding media coverage of different food domains, the three domestic food 
domains rank in the following order in terms of frequency of media coverage (from the 
highest to the lowest): 1. meat/dairy products; 2. manufactured food; 3. 
fruits/vegetables. For example, in 2010, there were 211 pieces of news articles reported 
by the Southern Metropolis Daily which were related to meat/dairy product safety, 
while the numbers were 149 and 110 for manufactured food and fruits/vegetables 
respectively (Wisers, 2000-2010)11.  
In addition to the printed press, other forms of mass media such as television, 
websites and microblogging (weibo) in China are devoted to looking at the issue of food 
safety (G. Yang, 2013). For example, the national broadcaster China Central Television 
(CCTV) broadcasts a weekly television program named Weekly Report on Product 
Quality12, and a yearly programme named CCTV 3.15 TV Show on Product Credibility 
                                                 
11
 Search keywords and similar words inputted in the WiserSearch database:  
For fruits/vegetables: ‘food safety and (fruits or vegetables)’; 
For meat/dairy products: ‘food safety and (milk or milk products or meat or eggs)’; 
For manufactured food: ‘food safety and (manufactured food or canned food or tea or sugar or cooking 
oil)’. 
12
 The programme was first broadcasted in 2003; online access: 
 http://cctv.cntv.cn/lm/meizhouzhiliangbaogao/index.shtml (retrieved on 20 February 2014) 
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(3.15 Wanhui) 13 . These programmes uncover the production process of adulterated 
goods made in China including food commodities. Also, microblogging has emerged as 
a new platform for information sharing in China since 2007 and nowadays has become 
a major source of commentary on a wide range of topics including food safety
14
. 
Despite the trend of increasing media coverage on food incidents, the fact that 
the Chinese media are running under censorship cannot be ignored. In particular, 
criticisms against the government are basically censored although the topic of food 
safety is less sensitive than in the past (Interviewee 27). According to the Word Press 
Freedom Index released by Reporters without Borders, China ranked at 168 out of 175 
countries in 2012; in 2013, it was 173 out of 179 (Reporters Without Boarders, 2013). 
The Chinese state control over the media encompasses a number of government bodies. 
The most powerful monitoring body is the Publicity Department of the Chinese 
Communist Party (formerly named the Propaganda Department)
15
, which coordinates 
with the General Administration of Press and Publication and the State Administration 
of Radio, Film, and Television to ensure content promotes party doctrine. Xinhua News 
Agency, the state news agency subordinated to the State Council, is widely considered 
‘official propaganda’. The consideration of media censorship should be taken into 
account because it is a crucial factor in deterring media attention or altering media 
attitudes towards food scandals. Given the sensitive nature of information, it is difficult 
to determine the factors under consideration when the censorship judgments were made. 
This may be contingent on the victim size, the form of ownership and scale of the 
implicated firms, and the relevance to regulatory failure. However, an interview 
confirmed that criticisms against the Chinese government are principally censored 
(Interviewee 27). 
Notwithstanding media censorship, the increasing trend of media attention on 
the issue of food safety is manifest. Also, the media have the highest level of concern 
towards domestic meat/dairy products, a relatively lower level for manufactured food 
                                                 
13
 The programme was first broadcasted in 1991; online access: 
http://315.cntv.cn/2012/index.shtml (retrieved on 20 February 2014) 
14
 Examples of microblogging include Sina Weibo, Tencent Weibo, Sohu Weibo, NetEase Weibo, and 
Tianya Weibo. 
15
 The Chinese name remains the Propaganda Department of the Chinese Communist Party (zhonggong 
zhongyang xuanchuan bu). 
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products and the least towards fruits/vegetables. This pattern of variation is closely 
related to the history of food incidents. One of the expectations of these variations is 
that regulators may adjust their enforcement activities towards food domains under 
higher levels of public concern, in order to show their commitment and reduce 
criticisms or pressure exerted by the media on their work. In the subsequent three 
chapters, there will be further discussions of how the emergence of food safety crisis 
raises public concern and consequentially brings about adjustments in enforcement 
measures under the context of internationalisation of regulation. 
5.4 Organised interests 
In the analytical framework, the last factor influencing regulatory choices and activities 
refers to interests and their interaction inside the regulatory space. Sources of these 
interests come from the industry and industry associations, pressure groups, and 
politicians/bureaucrats/regulators. Regarding the six food regulatory regimes, they 
operate in different regulatory contexts with varying levels and patterns of interest 
distribution and concentration (see Table 5-4). Again, what needs to be emphasised here 
is that variations depicted in Table 5-4 are on a relative basis that different food 
domains are ranked against each other. One of the general trends observed is that the 
overall exported food has stronger organised interests than domestic food. When 
comparisons are made between food sectors, the domestic manufactured food sector has 
seen stronger interest than domestic fruits/vegetables and meat/dairy products.  
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Source: author’s compilation, from previous literature and interviews conducted by the author 
5.4.1 Business interests and industry associations 
In exploring business interests, it is useful to look into concentration of the industry 
structure and bargaining power of industry associations. In terms of industry structure, it 
is found that the key stakeholder in the domestic fruits/vegetables and meat/dairy 
products industries – farmers – are highly diffused. In China, farmers cover a wide 
range of ownership and organisational forms, namely individual farmers, family farms 
(also known as farming households), cooperative economic organisations, rural 
cooperatives (also known as farmer cooperatives) (Lin, 2013), and agribusiness (also 
known as factory farms). These forms of farms do not only vary in terms of production 
size but also the form of ownership and organisation. For example, family farms are 
owner-managed businesses on a tiny scale; while cooperative economic organisations 
and rural cooperatives have a larger production scope, often led by agribusiness 
enterprises or the local governments. On the other hand, while individual farmers 
produce on their own basis, cooperative economic organisations and farmer 
Table 5-4: Organised interests in different food domains (in Guangdong Province) 
Food Domains 
The industry and 
industry associations 
Pressure 
groups 
Politicians/bureaucrats/regulators 
in the localities 
1. Domestic 
fruits/vegetables 
Diffused interests Weak Strong 
2. Exported 
fruits/vegetables 
Concentrated interests Weak Weak 
3. Domestic meat/dairy 
products 
Diffused interests Weak Strong 
4. Exported meat/dairy 
products 
Concentrated interests Weak Weak 
5. Domestic 
manufactured food 
products 
Medium-to-low level 
of concentration of 
interests 
Weak Strong 
6. Exported 
manufactured food 
products 
Concentrated interests Weak Weak 
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cooperatives are farmers working together by means of a socialised service system (X. 
Chen, 2013). Under different forms of ownership and organisation, mobilisation of 
business interest in different types of farms varies. For example, family farms are 
unorganised rural households scattered in extensive regions. Agribusiness enterprises, 
cooperative economic organisations and rural cooperatives (which often run under the 
leadership of the local governments), on the other hand, are more organised and have a 
closer relationship with the government (Interviewee 14).  
 In China, the structure of agriculture is dominated by family farms (see Figure 
5-8). According to the National Agricultural Census, by the end of 2006, there were 2.1 
million agricultural technicians and 348.74 million people engaging in agriculture 
(National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2008). Among all farms, 200.2 million were 
agricultural production households and 395,000 were agricultural production units
16
, 
meaning that 99.8% of agricultural producers in the whole country were small-sized 
farming households. 
  
                                                 
16
 An agricultural production household or an agricultural production unit refers to a household or a unit 
engaging in agricultural production, forestry, animal husbandry and fishery, as well as the service 
industry relating to farming, forestry, animal husbandry or fishery. At least one of the following criteria 
has to be fulfilled: (i) managing a piece of farming land, gardening land or aquaculture land with an area 
at least 0.1 mu by the end of the year; (ii) managing forest land or grassland with an area at least 1 mu by 
the end of the year; (iii) rearing at least one medium and large-sized livestock such as cow, horse, pig or 
sheep/goat by the end of the year; (iv) rearing at least 20 small animals such as rabbit and poultry; (v) 
selling or consuming self-grown agricultural products of over RMB 500 (approximately USD 73) in 2006; 
(vi) earning an income of over RMB 500 (approximately USD 73) by providing services to agricultural 
production units. 
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Figure 5-8: The structure of the agricultural sector in China 
 
Source: author’s compilation, from statistics released in the ‘Bulletin on Major Data of the Second 
National Agricultural Census’ (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2008) 
A similar finding of farming household’s domination is also found in 
Guangdong Province (see Figure 5-9). In 2006, there were 7.86 million agricultural 
production households and 22,300 agricultural production units in Guangdong, which in 
turn represented up to 14.3 million farmers in total (The Statistics Bureau of Guangdong 
Province, 2008). In other words, 99.7% of agricultural producers in Guangdong 
Province were small-sized farming households.   
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Figure 5-9: The structure of the agricultural sector in Guangdong Province 
 
Source: author’s compilation, from statistics released in the ‘Guangdong Second Agricultural Census 
Statistics Bulletin’ (The Statistics Bureau of Guangdong Province, 2008) 
Comparatively, the composition of industry structure tends to be more diverse in 
the food manufacturing sector in China. In its market structure, there are multinational 
food enterprises, large-scale food factories, as well as small food workshops which are 
owner-managed businesses. Relevant data from Guangdong were not available, only 
national statistics. According to a government White Paper (see Figures 5-10 and 5-11), 
there were 448,000 food processing enterprises in China in 2007 (The State Council 
Information Office, 2007).
 
Among them, 5.8% (26,000) were enterprises of designated 
size and above
17
, which occupied 72% of the total market share in terms of number of 
output. 15.4% (69,000) were enterprises below designated size but with more than ten 
workers, representing a market share of 18.7%. The remaining 78.8% (353,000) were 
small businesses or workshops with fewer than ten workers
18
, which occupied 9.3% of 
the total market share. 
  
                                                 
17
 Defined as all state-owned enterprises and non-state owned enterprises that had annual sales of RMB 5 
million (about USD 730,000) or more (van Ark, Erumban, Chen, & Kumar, 2010, p. 117), the same as the 
following. 
18
 AQSIQ defines food workshops as food production units having the following features:  (i) with few 
workers; (ii) with a fixed site; (iii) with basic production facilities and equipment; (iv) that produce 
traditional low-risk food; (v) without a food production licence (The General Administration of Quality 
Supervision Inspection and Quarantine, 2007). 
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(Guangdong) 
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Figure 5-10: The structure of the food manufacturing sector in China 
 
Source: author’s compilation, from statistics released in the ‘White Paper on Food Quality and Safety’ 
(The State Council Information Office, 2007) 
Figure 5-11: The market share of food manufacturing units in China 
 
Source: author’s compilation, from statistics released in the ‘White Paper on Food Quality and Safety’ 
(The State Council Information Office, 2007) 
In summary, a comparison between Figures 5-8, 5-9, 5-10 and 5-11 reveals that 
the manufactured food industry is featured by a higher portion of large enterprises in the 
market structure. While food manufacturing enterprises of designated size and above 
produced 72% of the total market share, for agriculture there was no evidence indicating 
a similar domination held by the large farms.  
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Another distinctive finding can be seen when the domain of domestic food 
products is further compared with that of exportation. In China, as required by law 
("The PRC Law on Import and Export Commodity Inspection," 2002), only registered 
businesses are allowed to produce food for export, while export registrations are 
approved and administrated by CIQs under specific requirements (see Section 7.4 in 
Chapter 7). For example, only cooperative economic organisations, rural cooperatives 
or agribusiness enterprises can export crops or rear animals ("The PRC Law on Import 
and Export Commodity Inspection," 2002). In 2013, there were about 200 agricultural 
exporters in Guangdong Province (Guangdong Entry-Exit Inspection and Quarantine 
Bureau, 2013). Agricultural food products cultivated by individual farmers and family 
farms, in contrast, are bounded in the Chinese domestic market only, with no regard for 
their qualities. Manufactured food witnesses a similar situation – products from small 
food workshops are not allowed to be exported. In 2013, there were about 900 food 
manufacturing exporters in Guangdong Province (Guangdong Entry-Exit Inspection and 
Quarantine Bureau, 2013). Given the constraints, the exported food industry and hence 
business interest tend to be more concentrated.  
Another way to explore business interests is to look at the nature of industry 
association such as its number and organisational structure or relationship with 
regulatory bodies. In China, the industry association (hangye xiehui) or trade association 
typically serves the purposes of protecting the rights of their members, providing 
information, facilitating communication and cooperation inside the industry and with 
the government, and promoting the industrial growth and expansion (Guangdong Pig 
Rearing Industry Association, 2012). They are usually founded and partially-funded by 
the government as ‘professional units’ (shiye danwei), and their personnel and operation 
are to a certain extent under government’s control. As discussed in Section 5.1, these 
professional units are government-affiliated institutions that emerged as a result of 
marketisation of nonessential service operations in the late 1990s in China in order to 
reduce government payroll size (D. Yang, 2004, pp. 49-53). As shown in Table 5-5, 
across the six food domains, the number of industry associations and their 
organisational structure vary widely.  
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In terms of number of industry associations, manufactured food is comparatively 
less than agricultural food sectors, given that the latter is divided between agricultural 
subsectors. Regarding domestic agriculture, a full range of industry associations are 
created in different agricultural subsectors. At the national level, for example, there are 
the China Association for Plant Nutrition and Fertilisers, the China Green Food 
Association, the China Association for Seed Trade, the China Citrus Society, the China 
Animal Agriculture Association, the Dairy Association of China and the China Feed 
Industry Association. In terms of agricultural export, on top of the above associations, 
the business interest is also represented by the China Agricultural Council for the 
Promotion of International Cooperation, and the China Agricultural Association for 
International Exchange. At the Guangdong provincial level, for example, there are the 
Guangdong Seed Association, the Guangdong Animal Husbandry and Veterinary 
Association, the Guangdong Poultry Association, the Guangdong Animal Feed 
Association, and the Guangdong Dairy Products Association. In contrast, industry 
associations of the food manufacturing industry are comparatively more concentrated. 
At the national level, the China National Food Industry Association is the only business 
group representing the manufactured food sector ("China National Food Industry 
Table 5-5: Industry associations of different food domains 
Food domains 
Number of 
industry 
associations 
at the 
central level 
Affiliated to 
government 
regulators? 
Number of 
industry 
associations at 
the Guangdong 
provincial level 
Affiliated to 
government 
regulators? 
1. Domestic fruits/vegetables Many Yes Many Yes 
2. Exported fruits/vegetables Many Yes Many Yes 
3. Domestic meat/dairy 
products 
Many Yes Many Yes 
4. Exported meat/dairy 
products 
Many Yes Many Yes 
5. Domestic manufactured 
food products 
A few No A few No 
6. Exported manufactured 
food products 
A few No A few No 
Source: author’s compilation, from previous literature, laws and regulations of the PRC and interviews 
conducted by the author 
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Association," n.d.). Its responsibilities include regulating their members and 
participating in national and local food standard-setting. Similarly, the Food Industry 
Association of Guangdong Province at the provincial level and the Food Industry 
Association of City A at the city level are the only representatives in the regions.
 
Regarding organisational structure of industry associations, a distinctive pattern 
is found. As a legal mandate, all industry associations are required to register with the 
local Civil Affairs Department as a social organisation (shetuan zuzhi) (The State 
Council, 1998). However, while industry associations of the agricultural sector are 
affiliated to the government regulatory body for food safety, those for manufactured 
food are not. For instance, the Guangdong Pig Rearing Industry Association was 
established in 1992 as a sub-unit of the Guangdong Department of Agriculture, the 
government body responsible for regulating pork safety (Guangdong Department of 
Agriculture, 2008b). In contrast, industry associations of the food manufacturing 
industry are comparatively more organisationally detached from the regulatory bodies. 
Although these associations are also registered as social organisations with the civil 
affairs authorities and are under the supervision of a particular government body, they 
do not organisationally affiliate to the government regulatory bodies. For example, the 
supervising unit of the Food Industry Association of Guangdong is the Economic and 
Trade Commission of the provincial government (Guangdong Pig Rearing Industry 
Association, 2012). In other words, food regulatory bodies of the manufactured industry 
(i.e. the Guangdong Bureau of Quality and Technical Supervision, the Guangdong 
Department of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, the Guangdong 
Administration for Industry and Commerce, the Guangdong Department of Health and 
the Guangdong Food and Drug Administration) do not have a supervisory role or 
funding role in the industry.  
5.4.2 Pressure groups 
As identified by the private interest theory (Stigler, 1971; Peltzman, 1976), pressure 
groups and all other non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are a key source of 
interest in the regulatory space. However, NGOs in China are rarely found by 
independent individuals. Instead, most of them receive financial and policy supports 
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from the governments at different levels. At the time of writing, the national law of 
China stipulates that every NGO must be supervised by a government body prior to 
registration with the local Civil Affairs Department (The State Council, 1998). This 
statutory requirement ensures all NGOs in China are censored and their movements are 
under tight control. Independent NGOs are reluctant to use the registration system, and 
meanwhile government bodies are suspicious and unfriendly towards NGOs offending 
them or protesting against their interests. Under this condition, the civil society in China 
is inevitably underdeveloped. Some NGOs in China would register as business 
enterprises instead of social organisations although they might be unsuccessful or prone 
to legal offences such as tax fraud. Regarding the food-related area, Greenpeace China 
exemplifies this situation. Greenpeace China, with the head office located in Beijing, is 
concerned about genetically-modified food. At the time of writing, it was registered 
under the business law in China rather than as a social organisation with the Civil 
Affairs Bureau. According to their spokesperson, Greenpeace did not attempt direct 
action protests in China but concentrates on “putting solutions in place” (Greenpeace, 
2011). 
In recent years, some attempts have been made by consumers and victims to 
form pressure groups advocating consumer rights, although their protest and activities 
remain highly restricted. The contaminated milk scandal in 2008 illustrates the case well 
(see Section 2.2.5 in Chapter 2). Zhao Lianhai, a father of an infant victim, who was 
also a former employee of China’s food quality and safety authority (Lee, 2011), started 
a website ‘Home for Kidney Stone Babies’ to exchange information with other parents. 
The website documented cases of victims, provided networking between parents, and 
offered advice on legal action against the milk companies ("Founder of 'home for 
kidney stone babies’," 2009). Campaigns such as online petition were launched by 
parents to fight for restitution and treatment for their children. However, activities of the 
victim group were promptly strictly monitored and they were harassed by the 
government. At first Zhao was threatened by the police and later his family was also 
warned. The website ‘Home for Kidney Stone Babies’ was finally closed down. In 2009, 
Zhao was arrested and accused of organising illegal gatherings (i.e. a candlelight vigil in 
memory of the victims), holding a placard and chanting slogans in a protest, and giving 
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media interviews in a public place (J. Ma, 2010). Finally Zhou was jailed for 30 months 
for ‘inciting social disorder’ ("Zhao Lianhai found guilty," 2010). 
5.4.3 Politicians/bureaucrats/regulators 
As described in the analytical framework, the political interests of members of the 
government are another source of private interest identified in the regulatory space. In 
the Chinese regulatory context, politicians, bureaucrats and regulators in the localities 
are the key players in shaping regulation and regulatory strategies to further their 
interests. Inextricable links are also formed between local party leaders, bureaucrats, 
regulators, business owners and investors in the domestic Chinese politics. 
Table 5-6 shows the distribution of these identified interests across different 
food domains, in terms of interests of officials, party leaders and bureaucrats, and turfs 
between regulators. Given that there are no apparent variations between different 
agricultural subsectors of fruits/vegetables and meat/dairy products, in this section the 
agricultural sector is discussed as an overall category. Relative variations across 
different sectors are found. One of the general observations is that while interests of 
official and party leaders are consistently strong across different domains, the regulatory 
turf is much stronger for domestic manufactured food than exported food products.  
 
First, in terms of interests of politicians/bureaucrats, the party leaders and 
bureaucrats in the localities are keen on maintaining a bright GDP growth and a high 
employment rate in areas under their governance. The main reason behind this is that in 
the Chinese bureaucratic system, economic achievement is directly linked to cadre 
Table 5-6: Local political interests in different food regulatory regimes 
Food regulatory regimes 
Interests of officials/party 
leaders/bureaucrats 
Regulatory turf between 
regulators 
Domestic agricultural food sector Strong Weak 
Exported agricultural food sector  Medium Nil 
Domestic manufactured food sector Strong Strong 
Exported manufactured food sector Medium Nil 
Source: author’s compilation, form previous literature and interviews conducted by the author 
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performance appraisal and hence, their career prospects (Cheng & Li, 2012). Having 
their interests embedded into the locality, party leaders and bureaucrats have strong 
incentives to intervene in regulatory work if it adversely impacts on the local economy. 
One of the examples is that the Bureau of Quality and Technical Supervision is required 
to obtain prior consent from the local government before issuing an order of 
confiscation or termination of licence to a medium and large-sized food manufacturing 
enterprise, especially if its ownership falls into state-owned enterprises or TVEs (see 
Chapter 8). Apart from unemployment and GDP contribution to the local economy, 
considerations are also made on the basis of local tax revenue, bank loans and debts of 
enterprises (Interviewee 11). Given that both farming and food manufacturing activities 
play a crucial role in local livelihoods regardless of what their production scale is or 
whether they are export-oriented, interests of officials and party leaders are high in all 
sectors. However, an important exception rests on the exported food sector: even if local 
party leaders and bureaucrats would like to protect export-oriented enterprises from 
suspension of license or closure, their influence is rather limited since the regulatory 
body, the CIQs, are vertically supervised by the AQSIQ at the central government level 
but not by the local government (see Section 5.1 above).  
Finally, as well as politicians and bureaucrats, regulators also have a vested 
interest in shaping regulatory strategies in a way to maximise their self-interest and 
safeguard their turf. Turf between regulators is more rigorous in sectors which have 
numerous regulatory bodies involved, and this is closely related to the institutional 
design of regulatory bodies discussed above in Section 5.1. Since the regulation of 
domestic manufactured food involves many regulatory bodies, regulatory turf in this 
domain is the most explicit. For example, as discussed in Chapter 2, the establishment 
of the State Food and Drug Administration (SFDA) in 2003 to take over overall food 
and drug regulation encountered strong resistance because other ministries or 
administrations were reluctant to transfer the power to the new SFDA (Burns et al., 
2010). The reason behind this is linked to the Chinese administrative system, in which 
fines collected from the regulated business are one of the sources of revenues for the 
regulatory administrations. Welfare of the regulatory officials, in the meantime, largely 
depends on the budgets of their administrations, including their pay and bonus, housing 
allowance, and catering and travelling benefits (see Chapter 8). To protect their well-
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being or self-interest, regulators and bureaucrats in general have high incentives to 
safeguard their vested interests in terms of regulatory power and budgeting.   
Comparatively, regulatory turf in agricultural food sector is less apparent, given 
that only one governmental agency (i.e. the Ministry of Agriculture or Provincial 
Department of Agriculture) is involved in agricultural food regulation. Nonetheless, the 
Ministry of Agriculture has to achieve potentially conflicting goals. As specified in the 
PRC Law on Agriculture, “agriculture and village economy development” is the key 
mandate of the agricultural authorities ("The PRC Law on Agriculture," 1993, Article 1; 
Ministry of Agriculture, n.d.). Similarly, at the provincial level, the responsibilities of 
the Guangdong Department of Agriculture include: to develop medium-and-long-term 
strategies which stimulate the rural economy and boost the agricultural industry, to 
undertake reforms on rural economics, and to engage in poverty-alleviation measures 
(Guangdong Department of Agriculture, 2008c). The issue of concern is how the 
Department of Agriculture ranks agricultural food regulation against rural economic 
development when conflicts between them arise (see Chapter 8). At the other extreme, 
regulatory turf and conflicting goals are the least apparent in exported food regulation. 
This is mainly because only a single regulatory body (i.e. the AQSIQ and its CIQs) is 
involved in exported food regulation, and it does not bear the responsibility of 
promoting export growth. 
In summary, organised interests in terms of business interests, pressure group 
interests and bureaucratic interests vary widely across the six food domains. While 
pressure group interest is consistently low in all food sectors, in the exported food sector, 
there are relatively concentrated business interests but relatively weak bureaucratic 
interests in the localities. In comparison, business interests of the domestic 
manufactured food sector are relatively less diffused than that of the agricultural food 
sector, although competition and turf between regulatory bodies of the former is more 
rigorous than the latter. One of the expectations of these variations is that business 
interests of the exported food industry overall and the domestic manufactured food 
industry are more easily organised than diffused individual farmers in the domestic 
agricultural industry, and hence are in a better position to negotiate with regulators to 
shape regulation in favour of their interests. Meanwhile, since self-interest of party 
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leaders, bureaucrats and regulators is deeply embedded in the localities, local 
protectionism is a factor shaping measures of enforcement in the domestic food sectors. 
The exported food sector, on the other hand, is less affected by local protectionism 
because the regulatory body is under the vertical administration of the Chinese Central 
Government. Again, in the subsequent three chapters, there will be further discussions 
of how these interests impact on food standard-setting and regulatory enforcement; and 
at the same time, how they are becoming less important under the context of 
internationalisation of regulation.  
5.5 Summary 
Overall, the chapter has compared the institutional design of different regulatory 
regimes, as well as three other aspects derived from the analytical framework 
concerning the regulatory context under which the regimes operate. These include 
international pressure in terms of export bans imposed by importing countries and its 
impact on Chinese food export value, public opinions and media coverage on different 
food types, and organised interests embedded in the industry, pressure groups and 
politicians/bureaucrats/regulators. Examining variations of these factors and their 
profound implications is helpful for addressing the research question of how 
international factors shape food regulatory regimes in China, and relatedly whether local 
factors contribute in the same way as before under the new context of globalisation of 
regulation.  
In terms of institutional complexity of regulatory bodies, regulatory regimes for 
domestic manufactured food products are characterised by a fragmented institutional 
design because regulatory authorities are divided into different points along the food 
production chain. If this institutional feature is considered together with interest-
maximising bureaucrats and regulators, blame-shifting and regulatory turf in the 
domestic food regulation sector can be explained. Meanwhile, a regulatory agency 
having a vertical administration has different regulatory outcomes with one having a 
dual-head leadership. Vertical administration in exported food regulation can make 
local protectionism less likely to happen, which is typically a result of divergent 
interests between central and local authorities. On the other hand, the dual-head 
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leadership of supervisory and ‘guidance’ roles in domestic food regulation offers local 
party leaders and bureaucrats an opportunity to alter enforcement measures in a way 
that maximises their self-interests, such as promoting GDP growth.    
Over the last two decades, China has seen an expansion in its overall 
international food trade. However, whenever a large scale or severe food safety incident 
occurs, a high level of international pressure is exerted on China by export ban. Among 
different food industries, export bans are most extensive in the dairy sector, less in the 
meat sector, and the least in the sectors of fruits/vegetables and manufactured food 
products without milk and meat content. To rebuild the reputation of food ‘Made in 
China’, regulatory reform or adjustments in regulatory strategies need to be made.  
Food safety crises do not only adversely impact on international food trade but 
also consumer confidence. In general, the media has the highest level of concern 
towards domestic meat/dairy products, relatively low levels for manufactured food 
products and the least on fruits/vegetables. To respond to opinions, there is pressure for 
the government to adjust their enforcement activities towards food domains due to 
higher levels of public concern.  
Finally, organised interests in the regulatory space including business interests, 
pressure group interests and bureaucratic interests may shape the regulatory regimes in 
different ways. In terms of business interest distribution, the exported food sector has 
relatively more concentrated interests than the domestic food sector because food 
exportation is limited to a registered list only. Producers of exported food are therefore 
easier to organise and negotiate with regulators to shape regulation in a way which 
maximises their interests. On the other hand, vested interests of party leaders and 
bureaucrats in the locality are relatively stronger in both the domestic agricultural and 
manufactured food sectors. Provided that economic growth, employment rate and tax 
revenue are the key concerns of local officials, it is highly possible that local 
protectionism in the two sectors may compromise regulatory enforcement.  
To put forward the arguments and discuss how the international factors shape 
food safety regulation in China and correspondingly how the local factors become less 
important under the context of internationalisation, the following three chapters will 
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narrow down the analysis to the three control components of a regulatory regime, that is, 
standard-setting, information-gathering and behaviour-modification. A comparative 
approach will be adopted to reveal the differences across different regimes, while the 
discussion will centre on how the effects of internationalisation of regulation explain 
regulatory variations. 
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Chapter 6 : Standard-setting in different food 
regulatory regimes 
The three control components in different food regulatory regimes in China will be 
presented in this and the subsequent two chapters, and standard-setting will be the focus 
here. This chapter aims to address the key inquiry ‘to what extent does 
internationalisation of regulation impact on standard-setting in different regulatory 
regimes?’ by applying different perspectives in the analytical framework introduced in 
Chapter 3. To this end, it will illustrate types of food standards developed for different 
food sectors, procedure and practice of setting food standards and parties involved. This 
chapter argues that standards of the exported food regulatory regime are initially more 
stringent than that of the domestic ones. However, over the last decade, standard-setting 
of the domestic food regulatory regimes has witnessed a gradual change. The direction 
of transformation is towards the convergence of the exported food regulatory regime, in 
terms of the standards adopted and the practice of setting standards. Consequentially, 
domestic food standards have become more stringent in recent years under the influence 
of internationalisation of regulation. 
The chapter is structured as follows: in Section 6.1, it will discuss standards 
regulating exported food products, domestic agricultural food products and domestic 
manufactured food products. In Section 6.2, it will use a comparative approach to 
discuss the procedure of standard development of the above food domains. In this 
section, it shows that business interests have been playing a role in domestic food 
standard-setting; but alongside, in recent years, domestic food standards and their 
setting in China have been increasingly influenced by that of international food 
standards. Finally, Section 6.3 will discuss the impacts of international regulation on 
standard-setting in the Chinese food regulatory regimes and illustrate how other local 
factors are becoming less important under the context of internationalisation.  
6.1  Food standards of different sectors 
According to the concept from Hood et al.’s (2001) work, standard-setting is one of the 
components of a control system in order to “allow a distinction to be made between 
 136 
 
more and less preferred state of the system” (Hood et al., 2001, p. 23). Being a ‘director’ 
of the control process, in a narrow sense standard-setting denotes the setting of 
standards such as specifying an acceptable level of risk in quantitative or qualitative 
terms, with the intention of keeping the state of the system at or below that level of risk. 
Examples include the maximum levels for pesticide residues and technical requirements 
for measuring chemical indices. In a broader sense, standards also include other goals, 
targets and guidelines (Hood et al., 2001, p. 25). Based on this definition, this chapter 
will focus on standards, goals, targets, guidelines and codes of practice when exploring 
standard-setting in different food regulatory regimes in China.  
Food standards of different food sectors will be introduced in this section, 
covering exported food products, domestic agricultural food products and manufactured 
food products. In comparison exported food standards in China are generally more 
stringent than domestic food standards because international food standards are directly 
used in international trade. Despite this general trend, in recent years through standard 
harmonisation and standard revisions initiated by the Chinese government, domestic 
food standards have become more stringent and similar to exported food standards (see 
Section 6.2). 
6.1.1 Standards of exported food products 
As discussed earlier in Section 5.1 in Chapter 5, China’s approach to exported food 
regulation is featured by the institutional design of concentrating regulatory power in 
the General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine (AQSIQ) 
and its directly supervised China Entry-Exist Inspection and Quarantine Bureaux 
(CIQs). Despite this ‘monopoly power’ in exported food regulation, the AQSIQ itself 
does not formulate food standards for exportation; instead, standards of importing 
countries or international standard organisations are directly applied in international 
trade. 
The Codex Alimentarius international food standards and the ISO international 
standards are the two major sources of standards that China uses in its international food 
trade, and these standards usually serve as the basis of bilateral/multilateral trade 
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agreements between China and other importing countries
19
. The following sections will 
introduce the two categories of standards and discuss China’s role in these international 
standard organisations. The process of standard development will be discussed in 
Section 6.2, where a comparison will be made with Chinese domestic food standard 
development.  
The Codex Alimentarius international food standards 
To protect human health and facilitate international trade, the Codex Alimentarius 
international food standards have been developed by three international organisations 
concerned about food safety. These include the Food and Agriculture Organisation of 
the United Nations (FAO)
20
, the World Health Organisation (WHO)
21
, and the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO)
22
. According to the WTO, their member countries are 
encouraged to use the Codex standards, guidelines and recommendations where they 
exist. WTO members who apply stricter food safety measures than those set by the 
Codex may be required to justify their measures scientifically (World Trade 
Organisation, 2010, p. 10). Otherwise, involved members will risk being challenged in a 
WTO dispute. 
                                                 
19
 For example, in the 2007 Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) signed between China and the US (The 
U.S. Food and Drug Safety Administration & The PRC General Administration of Quality Supervision, 
2007), and the 2010 Framework Agreement signed between China and Japan, agreed food trade standards 
are based on the Codex Alimentarius international standards and the ISO international standards. In other 
words, Chinese food exported abroad to the US and Japan has to meet the Codex/ISO standards. 
20
 FAO is an international body which is concerned with agricultural product security and safety. It serves 
as a neutral forum for member states to negotiate agreements and debate policies associated with 
agriculture and fisheries. As a founding member of FAO and a member in the FAO Council, China has 
maintained a close cooperative relationship with other countries in food and agriculture development 
(FAO Representation in China, 2011) 
21
 WHO is the directing and coordinating authority for health in the United Nations system, providing 
leadership on global health matters such as setting norms and standards on food safety and promoting 
implementation. China set up its office as the WHO representative in 1981; in 2004, China and WHO 
further signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to strengthen health cooperation and exchanges, 
with food safety as one of the areas of cooperation (World Health Organisation, 2013, p. 19). 
22
 WTO is a rules-based and member-driven global international organisation officially established on 1 
January 1995, replacing the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) established in 1948. WTO 
provides a forum for reducing obstacles to international trade, by negotiations of agreements governing 
the conduct of trade such as product safety. China became a member of WTO on 11 December 2001, 
although it attempted but failed to become a founding member in 1995. Since 1986, China had begun 
working towards becoming a founding member of the WTO and had gained observer status with GAT. 
However, its admission to the WTO was preceded by a lengthy process of negotiations, mainly because 
the United States, the European states and Japan requested reforms to be made to the Chinese economy, 
including tariff reductions, opening up of the markets and adjustment to industrial policies. One of the 
implications of China’s late accession to WTO is that China is bound by global rules that it did not make, 
although they significantly affect China’s vital interests (Prime, 2002, p. 6). 
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The FAO/WHO Joint Codex Alimentarius Commission (Codex) was jointly 
established by the FAO and the WHO in 1963, aimed at developing harmonised 
international food standards, guidelines and codes of practice to protect the health of 
consumers and ensure fair practices in food trade
23
. Being a science-based organisation, 
the Codex comprises experts and specialists from a wide range of disciplines. In 1995, 
the WTO’s Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS 
Agreement) also names the Codex as the food safety standard-setting organisation of 
the WTO (World Trade Organisation, 1995, Article 12.3 and Annex A paragraph 3(a)).  
ISO international standards 
International standards developed by the International Organisation for Standardisation 
(ISO) are another category of standards used in international food trade between China 
and other trading partners. The ISO is a transnational standards organisation founded in 
1947 and is the world’s largest developer of voluntary international standards about 
product quality including food products (International Organisation for Standardisation, 
2012, p. 3).
 
The organisation is a network of national standards bodies, having China as 
one of the founding member bodies since its creation in 1947
24
. In 2001, the 
Standardisation Administration of China (SAC) was established, the same year in which 
China entered into the WTO, and since then the SAC has represented China in the ISO 
as a full member. The SAC is an administration under the supervision of the General 
Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine (AQSIQ), taking the 
main responsibilities of unifying standards of different sectors in China, and supervising 
and coordinating the overall standardisation work (see Section 6.2). 
As a full member of the ISO, the SAC participates and votes in ISO technical 
and policy meetings (International Organisation for Standardisation, 2013b, pp. II/9-10). 
Its participation in technical committees/subcommittee (TCs/SCs) related to food 
products or food production measures is also active (International Organisation for 
                                                 
23
 Until 2013, the Codex has “developed over 200 standards covering processed, semi-processed or 
unprocessed foods intended for sale for the consumer or for intermediate processing; over 40 hygienic 
and technological codes of practice; evaluated over 1000 food additives and 54 veterinary drugs; set more 
than 3,000 maximum levels for pesticide residues; and specified over 30 guidelines for contaminants” 
(World Trade Organisation, 2014). 
24
 China’s membership was suspended in wartime and then withdrawn in the revolution period between 
1950 and 1977 (International Organisation for Standardisation, 2013a). 
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Standardisation, n.d.-c). Until 2013, the SAC has participated in 712 TCs/SCs and three 
policy development committees; among them, one TC and fourteen SCs are related to 
food production. 
6.1.2 Standards of domestic fruits/vegetables and meat/dairy products 
Compared with the exported food regime, food standards of domestic food products 
have a more complicated structure, involving multiple sets of standards developed by 
various government bodies. This section will first look into various types of standards 
for domestic agricultural food products covering both domestic fruits/vegetables and 
meat/dairy products, followed by that of domestic manufactured food products.  
A three-level hierarchy of domestic agricultural food standards has been 
established in China since the early 1990s: ‘pollution-free food’, ‘green food’ and 
organic food (see Figure 6-1). In terms of level of standards, pollution-free food ranks at 
the bottom in that it has the lowest standard requirements, green food ranks in the 
middle and organic food at the top. While pollution-free food standards are mandatory 
market entry standards that all agricultural products are obliged to achieve, green food 
and organic food standards are optional for farmers.  
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Figure 6-1: The three-level hierarchy of standards on agricultural food products 
 
Source: author’s compilation, from laws and regulations of the PRC 
A general comparison of the three-level standard structure of agricultural food is 
summarised in Table 6-1, detailing the status, legal basis, evolvement, regulatory bodies 
and labels of these standards. The following section will discuss these standards 
accordingly. 
Level of standard Quantity of produce 
• Optional to producers 
• Without the use of chemical fertilisers, 
pesticides, drugs, chemical preservatives 
and hormones 
 
 
 
 
Organic 
food 
• Optional to producers 
• With stringent regulation on the 
use of fertilisers, pesticides, 
drugs, animal feeds and other 
chemicals 
Green food 
• Mandatory for 
producers 
• With less stringent 
regulation on the 
residue limits of 
fertilisers, pesticides, 
drugs, heavy metals 
and other chemicals 
Pollution-free food 
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Table 6-1: Comparisons of the three-level hierarchy of domestic agricultural 
food standards 
 
Pollution-free food 
standards 
Green food standards Organic food standards 
Status 
Mandatory; 
the use of ‘pollution-free 
food’ label is optional and 
subject to approval 
Optional Optional 
Legal basis 
The PRC Agricultural 
Product Quality Safety 
Law 
The Regulatory Measures 
on Supervision and 
Management of Green 
Food Logo 
The Organic Food 
Certification and 
Management Measures; 
the Regulatory Measure 
on Organic Product 
Certification 
Management, 
the Implementing Rules 
on Organic Certification 
Year of 
establishment 
2002; became mandatory 
in 2006 after extensive 
food poisoning cases and 
trade restrictions imposed 
by other countries 
1992 1994; 
formal legislation in 2001 
Regulator 
The Ministry of 
Agriculture; 
(i) Production site 
certification: the Provincial 
Department of Agriculture; 
(ii) Product certification:  
the Centre for Farm 
Produce Quality and 
Safety under the Ministry 
of Agriculture 
The China Green Food 
Development Centre under 
the Ministry of Agriculture 
The State Environmental 
Protection 
Administration; 
(ii) Overseeing organic 
certification and 
accreditation:  
Certification and 
Accreditation 
Administration of the 
PRC 
(ii) Conduct assessment 
and accreditation for 
certification bodies:  
China National 
Accreditation Service for 
Conformity Assessment  
(iii) Approval and 
registration of 
certification and 
certification training 
bodies:  China 
Certification and 
Accreditation Association 
Official label 
printed on 
food package 
  
 
Source: author’s compilation, from laws and regulations of the PRC 
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Pollution-free food standards 
‘Pollution-free food standards’, also known as ‘quality and safety standards of 
agricultural products’, are the mandatory standards for domestic market entry for all 
agricultural food products in China ("The PRC Agricultural Product Quality Safety 
Law," 2006, Articles 11-14). Although pollution-free food standards were first created 
in 2002, they only became compulsory market entry standards after the legislation of 
the PRC Agricultural Product Quality Safety Law in 2006. 
The four-year gap between 2002 and 2006 merits a brief discussion given its 
importance (see also Figure 2-1). Before the legislation of the PRC Agricultural 
Product Quality Safety Law in 2006, regulation of agricultural food was basically 
premised on the PRC Law on Agriculture legislated in 1993 (revised in 2002) ("The 
PRC Law on Agriculture," 1993). Instead of agricultural product quality and safety, the 
key concerns of this law were about rural economic reform and development of the 
agricultural industry (see Section 2.2.4 in Chapter 2). According to a government 
document, in the early 2000s, two imperatives emerged which fostered the legislation of 
the PRC Agricultural Product Quality Safety Law in 2006 (Drafting Committee of the 
PRC Agricultural Product Quality Safety Law, 2006, pp. 2-6); these two imperatives are 
related to extensive food poisoning incidents since 2004, and non-tariff trade 
restrictions imposed by other countries. 
In 2002, after the introduction and promotion of the non-mandatory ‘pollution-
free food standards’, agricultural food safety was considerably improved in China 
(Drafting Committee of the PRC Agricultural Product Quality Safety Law, 2006). 
However, the progress only lasted for a short period of time. In 2004, there were 381 
serious food poisoning cases reported by the Ministry of Health, among them 140 
related to agricultural food (Drafting Committee of the PRC Agricultural Product 
Quality Safety Law, 2006). Some widely-reported cases included poisoning garlic in 
Hebei Province, toxic tea in Anhui Province and contaminated fish with malachite green 
across the country. Alongside food scandals, China’s food export was impeded by food 
safety problems including the abusive use of chemical fertilisers and pesticides and 
farmland pollution. Based on the official data, in 2002, 90% of Chinese farms for 
exportation were adversely affected by barriers imposed by importing countries, which 
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represented a total loss of about USD 9 billion (Drafting Committee of the PRC 
Agricultural Product Quality Safety Law, 2006). Most importantly, during the early 
2000s, China was criticised by other WTO members for lacking a system of compulsory 
national food standards developed on the basis of scientific risk assessment, while these 
members were concerned about their vital interests in exporting their agricultural 
products to the Chinese domestic market. Hence, in order to fulfil the WTO’s 
expectations, the Chinese Central Government was prompted to develop national food 
standards based on scientific risk assessment and make them compulsory.  
Standards of pollution-free food are developed by the Centre for Farm Produce 
Quality and Safety (CFPQS). CFPQS was established in 2002 as a bureau-level 
administration under the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) (Ministry of Agriculture, 2013). 
According to the Measures for the Administration of Pollution-free Agricultural 
Products issued in 2002, pollution-free food standards are categorised into three main 
realms (Ministry of Agriculture & The General Administration of Quality Supervision 
Inspection and Quarantine, 2002, Article 2). These include final product standards, 
environmental standards on production sites, and technical standards on production 
process.  
First, final product standards are to put maximum residue limits on pesticide 
residue, drug residue, heavy metal and mycotoxin. According to the government, these 
chemicals were selected to be put under control because they were the most common 
sources of risks in vegetables, meats and grains in the early 2000s (Drafting Committee 
of the PRC Agricultural Product Quality Safety Law, 2006, pp. 23-24).  
Second, environmental standards on production sites are concerned about the 
tolerance for harmful materials in the water, air and soil of farmlands (Calvin, Gale, Hu, 
& Lohmar, 2006). Polluted areas with excessive toxic substances are prohibited from 
farming ("The PRC Agricultural Product Quality Safety Law," 2006, Articles 15-19). 
To put this restriction into practice, ‘blacklists’ are issued by local agricultural 
authorities who identify areas where farming is disallowed because of severe pollution. 
In parallel, local governments also compile ‘whitelists’, designating some privileged 
farmlands as the ‘standardised farming sites’. Farmlands recognised by local authorities 
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in ‘whitelists’ are recommended areas for farming, where disposal of solid waste, 
emission of polluted gas and discharge of polluted water are prohibited. According to 
the official statistics released by the Ministry of Land and Resource in 2013, more than 
3.3 million hectares of farmlands in China were severely polluted and prohibited from 
growing crops, representing about 2% of China’s 136 million hectares of total arable 
land ("8 million acres of China's farmland," 2013).   
Third, technical standards on production process are provided in the forms of 
standardised operational instructions and guidelines for agriculture. These technical 
standards include the installation of examination and quarantine facilities in farmlands, 
and the execution of a record keeping system on invested substances. These compulsory 
technical requirements are applicable for agribusinesses, farmer cooperatives and 
cooperative economic organisations only. In contrast, individual farmers or farming 
households are exempted from the obligations (see Chapter 7). 
While pollution-free food standards are mandatory, the use of ‘pollution-free 
food’ label  is optional for farmers and is subject to official certification (see Table 6-1) 
("The PRC Agricultural Product Quality Safety Law," 2006, Article 32; Drafting 
Committee of the PRC Agricultural Product Quality Safety Law, 2006, p. 76). 
Certifications of pollution-free food encompass two areas, that is, production site 
certification and product certification (Ministry of Agriculture & The General 
Administration of Quality Supervision Inspection and Quarantine, 2002). While the 
former is administered by the Provincial Department of Agriculture, the latter is 
administered by the CFPQS (Ministry of Agriculture & The General Administration of 
Quality Supervision Inspection and Quarantine, 2002, Articles 13 & 21). For both types 
of certification, they are valid for three years. 
Green food standards 
Climbing up the standard hierarchy of domestic agricultural food products to the second 
level is ‘green food’, which was established in 1992, around ten years earlier than the 
introduction of the mandatory pollution-free food standards. Rather than being related 
to food safety concern, green food development was first initiated by the concern about 
grain security and sustainable rural development. The steer of green food development 
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in 1992 largely came from the personal drive of a senior official of the Land 
Reclamation Unit in the MoA, Liu Lianfu (Sanders, 2006). In response to the Eighth 
Five-year Plan of the People’s Republic of China (1991-1995) which highlights the top 
concerns of the Chinese Central Government about food security, arable land protection 
and sustainable rural development, Liu proposed a series of new initiatives to promote 
sustainable agriculture in China. 
Under this background, the China Green Food Development Centre (CGFDC) 
was established in 1992, under the supervision of the MoA (The China Green Food 
Development Centre, 2010). Apart from developing green food standards, the CGFDC 
is responsible for international liaison (The China Green Food Development Centre, 
2012). In 1993, the CGFDC was accepted to the International Foundation for Organic 
Agriculture (IFOAM) as a member (Sanders, 2006, pp. 211, 216). 
Green food is grown in an environment with restrictive use of fertilisers, 
pesticides, veterinary drugs and other additives (Giovannucci, 2005). It is divided into 
‘A’ and ‘AA’ classes, with the latter having higher standards. According to the CGFDC, 
class ‘A’ green food represents a transition between conventional and organic food, 
allowing restricted use of chemical fertilisers and pesticides; on the other hand, class 
‘AA’ green food represents a full organic status where the use of chemicals is banned in 
the farming process (Lu, 2005). As emphasised by the CGFDC, since 1995, green food 
standards have been developed with reference to standards of the IFOAM, the Codex 
and other developed countries (The China Green Food Development Centre, 2007). In 
particular, ‘AA’ green food standards are designed to conform to all major international 
standards for organic food, including the IFOAM standards, ISO65 and EU2092/91 
(Sanders, 2006, pp. 211, 216). This can be perceived as the very first indicator 
signalling that the domestic agricultural food system in China has attempted to 
incorporate into the international system.   
Regarding green food certification, samples of soil, water and final products are 
tested by the CGFDC on residues of pesticides and drugs and heavy metals. ‘A’ and 
‘AA’ green food certifications are valid for three years and one year respectively, while 
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certified green food can have the ‘green food’ label printed on its package (see Table 6-
1). 
Organic food standards 
At the top of the three-level hierarchy of domestic agricultural food standards is organic 
food, which is produced without the use of chemical fertilisers, pesticides, drugs, 
chemical preservatives and hormones. Organic food in China was developed in 1994 by 
the State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA), with an original rationale 
similar to that of green food – food security concern and arable land protection. 
However, during the later period, organic food development in China was mainly 
prompted by international trade. 
As discussed above, in the late 1980s, against the backdrop of food security 
crisis resulting from diminishing arable lands, the MoA has developed class ‘A’ and 
‘AA’ green food since 1992. In spite of the progress made by the MoA, in 1994, the 
SEPA took another initiative in promoting organic agriculture as a response to the 
Chinese Central Government’s concerns about environmental sustainability in rural 
areas.  
In the mid-1990s, export opportunity emerged as an additional force for the 
development of organic agriculture in China. At the beginning, foreign markets 
importing Chinese organic food such as tea included the European Union, the United 
States and Japan only (International Trade Centre, 2011); however, the demand has 
witnessed a rapid growth in the later period. In 1996, the total value of exports of 
organic food was USD 7 million; by 1998, it had risen to USD 10 million; and in 1999 
to USD 12 million, with over fifty different products involved, including potatoes, rice, 
maize, wheat, tea, beans, herbal medicines, vegetables, sesame, honey, eggs and peanuts 
(Sanders, 2006, p. 216). In 2001, the foreign market for Chinese organic food was 
further expanded after China’s entry into the WTO. Under the circumstances, the desire 
of expanding overseas organic market drove the Chinese government to formulate 
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various rules and regulations on organic agriculture in 2001
25
, which defines principles 
of organic products and requirements of organic certification. 
Organic food standards adopted in China are developed on the basis of the 
IFOAM standards and requirements. The standards, namely “national standards on 
organic products of China” (Wu, 2005) 26 , are formulated by the Organic Food 
Development Centre (OFDC),
 
a science institute established by the SEPA in 1994 
(Ministry of Environmental Protection, 2004). Whilst the OFDC was originally fully 
funded by the SEPA, it is now partially commercialised through generating revenue 
itself by providing certification services
27
. Since the OFDC has achieved full IFOAM 
accreditation and ISO65 accreditation, OFDC-certified organic products are not only 
recognised by the domestic Chinese market but also enjoy international acceptance 
(Sanders, 2006, p. 216). In addition, the OFDC possesses mutual recognition with 
twenty IFOAM accredited certification agencies in the EU, U.S. and Japan, which 
denotes that OFDC-certified products have a privileged access to these major overseas 
organic food markets (Ministry of Environmental Protection, 2004).  
In summary, the discussion so far has shown that domestic agricultural food 
standards in China were initially driven by the concerns about food security and 
environmental protection in the early 1990s, but later on have been driven by export 
opportunities, international obligations and domestic food incidents. 
Conceivably, the number of produce of the three-level products has an inverse 
relationship with the level of standard – pollution-free food owns the largest share in the 
market, green food ranks second while organic food has the smallest portion (see Figure 
6-1). In China only large factory farms and cooperative economic organisations have 
the capacity to commit to high-quality production or organic agriculture. This is because 
of farmers’ significant risks in start-ups of organic agriculture: international organic 
                                                 
25
 The first national regulation on organic food certification and accreditation, the Organic Food 
Certification and Management Measures, was issued in 2001 by SEPA. Another two relevant regulations 
on organic food and organic certification are the Regulatory Measure on Organic Product Certification 
Management, and the Implementing Rules on Organic Certification (International Trade Centre, 2011, p. 
7). 
26
 That is, national standards on organic products (GB/T19630-2005) 
27
 The OFDC charges approximately RMB 10,000 (approximately USD 1,460) for inspection and 
certification of farmers or food processors, depending on the size of their farms or enterprises (Sanders, 
2006, p. 220). 
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food standards normally require that the farmland must have been chemical-free for at 
least three years before organic farming begins; and during this period of time, there are 
no premium profits to earn while yields are frequently lower. Under these circumstances, 
it is unlikely that the initiative to convert to organic agriculture comes from individual 
farmers themselves (Sanders, 2006). Instead, organic agriculture in China is more likely 
to be promoted and adopted by organised companies and producer associations (Xie & 
Xiao, 2007)
28
, as well as state farms, collective villages, companies or entrepreneurs 
(Sanders, 2006).  
6.1.3 Standards of domestic manufactured food products 
Different from the hierarchical standard structure of domestic agricultural food, 
domestic manufactured food products regulation is featured by having two systems of 
standards working together at the same time. Corresponding to the two laws related to 
manufactured food products regulation (i.e. the PRC Food Hygiene Law and the PRC 
Product Quality Law, see Chapter 2), two types of manufactured standards are framed – 
‘food hygiene standards’ and ‘quality safety standards’. In mid-2009, after the 
legislation of the PRC Food Safety Law ("The PRC Food Safety Law," 2009), ‘food 
safety standards’ were further set up with a final goal to replace the former two 
standards. However, since the review process only officially started in 2013, it is 
beyond the scope of this study. Therefore, this section will not discuss the ‘food safety 
standards’ in detail. A summary of the three types of standards is shown in Table 6-2. 
                                                 
28
 Three organic production models are identified by Xie and Xiao (2007).  The first model is known as 
‘firm leasehold management’, under which an organic processor or trader leases land from farmers and 
this company then manages the farm production. Farmers are paid rent and become farm workers on the 
company’s leased land. The second model is known as ‘company plus base plus farmers’. The processor 
or trader sets up an organic production project in cooperation with a local agent or government in a 
village or town. Local government signs a long-term contract with farmers for organic production and 
purchase, while farmers in the designated project areas are requested to convert to organic production to 
meet the firm’s demand. The third model is organic producer associations formed by the 
township/village-level governments or farmers themselves. The association then manages the production 
and provides technical support to their members. Agricultural produce is purchased by the associations 
and finally sold to processors or traders. 
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Food hygiene standards 
Food hygiene standards are mandatory food standards developed by the Ministry of 
Health (MoH). They were first established in 1982 with the legal basis residing with the 
PRC Food Hygiene Law (Trial Implementation) ("The PRC Food Hygiene Law (Trial 
Implementation)," 1982), and is regarded as the first attempt by the Chinese government 
to place a barrier on market entry by criteria of hygiene/safety conditions. In 1995, food 
hygiene standards were further developed, during which the PRC Food Hygiene Law 
was formally legislated after thirteen years of trial ("The PRC Food Hygiene Law," 
1995). 
Food hygiene standards cover a wide range of areas. These include requirements 
on raw food materials, food additives, microorganism index, chemical index, packaging 
and labelling, and hygienic requirements of food processing. According to the official 
figures released by the MoH, there were more than 400 food hygiene standards in 2007 
(T. Zhou & Zhu, 2007). With respect to food products lacking national hygiene 
standards, provincial governments can formulate their own local hygiene standards 
which are only binding to food commodities manufactured in its governing regions 
Table 6-2: The three types of standards on manufactured food products 
 
Food hygiene 
standards 
Quality safety 
standards 
Food safety standards 
Status  
Mandatory Mandatory; the ‘QS’ 
certification becomes 
mandatory in 2008 
Mandatory 
Legal basis The PRC Food 
Hygiene Law 
The PRC Product 
Quality Law 
The PRC Food Safety 
Law 
Year of 
establishment  
1982 1993 2009 
Official label 
printed on food 
package 
None 
 
None 
Source: author’s compilation, from laws and regulations of the PRC 
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("The PRC Food Hygiene Law," 1995, Article 15). Local hygiene standards have to be 
reported to both the MoH and the SAC for record.  
Quality safety standards 
‘Quality safety standards’ are another type of mandatory food standard developed by the 
AQSIQ for domestic food products. Although quality safety standards were first created 
in 1993 in accordance with the PRC Product Quality Law (amended in 2000) ("The 
PRC Product Quality Law," 1993), they were not mandatory standards during the early 
period. Actually the ‘Quality safety’ (QS) certification only became mandatory for all 
domestic manufactured food products as late as in 2008. 
The evolution of making the ‘QS’ certification compulsory is similar to the 
development of pollution-free food standards in the domestic agricultural sector – food 
incident-driven. The ‘QS’ certification was initially a voluntary product certification 
programme introduced in 2000. However, a series of poisoning and counterfeit food 
reports in the early 2000s drove the Chinese government to make ‘QS’ certification a 
compulsory requirement (The State Council Information Office, 2007). For instance, in 
2001, 484 persons in Heyuan City suffered from food poisoning after consuming pork 
contaminated by ractopamine; in 2003, ham factories in Jinhua City were discovered to 
use dichlorvos as a preservative to control pests; in 2004, fake formula milk of little 
nutritional value was found in Fuyang City which caused the death of at least twelve 
infants ("Ten types of food," 2009). Since 2004, five types of the most consumed food 
in China have been placed under a mandatory requirement of  ‘QS’ certification, 
including rice, cooking oil, wheat flour, soy sauce and vinegar (The General 
Administration of Quality Supervision Inspection and Quarantine, 2003). In 2005, ten 
additional products were further covered by the ‘QS’ certification29. After the melamine 
milk scandal in 2008 (see Section 2.2.5 in Chapter 2), the Chinese Central Government 
finally put forward the ‘QS’ certification to include an additional thirteen products30. 
Since then all domestic manufactured food products in China have been subject to the 
mandatory ‘QS’ certification for market access (The General Administration of Quality 
                                                 
29
 These included meat products, dairy products, instant food, frozen food, puffed food, seasoning, drinks, 
biscuits and canned food (MBA Library, n.d.). 
30
 These included tea, sweets, wine, beer, rice wine, pickled vegetables, jam, roasted nuts, egg products, 
cocoa products, roasted coffee, seafood products and products of starch (MBA Library, n.d.). 
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Supervision Inspection and Quarantine, 2005). This incremental approach of making 
product quality standards compulsory shows that food incidents are a driving force 
directing the evolution of quality safety standards.  
Quality safety standards cover a wide range of areas. These include limits on 
additives, banned use of some chemicals, nutritional specifications of food for 
vulnerable groups such as infants, technical requirements on food testing, hygiene of 
production units and facilities, requirements on packaging, labelling and transportation. 
The ‘QS’ certification is performed by laboratories affiliated with the AQSIQ or 
provincial Bureaux of Quality and Technical Supervision, while certified products 
should have the ‘QS’ label printed on  packaging for market access (see Table 6-2).  
Food safety standards 
A regulatory reform emerged in 2009 that brought about the introduction of food safety 
standards, which aim to replace the ‘food hygiene standards’ and ‘quality safety 
standards’ in the long term.  
As explained in Chapter 2 (Section 2.2.5), the milk scandal in 2008 led to the 
legislation of the PRC Food Safety Law, which took effect from mid-2009. In this law, 
it explicitly states that various standards including food hygiene standards and quality 
safety standards have to be integrated into a single set of compulsory ‘food safety 
standards’ ("The PRC Food Safety Law," 2009, Articles 19 and 22). According to the 
MoH, there are about 5,000 various food-related standards to be reviewed. Although the 
review of existing standards started officially in 2013 (National Health and Family 
Planning Commission, 2014), 185 food safety standards and guidelines were issued in 
2011 (Q. Cui, 2011); in 2013, 411 food safety standards and guidelines were further 
issued (National Health and Family Planning Commission, 2014). Government officials 
admitted that the long history and vested interests in hygiene standards and product 
quality standards are the main obstacles for the setting of new food safety standards (Q. 
Cui, 2011). As explained earlier, since this is beyond our research scope, food safety 
standards will not be further elaborated upon here. 
In summary, the discussion so far has shown that the evolution of domestic 
manufactured food standards in China is to a large extent driven by food safety crises in 
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the past decades. Getting a broad overview of all food standards on both exported and 
domestic food sectors, the next section will illustrate how domestic food standard-
setting in China is influenced by the exported food regulatory regime under the context 
of internationalisation of regulation.  
6.2 Processes of standard-setting in different food regulatory 
regimes: A comparative perspective 
The evolution of domestic food standards described above has so far indicated that 
transformations of domestic standards are driven by factors of environmental protection 
concerns, export opportunities, international obligations and food scandals. This section 
will further look into how these standards are formulated. In general, it can be seen that 
business interests have played a significant role in domestic food standard-setting in 
China. However, recent years have seen a trend of transformation indicating that 
standard-setting in domestic food regulatory regime is increasingly influenced by the 
exported food regulatory regime. And under this context, business interests are 
becoming less important. First, in terms of the procedure of food standard-setting, the 
process of domestic food standard development has become more or less similar to that 
of the Codex as well as the ISO. Second, in formulating domestic standards, 
international standards are taken as a reference. Selected domestic food standards are 
also directed by the SAC to be in harmony with international standards. Third, the basis 
of domestic food standard-setting is gradually more inclined to international practice 
and norms such as the use of scientific risk assessment.  
In the earlier period before 2008, the process of domestic food standard-setting 
has been perceived by both provincial regulators and the regulatees as non-transparent, 
as well as being inclined towards the business interests of large-sized producers 
(Interviewees 2, 7, 9, 11 and 25). For example, the compositions of committees 
responsible for drafting food standards predominantly represent the interests of the 
leading enterprises rather than medium and small-sized businesses. Examples include 
committees of canned fish and soft drinks (Interviewee 9). An official further illustrated 
the scenario in the interview using the case of Guangdong style cured meat (Interviewee 
9). In 2005, a committee of eight members was formed to draft a new standard on 
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Guangdong style cured meat products (Guangdong Bureau of Quality and Technical 
Supervision, 2007). Among the eight members, two were representatives of industry 
associations
31
, four were from leading enterprises of the cured meat products industry, 
one was an official from the regulatory body
32
, and one was a scientific expert. Small 
businesses, however, were not represented on the committee. The predominance of 
leading enterprises in the committee was criticised by small producers as favouring the 
business interests of large producers. When the proposed new standard of Guangdong 
style cured meat products was published in 2007, it was criticised by small producers as 
too stringent so that their lower-priced sausages could no longer fulfil the new standards. 
In other words, the stringent standard has become an obstacle for small producers to 
survive in the market. Despite efforts made by small producers to bargain with the 
regulatory body, the new standard was finally promulgated. Since then, products of 
these small producers have to be named ‘local flavour sausages (fengwei lachang)’ 
instead (Huang, 2007).  
However, a gradual change has been observed in about 2008 – the practice of 
standard-setting has become more transparent and standardised. Figure 6-2 summarises 
the procedures of standard-setting of domestic food standards. Notably the role of the 
Standardisation Administration of China (SAC) in standard-setting has become critical, 
although it is not delegated as the regulator of any food sectors in China
33
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
31
 That is, Guangdong Food Industry Association, and Guangdong Sausage Industry Association 
32
 That is, Guangdong Bureau of Quality and Technical Supervision 
33
 For example, before 2003, food hygiene standards were formulated by MoH solely; however, from 
2003, they are more likely to be developed and published together by the MoH and SAC. 
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Figure 6-2: National food standard development in China 
 
Sources: author’s compilation from interviewees 2, 7, 9 and 11 
 
The steps of domestic food standard-setting are as follows, covering the 
proposal, drafting, committee, consultation, approval and publication stages. First, at the 
first proposal stage, a new work item proposal is submitted to the relevant technical 
committee (TC). If an approval from the TC is obtained, the new work item proposal is 
then submitted to the SAC at the second proposal stage. The SAC will then determine 
the inclusion of the work item in its working programme. If the proposal is accepted by 
Proposal stage 1 
•A new work item is proposed to the relevant TC of the SAC, either by 
industry associations or leading enterprises 
Proposal stage 2 
•The new work item is proposed to the SAC 
Drafting stage 
•Working group of the TC prepares for a working draft 
•Working group can suggest the TC to terminate the process if it finds it 
unnecessary or inappropriate to set a new standard 
Technical committee stage 
•First working draft shared with members of the TC for debate and 
consensus-building 
Consultation stage 
•Draft shared with state regulators, the industry, other interested parties 
and the public, who are asked to comment 
•Working group revises the draft based on comments received 
•Maximum period: 5 months 
Approval stage 1 
•Final draft sent to all technical committee members for a Yes/No vote 
•Maximum period: 5 months 
Approval stage 2 
•Final draft sent to the SAC for review and approval 
•Maximum period: 3 months 
National food standard 
•Standards published by the SAC and the relevant ministry 
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the SAC, a working group of experts is formed by the TC for the preparation of a 
working draft. At this drafting stage, if the working group finds it unnecessary or 
inappropriate to develop a new standard, it can advise the TC to terminate the process. 
Otherwise, the working group will complete the first working draft and submit to the 
TC. Then at the technical committee stage, members of the TC will debate on the 
working draft for consensus-building. Afterwards the consultation stage begins. The 
draft is circulated to relevant regulatory bodies, the food industry and the public for 
comments for a period of five months at most. Comments received are returned to the 
originating working group for consideration and study; if necessary, a revised document 
is worked out. With a final draft completed by the working group, it is submitted again 
to the TC at the first approval stage for a final debate. An approval or disapproval 
decision should be made within a period of five months. If unanimous consensus cannot 
be reached inside the TC, a Yes/No vote will be held. For the final draft to pass, a three-
fourths majority is required. The final draft is further submitted to the SAC at the 
second approval stage for review. A final approval or disapproval decisions should be 
made within a period of three months. Once the final draft has been approved by the 
SAC, it becomes the national standard and will be published by the SAC together with 
the relevant ministry. 
When comparing this procedure of domestic food standard-setting with those of 
international food standards that Chinese exported food products apply, some 
similarities can be found. Figure 6-3 is a comparison between the Chinese national food 
standard development and the Codex and the ISO international standard development. 
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Figure 6-3: A comparison of different food standard developments 
 
Source: author’s compilation, from “Understanding the Codex Alimentarius” (Secretariat of the Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards Programme, 2006, p. 16), the 
webpage of ISO (International Organisation for Standardisation, n.d.-b)
 
and interviews conducted by the author 
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From Figure 6-3, similarities in terms of technical committee formation and 
consultation are observed. First, the formation of technical committees (TCs) and the 
reliance of TCs on standard-setting in China are identical to the practice of the ISO. In 
the ISO, TCs, together with their subcommittees and working groups, are responsible 
for developing ISO standards. Similarly, inside the SAC in China, there are about 518 
TCs responsible for researching and drafting national standards in different technical 
areas
34
. The formation of TCs can either come from the initiatives of the SAC or from 
the relevant ministry such as the MoA, the MoH or the AQSIQ. Industry associations 
and leading enterprises in the industry may also directly negotiate with the SAC or the 
relevant ministry about the creation of a TC. If the SAC accepts the proposal, a TC is 
then formed and is normally jointly-run by both the SAC and the relevant ministry. The 
SAC and the ministry can then nominate and appoint members to the TC. Members of 
TCs include experts and specialists from research institutes and academia, industries 
and industry associations, ministries and state regulators (Interviewees 2, 7, 9 and 11). 
This practice is also similar to the multi-stakeholder approach of setting standards 
adopted by the ISO. As explained by the ISO, this approach “consolidates contributions 
from industry, government, research, academia, international organisations and NGOs 
representing all stakeholders including consumers and small businesses” (International 
Organisation for Standardisation, 2012, p. 2).  
Second, the consultation stage in the standard-setting process of the SAC in 
China is also similar to the Codex and the ISO. At the consultation stage, drafted 
standards are shared with relevant regulatory bodies, the industry, other interested 
parties and the public for comments. Consultation documents are sometimes posted 
online. Such consultation exercises are similar to the Codex and the ISO which request 
their member countries to comment on the draft. This consultation process, together 
with the multi-stakeholder approach introduced above, consequentially bring about a 
more transparent decision-making process of domestic food standard development in 
China.  
                                                 
34
 For example, in terms of agricultural food products, there are TCs on vegetables (TC 467 Vegetables), 
dairy products (TC 433 Dairy Products), honey (TCSWG2 Honey)
 
and slaughtering (TC 516 Slaughtering) 
(The Standardisation Administration of China, n.d.). Regarding manufactured food products, SAC has 
TCs on food additives (TC 11 Food Additives), rice and noodles (TC 361 Rice and Noodles), drinks (TC 
472 Drink), meat products (TC 399 Meat Products) and flavouring (TC 398 Flavouring) (The 
Standardisation Administration of China, n.d.).
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On top of these similarities, standard harmonisation is a strong indicator 
suggesting a direct influence of exported food standards on domestic food standards in 
China. Standard harmonisation here refers to the adoption of consistent international 
standards in domestic standards. In China, the initiatives of harmonising domestic food 
standards to international ones such as the ISO international food standards are directed 
by the SAC. Although there was no official data indicating exactly how many domestic 
food standards in China are harmonised to international standards, an inference can be 
made from the official figures released by the SAC on its overall national standards 
covering all sectors. By the end of 2006, the total number of national standards in China 
reached 21,410. Among them, 9,931 (46%) were adopted from international standards 
such as the ISO, the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), and the 
International Telecommunication Union (ITU) (The Standardisation Administration of 
China, 2011). In recent years, the Chinese Central Government has also publicly 
expressed its goal of increasing the number of standards that are based on adoptions of 
international standards or standards of developed countries (American National 
Standards Institute, n.d.). 
In fact, in some documents prepared by the working groups of TCs in the SACs, 
they explicitly state that Chinese national food standards are drafted with reference to 
other international standards. For example, as laid down in the draft, the ‘Hygiene 
Standards on Canned Fish (GB14939-2005)’ correspond to the Codex Alimentarius 
standard ‘Codex Stan 70-95 Canned Tuna and Striped Tuna’ (Ministry of Agriculture & 
The Standardisation Administration of China, 2005, p. 2). Another example is the draft 
of ‘Guangdong Local Standards on Drinking Natural Spring Water’, which states 
explicitly that the proposed standards are drafted with reference to the Codex 
Alimentarius standard ‘Codex Stan 227-2001 Bottled/Packaged Drinking Waters’ 
(Guangdong Bottled Water Industry Association, 2011).  
The process of standard harmonisation is summarised in Figure 6-4, while a 
comparison is made with the procedure of usual Chinese national food standard 
development. 
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Figure 6-4: A comparison of standard harmonisation and the usual Chinese 
national food standard development 
 
Sources: author’s compilation, from interviews conducted by the author 
Comparing the standard harmonisation procedure with domestic food standard 
development procedure, the most obvious finding is that in the case of standard 
harmonisation, industry associations and leading enterprises are barely included in the 
process. In particular, the following stages are left out: proposal stage one when a work 
item is proposed to the TCs by industry associations or leading enterprises, the technical 
committee stage when the first working draft is shared with members of the TCs for 
debate and consensus-building, the consultation stage when drafts are shared with other 
parties for comments, and approval stage one when members of the TC cast their votes 
for the final draft. In general, the role of the TCs has been minimised to work on the 
working draft only, without the authorities deciding whether standards should be set or 
revised. Similarly, because of the lack of a consultation process, regulatory bodies, the 
food industry and consumers are less able to exert their influence over the proposed 
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standard. Instead of adopting a multi-stakeholder approach with consultation, a top-
down approach is observed in standard harmonisation cases. 
Finally, in terms of the basis of standard-setting, the use of scientific risk 
assessment can be perceived as another piece of evidence suggesting that international 
regulation has exerted some significant influences on the domestic food regulatory 
regimes. Take pollution-free food standards as an example, the requirement of applying 
results of scientific risk assessment in standard-setting is explicitly highlighted in the 
PRC Agricultural Product Quality Safety Law legislated in 2006 ("The PRC 
Agricultural Product Quality Safety Law," 2006, Articles 6 & 12). As explained above, 
this practice aims to respond to the WTO’s expectation and critiques of other WTO 
members (Drafting Committee of the PRC Agricultural Product Quality Safety Law, 
2006, p. 17). Corresponding to the requirement, the Commission of Risk Assessment of 
Agricultural Product Safety (CRAAPS) was established under the MoA (The Press 
Office of the Ministry of Agriculture, 2012). In 2012, 76 members were appointed in 
the CRAAPS (Ministry of Agriculture, 2012a), comprising scientific experts ranging 
from the disciplines of agriculture, environment, public health, to quarantine and 
veterinary, as well as representatives from academia and government. The mandates of 
the CRAAPS are to conduct a risk analysis on potential hazards in agricultural products, 
and evaluate their risk impacts. Assessment results and policy advice are delivered to 
the MoA as well as the SAC for considerations of further actions such as standard 
formulation or amendment (Ministry of Agriculture, 2012b).  
6.3 Discussion: Impact of internationalisation of regulation on 
standard-setting 
This chapter has discussed different types of standards in various food regulatory 
regimes in China and the way standards are developed. Overall, the evolution of 
domestic food standards was driven by environmental protection concerns, export 
opportunities, international obligations and food incidents. The observed trend is that 
standards for Chinese exported food are in general higher than that for domestic 
consumption, because the former directly adopt international food standards from the 
Codex and the ISO. However, in recent years a transformation has emerged that 
standard-setting of the domestic food regulatory regimes is increasingly influenced by 
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the exported one, in terms of standards adopted and the practice of setting standards. 
Consequentially, domestic food standards have gradually become higher. 
This section aims to explore the question raised in the beginning of the chapter: 
‘to what extent does internationalisation of regulation impact on standard-setting in 
different regulatory regimes?’ To answer the inquiry, the impacts of the 
internationalisation of regulation can be classified into compulsory international 
obligation and voluntary learning as follows: 
First, in terms of compulsory international obligation, the most obvious 
influence of the internationalisation of regulation is on the Chinese exported food sector, 
where the Codex and the ISO international food standards are directly applied. This is 
because of international obligations that China as a WTO member should comply with 
WTO agreements. Meanwhile, the use of scientific risk assessment as the basis of 
national standard-setting is also for the purpose of fulfilling WTO expectations. 
Second, in terms of voluntary learning, the Chinese government has tried to 
develop national food standards in accordance with international standards, although no 
coercive force is imposed. For example, as early as in 1992 and 1994, green food 
standards and organic food standards were developed with reference to standards of the 
IFOAM, the Codex, the ISO and other developed countries, with the aim of expanding 
the export market throughout the world. In recent years, the Chinese Central 
Government has also pushed forward harmonisation work with its national food 
standards, towards a convergence with international Codex and ISO standards. Similarly, 
although it is not a compulsory international obligation, China is using a similar practice 
and procedure of national food standard-setting as that of the Codex as well as the ISO. 
For example, the formation of technical committees and working groups in the SAC, 
and the multi-stakeholder approach of standard-setting are both similar to the practice 
and principles of the Codex and the ISO. 
In summary, the impact of internationalisation of regulation on standard-setting 
in different Chinese food regulatory regimes is becoming increasingly influential and 
strong. In the exported food sector, its impact is direct and coercive under international 
obligations and harmonisation. On the other hand, in the domestic food sector, its 
impact is inclined to be a kind of learning process resulting from transnational 
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communication, whereby China has started to gain international experience after its 
WTO entry, and in particular through the SAC’s participation in different global 
standard institutions. Against this backdrop, domestic food standards are 
consequentially under a transformation towards a convergence with exported food 
standards. As a result, the local factor of business interest is becoming less important in 
standard-setting under the trend of harmonising national food standards with 
international standards, as initiated by the Chinese Central Government.  
With an understanding on how food standards in China evolve and the process 
of setting them, the next two chapters will turn to discuss how these food standards are 
enforced in practice. 
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Chapter 7 : Information-gathering in different food 
regulatory regimes 
In this chapter, variations in the control component of information-gathering across the 
six food regulatory regimes will be presented. It aims to address the inquiry ‘to what 
extent does internationalisation of regulation impact on information-gathering in 
different regulatory regimes?’ To this end, this chapter will look into the question from 
different perspectives in the analytical framework (see Chapter 3), comprising 
regulation as a product of internationalisation of regulation, as a response to public 
opinions, and as an outcome of interest interaction. This chapter finds out that across 
different domestic food sectors, reactive and interactive approaches of information-
gathering are adopted towards small and large-sized producers respectively. In contrast, 
in the exported food sector, rather than differentiating between producers, an active and 
comprehensive approach of information-gathering is consistently applicable to all food 
businesses. This pattern can be attributed to the factors of limited regulatory capacity 
and international pressure from other trading partners. Nonetheless, food safety crises 
and hence international scrutiny such as trade bans can bring about alterations to this 
pattern of information-gathering strategy. In particular, to safeguard the reputation of 
products ‘Made in China’ in both domestic and international markets under the context 
of internationalisation, food scandals often lead to a shift of information-gathering focus 
towards the affected type of foodstuffs.  
The chapter is organised as follows: in Section 7.1, it will first discuss various 
tools of information-gathering, and portray an overall picture by summarising their 
applicability in the six food regulatory regimes in China. On the basis of this backdrop, 
detailed analyses will be made of each regime. In particular, how and why adjustments 
to information-gathering measures occur will be elaborated upon. Section 7.2 will 
examine information-gathering in the regulatory regime for domestic agricultural food 
products (i.e. covering both fruits/vegetables and meat/dairy products), followed by that 
for domestic manufactured food products in Section 7.3 and exported food in Section 
7.4. Finally, the chapter concludes by discussing the impact of internationalisation of 
regulation on information-gathering in the Chinese food regulatory regimes. 
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7.1 Tools of information-gathering and their applicability 
Information-gathering or monitoring involves the collation and provision of information 
about policy issues and problem areas (Hutter & O'Mahony, 2004, p. 3). It serves as a 
crucial component of a control system because it produces knowledge about current and 
changing states of the system (Hood et al., 2001, p. 24). There are a wide range of 
methods for gathering information, including conducting analyses and experiments, 
imposing legal requirements for registration, monitoring, testing and reporting, or 
paying others to provide information. Information can also be provided voluntarily by 
consumers, whistle-blowers, media, non-governmental organisations, and other parties 
who are willing to contribute (Hood et al., 2001, p. 24). Information and knowledge are 
distinguished from one another (Boisot & Canals, 2004). While information is facts or 
data provided about something, knowledge is more than facts and involves the 
interpretation of information to form an understanding of a subject. Without the 
gathering of information, regulators are unable to produce knowledge about the 
regulated business and adjust their regulatory and enforcement strategies accordingly. 
Different approaches of information-gathering can be identified – active, 
reactive and interactive. An active approach, also known as ‘police-patrol’ in the 
literature on oversight, is featured by its centralised, active, and direct measures, with 
the aim of detecting and remedying any violations of legislative goals (McCubbins & 
Schwartz, 1984, p. 166). On the other hand, a reactive approach of information-
gathering, also known as ‘fire-alarm’, implies that regulators rely on others such as 
consumer complaints to come forward with information. It is less centralised and 
involves less active and direct intervention than police-patrol oversight (McCubbins & 
Schwartz, 1984, p. 166). Finally, an interactive approach comes somewhere in between 
‘police-patrol’ and ‘firm-alarm’. In this approach, regulators typically gather 
information by imposing periodic reporting requirements on the regulatees, and 
respectively they will respond to the content of the reports (Hood et al., 2001, pp. 24-
25). 
Across the six studied food regulatory regimes in China, tools deployed by 
regulators to monitor the regulated industry are indeed similar. These include 
licensing/registration, inspection, record keeping and food testing. Licensing or 
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registration allows regulators to gain some basic information about the industry such as 
the number of producers in the sector, their locations, production scales and production 
facilities. Inspection work by inspectorates, on the other hand, can allow regulators to 
monitor the current state of the industry such as their compliance with the established 
standards. Imposing legal requirements on producers to keep production and sale 
records enables regulators to understand activities of food production, and also to trace 
the origin of food incidents in case they happen. Food testing and analysis are the 
scientific ways to obtain information about food risks and the trend of changes in food 
safety. In general, information gathered by the above identified tools mainly includes 
food production activities such as numbers of commodities produced, raw materials and 
chemicals used, and conditions of equipment and tools. Other information covers 
sources of raw materials, sale of finished products, worker’s health conditions, outbreak 
of animal or plant diseases, and food-testing results. 
Whether the above identified tools of information-gathering are active, reactive 
or interactive largely depends on how regulators deploy the tools. Actually, a broad 
range of variations are observed across the six Chinese food regulatory regimes, 
centring on how far regulators go in using these tools to collect information about the 
regulatees, and the extent to which these tools of information-gathering are applicable to 
the regulated entities. To provide an overall picture for analysis, Table 7-1 compares the 
level of applicability of different tools of information-gathering in the six observed 
Chinese food regulatory regimes. What needs to be emphasised here is that variations 
depicted in Table 7-1 are relative differences, with the six cases ranked against each 
other. 
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Table 7-1: Applicability and strength of information-gathering tools in different food regulatory regimes 
Food regulatory regimes 
Licensing/ 
registration 
Inspection 
Record keeping by 
regulatees 
Food testing by regulators Food testing by regulatees 
1. Domestic 
fruits/vegetables 
Low 
Large-sized 
producers 
Small-sized 
producers 
Large-sized 
producers 
Small-sized 
producers 
Large-sized 
producers 
Small-sized 
producers 
Large-sized 
producers 
Small-sized 
producers 
High Low High Low High Low High Low 
2. Exported 
fruits/vegetables 
High High High High High 
3. Domestic meat/dairy 
products 
Medium 
Large-sized 
producers 
Small-sized 
producers 
Large-sized 
producers 
Small-sized 
producers 
Large-sized 
producers 
Small-sized 
producers 
Large-sized 
producers 
Small-sized 
producers 
High Low High Low High Low High Low 
4. Exported meat/dairy 
products 
High High High High High 
5. Domestic 
manufactured food 
High 
Large-
sized 
producers 
Medium-
sized 
producers 
Small-
sized 
producers 
Large-
sized 
producers 
Medium-
sized 
producers 
Small-
sized 
producers 
Large-
sized 
producers 
Medium-
sized 
producers 
Small-
sized 
producers 
Large-
sized 
producers 
Medium-
sized 
producers 
Small-
sized 
producers 
Medium High Low High High High Medium High Low High High High 
6. Exported 
manufactured food 
High High High High High 
Source: author’s compilation, from previous literature, laws and regulations of the PRC and interviews conducted by the author 
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A pattern can be observed from Table 7-1: while a police-patrol oversight 
approach is consistently found across different exported food regulatory regimes, a 
mixed form of reactive and interactive approaches is used in the regimes for domestic 
food products. This pattern will be attributed to the factors of regulatory capacity and 
international pressure for detailed analysis in the following sections. In short, for the 
domestic food sectors, regulators have limited capacity in terms of information-
gathering to detect non-compliance activities of all food producers. A mixed method 
based on reactive and interactive approaches is, therefore, selected. The scale of 
production is the key factor determining the tools, sizes and styles of information-
gathering. In general, more regulatory effort is put on large enterprises so as to cover the 
maximum amount of food within limited regulatory resources. Meanwhile, to safeguard 
the reputation of products ‘Made in China’, a comprehensive and active approach of 
information-gathering is used to monitor non-compliance activities in the exported food 
sectors. Nonetheless, this study argues that the pattern can be altered by food safety 
crises: food scandals prompt regulators to adjust their focus towards affected foodstuffs, 
especially if the food incidents are associated with extensive international scrutiny such 
as export bans.  
7.2 Information-gathering on domestic fruits/vegetables and 
meat/dairy products 
Given that only minor variations are observed in terms of methods of information-
gathering between different agricultural subsectors, to avoid repetition, this section will 
discuss the agricultural food sector as a whole category rather than separating into 
fruits/vegetables and meat/dairy products. Tools deployed to gather information about 
agricultural food safety and quality include licensing/registration, inspection, record 
keeping, and food testing. In terms of regulatory variation, it mainly centres on how far 
these tools are deployed to monitor the regulated entities, and the amount of information 
obtained from the regulatees. In the following analysis, it can be seen that a reactive 
approach is adopted for small-sized producers; on the other hand, more effort is put into 
producers of a large size. 
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7.2.1 Small-sized producers 
At the local level, to detect whether farming activities are in compliance with the 
established standards and guidelines, farmlands are inspected by the Guangdong 
Department of Agriculture and the City A Bureau of Agriculture. Down to the level of 
District B, inspection work is delegated to the District B Pollution-free Food Inspection 
Station and the District B Animal Health Inspection Institute, which are ‘professional 
units’ (shiye danwei) affiliated with the City A Bureau of Agriculture (see Section 5.1 in 
Chapter 5).  
The frequency of farmland inspection in District B is very low for small-scaled 
individual farms and farming households. During fieldwork, it was common to find out 
family farms in villages which were not inspected by regulators, although they cropped 
and reared animals for sale (Interviewees 15-19). A farmer claimed:  
Inspectors have never visited us in my farming life, not for more than thirty 
years. Since we farm in a very small scale and our products are not sold in large 
cities, inspectors don’t have the time and incentive to visit us. To be honest, 
even if they visit us, we can simply tell them we are farming for our own 
consumption but not for sale. How can they check? Everyone can sell their 
products such as fresh meat and vegetables in wet markets here or any places 
actually (Interviewee 16). 
The lack of a registration system is one of the reasons accounting for this very 
low inspection frequency. As farmers are not required to register for agriculture, this 
imposes challenges on regulators to sort out the locations of farmlands, especially for 
those individual farmers located in remote and rural areas. Moreover, traditional 
Chinese family farmers mainly farm for their own consumption while they only sell 
their livestock and crops in the market when there is surplus. This makes farmlands 
producing for private consumption and producing for sale hardly distinguishable. 
Notwithstanding the lack of a registration system, inspectors have other means 
to gather information about farming activities. When asked if they had seen any 
inspectors on other occasions, farmers pointed out that there were some lectures or 
workshops organised by regulators that they were obliged to attend:  
Lectures or workshops on food safety with compulsory attendance are held 
every two years. At these events, we got chance to meet officers from the 
agricultural authority. They normally ask us some basic questions about 
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pesticides and animal drugs that we are using at that moment. But they do not 
check if we are telling them the truth. In past workshops, they taught us the 
correct ways of using chemicals in agriculture, and repeatedly emphasised the 
dangers and consequence of incorrect use of chemicals in farming activities. 
Sometimes samples of pesticides and animal drugs were distributed free to us 
(Interviewee 17). 
However, the efficacy of these lectures or workshops is in doubt because 
farmers are not monitored if they have applied what they have learnt in the real practice 
of farming, and regulators are also unable to assess whether their advice is implemented. 
7.2.2 Large-sized producers 
Despite the lack of a registration system, visits to large-sized cooperative economic 
organisations, rural cooperatives and factory farms are comparatively much more 
frequent. The relatively high inspection rate compared with small-sized farmers is a 
consequence of a limited regulatory capacity. 
In District B, the District B Pollution-free Food Inspection Station and the 
District B Animal Health Inspection Institute are required to create yearly and monthly 
inspection plans for farmlands in their governing areas, as well as weekly inspection 
schedules of farmlands visits. The pledge made by the District B Pollution-free Food 
Inspection Station is to inspect all farmlands in their areas at least once per week, as 
shown on the public notice board outside the station (Observation 2). However, 
regulatory resources and the capacity of the station are inadequate in that regulators 
cannot meet the said publicised pledge. For example, in 2009, the District B Pollution-
free Food Inspection Station only had fifteen employees and one vehicle for farmland 
visits (Observation 2), while the total area of District B is as large as approximately 900 
square kilometres. As a result, the station could only afford to visit the three large-
scaled rural cooperatives and factory farms in its area about twice a week on average, 
while leaving the remaining small-sized farms unvisited. An inspector emphasised in 
the interview that production scale of farms is their key consideration, arguing that:  
Production scale of agribusinesses is much higher than of individual farmers, 
and undoubtedly it is more cost-efficient for us to allocate our limited regulatory 
resources to monitor their performance…We allocate our limited regulatory 
resources to large farms because we can save time sorting out the locations of 
farming activities and travelling around those very tiny farmlands. Agribusiness 
rarely moves around and they are engaged to production throughout the year, 
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while their livestock and crops are undoubtedly for sale in the market 
(Interviewee 5). 
To verify if a true picture was portrayed by the inspector, a reference can be 
made to some national and Guangdong statistics. As shown in Chapter 5 (Section 5.4.1), 
the structure of agriculture in China is characterised by the domination of family farms 
– in 2006, 99.8% of agricultural producers in the whole country were small-sized 
farming households (see Figure 5-8 in Chapter 5) (National Bureau of Statistics of 
China, 2008). Similarly, in Guangdong Province, 99.7% of agricultural producers were 
small-sized producers (see Figure 5-9 in Chapter 5) (The Statistics Bureau of 
Guangdong Province, 2008). Having a huge number of farming households/family 
farms, it is conceivable that regulatory resources are inadequate to meet the said 
publicised pledge of inspecting all farmlands at least once per week. The argument 
made by the inspector is that it is more cost-effective to focus on large-scale production 
units in the situation of inadequate regulatory capacity and it seems to be valid. 
In addition to inspection, record keeping by farmers is another important source 
of information for regulators to understand and monitor farming activities, and to trace 
the origin when there are food incidents. In District B, record keeping typically takes the 
form of filling in log books, which are consistently designed by the District B Pollution-
free Food Inspection Station and the District B Animal Health Inspection Institute and 
distributed to large-sized farms. Information gathered in log books includes the 
application of pesticides, animal drugs, fertilisers and other chemicals, the outbreak of 
animal diseases or plant diseases, and harvesting (Observations 1 and 2). Farm 
operators are required to complete the log books on a daily basis, while the log books 
have to be kept for two years. A farm operator claimed that filling in log books is their 
routine work and the task is not difficult, although sometimes they may forget to do it 
(Interviewee 20). During farm inspection, inspectorates can request farm operators to 
submit their log books for checking (Observations 1 and 2). When food safety incidents 
are reported, the check of log books on the involved products is normally more frequent 
and more comprehensive (Interviewees 4 and 5). This indicates that to a certain extent, 
information-gathering of domestic agricultural product is scandal-driven.  
Notably this record-keeping requirement is only mandatory for cooperative 
economic organisations, rural cooperatives and factory farms but optional for individual 
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farmers and farming households ("The PRC Agricultural Product Quality Safety Law," 
2006).  It is also adopted in slaughterhouses, wholesale markets, wet markets and 
supermarkets, with information recorded mainly related to the sources of the 
agricultural products, dates of purchase, and results of food testing. 
As a tool to gather information about food risks, food testing by producers 
themselves is mandatory for large farms ("The PRC Agricultural Product Quality Safety 
Law," 2006, Article 26). Before sending their produce to wholesale markets and 
retailers, cooperative economic organisations, rural cooperatives, and factory farms are 
required to carry out food tests on their produce. Food sample tests can either be 
conducted by laboratories established in the farm sites, or delegated to external food 
testing centres, laboratories and research institutes which are ‘professional units’ (shiye 
danwei) affiliated with the government (see Section 5.1 in Chapter 5). In a similar vein, 
wholesale markets and large-scaled retailers such as supermarkets are obliged to 
establish food testing laboratories at their sites or send samples to external laboratories 
for testing. Food-testing results should be kept for two years. If non-compliance of 
standards is detected in food tests, operators of farms, wholesale markets and retailers 
should report to the agricultural authorities within a stated period (i.e. normally three 
days). In City A, the City A Administration for Industry and Commerce further requests 
supermarkets to post their food-testing results on their noticeboards, allowing 
consumers to obtain food safety information about vegetables, fruits and meat they 
purchase (Interviewee 7). 
In parallel, to monitor if agricultural food producers and sellers deliberately 
manipulate food-testing results, regulators also carry out food tests themselves. For 
example, both the District B Pollution-free Food Inspection Station and the District B 
Animal Health Inspection Institutes are equipped with analytical equipment and 
facilities for food tests. On the one hand, they conduct a duplicated test on the same 
sample that the food businesses have already tested. On the other hand, they collect their 
own samples for testing from cooperative economic organisations, rural cooperatives, 
factory farms, wholesale markets, wet markets and supermarkets. Regulatory bodies 
also station their staff in slaughterhouses to carry out tests, where the scope of tests 
covers animal disease, parasites and animal drug residue. In District B, there are four 
designated slaughterhouses and in each slaughterhouse, there are around fifteen 
 172 
stationed officers sent by the District B Animal Health Inspection Institute (Interviewee 
4). While the regulatory body aimed to conduct urine tests for every batch of pigs, again, 
this goal was impeded by the lack of adequate resources including manpower and 
equipment. As a result, only one third of pigs were tested in slaughterhouses 
(Observation 1). An inspector claimed:  
There are around 4,000 pigs per day sent for slaughtering in District B. It is 
impossible for us to carry out urine tests for every bath of pigs, although the test 
is rapid and useful for detecting drug residues. Despite us being stationed in 
slaughterhouses on a 24-hour basis, we can only check the appearance and smell 
of animals for slaughtering. If we recognise symptoms of animal diseases, we 
will conduct further tests. As you may know, making judgement depends on the 
experience of inspectors. But as we are suffering from a high staff turnover 
because of the unattractive job nature and salary, our tasks become more and 
more challenging (Interviewee 4).  
Based on prevailing public concern and food incidents, regulators do modify the 
contents and methods of food testing and analysis. For example, in 2009, more than 
seventy food poisoning cases were reported in Guangzhou City of Guangdong Province, 
resulting from the intake of pork contaminated with ractopamine  (i.e. ‘lean meat 
powder’) ("Seventy people poisoned," 2009). After the incident, a specific test for 
ractopamine was added to the content of tests of meat as a mandatory requirement 
(Interviewee 4). In a similar manner, the crisis of milk adulterated with melamine in 
2008 has also induced a change in food testing of dairy products. In response to 
incidents involving food suppliers who use the loopholes of established tests and add 
harmful melamine to maximise their profits (see Section 2.2.5 in Chapter 2), the 
government has introduced new instruments which can directly determine the protein 
content to tests of milk, infant formula and dairy products (Interviewee 4). Other special 
tests on particular products are also assigned to regulatory bodies or food testing 
laboratories at the local levels by the Guangdong Department of Agriculture 
(Guangdong Department of Agriculture, 2008a). Test results of the designated products 
have to be submitted to the department by a given deadline. While selections of 
products mostly depend on food incidents or food issues under public concern in 
Guangdong Province, they are sometimes commanded by the Ministry of Agriculture at 
the central level (Interviewees 8 and 14). A list is released online detailing the origins 
where test samples are drawn (Guangdong Department of Agriculture, n.d.), and the 
statistics about the numbers of food samples that each inspection unit has collected 
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(Guangdong Department of Agriculture, 2014). Regarding test results, they are updated 
online on a regular basis (Guangdong Food Safety Commission, 2013), covering results 
of both agricultural food products and manufactured food products. 
At the same time, consumer complaints, as an important source of information 
for regulators, can also lead to regulatory adjustments. Table 7-2 has summarised the 
number of consumer complaints on food products received by an official hotline in 
District B, as well as those handled by a national consumer association. As explained by 
an inspector, 
After receiving a consumer complaint, we will try to recognise the problem by 
investigation... The increasing trend of consumer complaints indeed puts some 
pressure on our work. To show the public we are committed to improving food 
safety, we are forced to make instant responses to consumer complaints, by 
carrying out inspection of the implicated producers and food tests. This, 
however, unavoidably alters our initial plan of work (Interviewee 5).  
Source: author’s compilation, from the webpage of China Consumers’ Association (China Consumers’ 
Association, 2009, 2011, 2012, 2013) and an internal document of District B Government 
In summary, from the above illustration it can be seen that regulators of the 
agricultural food sector face real difficulties in information-gathering. This is mainly for 
reason of inadequate regulatory capacity, given the huge number of diffused individual 
farmers and family farms in China, as well as the lack of a registration system in 
agriculture. As discussed in Chapter 1 (Section 1.1.1), the incapacity of regulators is a 
key challenge to regulatory enforcement in developing countries, and the above 
discussion has shown its profound implications for agricultural product regulation in 
China. Under constraint, regulators are inclined to devote their limited resources 
towards large-sized producers, which are at the same time legally required to build up 
Table 7-2: Consumer complaints on food products in District B and China 
Year 
Number of food 
complaints received 
by the official hotline 
of District B 
Percentage 
change 
(compared with 
last year) 
Number of food 
complaints in China 
(handled by China 
Consumers’ Association) 
Percentage 
change 
(compared with 
last year) 
2008 963 - 46,249 - 
2009 1,095 13.7% 36,698 -20.7% 
2010 1,276 16.5% 34,789 -5.2% 
2011 1,858 45.6% 39,082 12.3% 
2012 1,756 -5.5% 39,039 -0.1% 
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their own systems of record keeping and food testing. On the other hand, produce of 
small-sized producers remain unmonitored to a large extent. Nevertheless, this pattern is 
altered by food incidents, public concern and complaints, which also serve as an 
important source of information-gathering for regulators. In general, regulators act in 
response to food incidents and complaints by increasing the frequencies of inspection 
and food testing of involved products, or by introducing new food tests when necessary.  
7.3 Information-gathering on domestic manufactured food 
products 
Compared with domestic agricultural food products, a more extensive range of 
information-gathering tools is legally applicable to all domestic manufactured food 
producers regardless of their size. However, in practice, it is observed that there are 
significant variations in how far these tools are implemented, and how often regulators 
turn a blind eye to non-compliance of these information provision requirements. 
Notably the variations are partly based on size of producers and partly not. 
7.3.1 Information-gathering tools applicable to all producers 
regardless of their size 
Regarding information-gathering tools which are consistently applicable to all domestic 
manufactured food producers, these include licensing/registration, record keeping and 
food testing. 
First, a three-licence system is applicable to all producers in the food 
manufacturing industry. The registration/licensing system was first put into place in 
China as early as in the 1980s. Under the PRC Food Hygiene Law (Trial 
Implementation) enacted in 1982, a ‘food hygiene licence’ is required in the fields of 
food manufacturing, sale and catering ("The PRC Food Hygiene Law (Trial 
Implementation)," 1982, Article 26). Another permit, ‘business licence’, was introduced 
in 1987 by the State Administration for Industry and Commerce under the PRC 
Provisions on the Registration Procedures of Individual Industrial and Commercial 
Households (The State Administration for Industry and Commerce, 1987, Article 6). 
Despite the legal mandate to register, the two licensing requirements were loosely 
enforced during the early period (P. Liu, 2010b, pp. 249-250). 
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A turning point emerged in the early 2000s that drove the government regulatory 
bodies to put forward the licensing/registration system as a market access mechanism 
for the food processing industry, and this turning point is closely related to food 
incidents. In the early 2000s, China witnessed a series of extensive food incidents such 
as pork contaminated by ractopamine in 2001 and fake infant formula in 2004
35
. During 
that time, the State Council and the General Administration of Quality Supervision, 
Inspection and Quarantine (AQSIQ) perceived small food workshops as the key source 
of food risk; and these small businesses mainly run without the required licences (Y. 
Liu, 2011). As a response to food incidents, the State Council and AQSIQ decided to 
put forward the market access system in the food industry by enacting the PRC 
Regulation on Production Licence of Industrial Products (The State Council, 2005, 
Article 2.1) and the PRC Implementation Rule on Quality Safety Supervision of 
Manufactured Food Enterprises (Trial) (The General Administration of Quality 
Supervision Inspection and Quarantine, 2005). Under the two rules, all food processing 
units, regardless of their production size, have to obtain a ‘production licence’ before its 
start-up. The production licence is valid for a period of three years (The State Council, 
2005, Article 25). A licensed food product should contain the ‘QS’ (i.e. quality safe) 
label on the packaging, indicating that it meets the established standards and is allowed 
to circulate in the domestic market (The General Administration of Quality Supervision 
Inspection and Quarantine, 2005, Articles 5, 46-51). Food retailers, on the other hand, 
have to ensure that all products they sell are with the ‘QS’ label and other required 
certificates ("The PRC Product Quality Law," 2000, Article 33).  
Similarly, as a response to food scandals, the Ministry of Health (MoH) also 
further strengthened its food hygiene licensing system by enacting the PRC 
Administrative Rule on Food Hygiene Licence in 2005 (Ministry of Health, 2005). 
According to this rule, the issue of food hygiene licence is subject to conditions of food 
handling, preparing or producing procedure, raw agricultural products and food 
additives used, working conditions and hygiene, food processing facilities and 
equipment, pollution-prevention measures, food packaging and training provided to 
                                                 
35
 In November 2001, 484 persons in Heyuan City of Guangdong Province suffered from food poisoning 
after consuming pork contaminated by toxic chemical ractopamine. In 2003, ham factories in Jinhua City 
of Zhejiang Province were discovered to have used a toxic chemical dichlorvos as a preservative to 
control pests. In 2004, fake formula milk of little nutritional value was found in Fuyang City of Anhui 
Province. At least twelve infants died because of malnutrition. 
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workers (Ministry of Health, 2005, Articles 11-13). The food hygiene licence is valid 
for a period of four years (Ministry of Health, 2005, Article 27).  
Second, in terms of record keeping, all manufactured food producers are legally 
required to keep records of their production and sale activities, and these records should 
be kept for three years (The General Administration of Quality Supervision Inspection 
and Quarantine, 2005, Article 55). Different from agriculture, log books for record are 
not distributed by the regulatory bodies but designed by food producers themselves. 
Information included in a production log book usually covers sources of raw food 
ingredients and additives and food test results; meanwhile, a sale log book normally 
covers information about final products, batch and serial number, details of purchaser, 
quantity sold and date (Interviewee 25 and Observation 3). Based on these records, food 
businesses have to submit an annual report to the Provincial Bureau of Quality and 
Technical Supervision to give a description of their product quality and safety (The 
General Administration of Quality Supervision Inspection and Quarantine, 2005, Article 
56).  
Third, regarding food testing, according to the PRC Food Hygiene Law ("The 
PRC Food Hygiene Law," 1995, Article 18), all manufactured food producers are 
required to test their food products based on the established food standards before 
sending them out from the production site. Food producers can either install food testing 
facilities and equipment in their site, or commission food tests to external laboratories 
(The General Administration of Quality Supervision Inspection and Quarantine, 2005, 
Article 16). In either case, food producers should annually send samples of their tested 
products to a designated laboratory for a duplicated test (The General Administration of 
Quality Supervision Inspection and Quarantine, 2005, Article 38). 
What needs to be emphasised here is that notwithstanding the legal requirements 
of obtaining licences, record keeping and food testing, the fieldwork revealed that these 
measures were not consistently adopted across different producers. Compliance was 
particularly low for small-sized food workshops. For example, there was a large amount 
of food workshops running without obtaining the three licences, keeping production and 
sale records, or carrying out food test before selling their food products (Interviewees 
22-24 and Observation 4). While all these behaviours are associated with infringement 
of regulation, they will be further discussed in Chapter 8 on behaviour-modification. 
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7.3.2 Information-gathering tools based on the size of producers 
On top of the above tools which are legally applicable to all manufactured food 
producers, there are other information-gathering measures that the deployment of which 
is largely based on the size of producers. Production site inspection made by regulatory 
bodies is one of them. Similarly to the agricultural sector, the frequency of inspection 
varies between large-scaled food factories, medium-sized firms and small family-based 
or individually-run food workshops. Typically, more frequent visits are paid to food 
businesses with larger production scales and higher market shares. These include 
enterprises of designated size and above, and enterprises below designated size but with 
more than ten workers. Small food workshops, on the other hand, are inspected less 
often. 
In Guangdong Province, inspections to food production sites are mainly carried 
out by the Guangdong Bureau of Quality and Technical Supervision and the Guangdong 
Department of Health, and sometimes by the Guangdong Administration for Industry 
and Commerce. Typical inspection areas cover premises, equipment, workers, raw food, 
storage facilities such as fridges and freezers, and pollution prevention measures 
(Interviewee 25 and Observation 3). 
Similarly to the agricultural food sector, the variation in terms of inspection 
frequency can be attributed to the incapacity of regulators. An inspector commented in 
the interview that small workshops exist in a huge quantity and are geographically 
dispersed; therefore, regulatory resources required to inspect them are inevitably 
inadequate (Interviewee 11). Inspection work becomes more complicated for some 
small food businesses which operate seasonally, such as those festive food producers. 
The inspector argued: 
Given inadequate regulatory capacity, targeting two types of large and medium 
enterprises (i.e. enterprises of designated size and above, and enterprises below 
designated size but with more than ten workers) at least enables us to monitor 
approximately 90% of total processed food products in the market. This is a 
pragmatic approach to cover the maximum amount of processed food products 
under severe constraints on limited regulatory resources (Interviewee 11). 
When asked if data could be provided to supplement the argument that the two 
types of enterprises produce 90% of total processed food products in Guangdong 
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Province, the regulator denied the request in the interview. However, an inference can 
be made from the national figures. As discussed in Chapter 5 (see Figure 5-11), in 2007, 
food enterprises of designated size and above produced 72% of the total market share in 
China, whereas enterprises below designated size but with more than ten workers 
produced 18.7% of the total. In contrast, small businesses or workshops with fewer than 
ten workers only produced 9.3% of the total (The State Council Information Office, 
2007). The official figures appear to support the argument that monitoring the two types 
of enterprises can control most of the processed food products in the industry.  
Seemingly this strategy is inconsistent with the view of the State Council and the 
AQSIQ that small food workshops are the key source of food risks. When discussing 
the higher probability of food incidents that small food workshop may cause, the 
inspector admitted the problem. Nevertheless, he justified the decision of regulatory 
resources allocation by the reason of restricted circulation in the market:  
In most circumstances only products of large and medium enterprises are 
allowed to circulate in the market across the country. On the other hand, food 
products produced by small food workshops can only circulate in local groceries 
in townships or villages. Even if food incidents come about, the negative impact 
is restricted to townships or villages only (Interviewee 11). 
Various interviews with the regulated food businesses have further confirmed 
the finding that inspection force is focused on large and medium food producers. The 
owner of a food manufacturing factory (i.e. below designated size but with more than 
ten workers) claimed that his factory was inspected by the city-level Bureau of Quality 
and Technical Supervision four times per year, and by the district-level Health 
Inspection Institute twice per year (Interviewee 25). In comparison, inspection of small 
food workshops is far less frequent. The owner of a small food workshop (i.e. with four 
workers) admitted that over the past three years its workplace was only inspected once 
by the district-level Health Inspection Institute when he applied for the ‘food hygiene 
licence’ (Interviewee 23). Another small workshop (i.e. with two workers) running 
without any licences in a village has never been inspected since its start-up two years 
ago. Owners of the two small workshops emphasised that their cases are not exceptional: 
“Most of the small workshops running in our village are not inspected by inspectorate. 
As far as I know, there are more than ten alike small food workshops here” (Interviewee 
22). 
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Alteration to this inspection pattern is made according to the business’s history 
of compliance, consumer complaints and the occurrence of food incidents. First, 
according to the PRC Implementation Rule on Quality Safety Supervision of 
Manufactured Food Enterprises (Trial) (The General Administration of Quality 
Supervision Inspection and Quarantine, 2005), the regulatory body should re-visit food 
manufacturers with history of non-compliance (The General Administration of Quality 
Supervision Inspection and Quarantine, 2005, Article 60). On the other hand, large-
sized enterprises with HACCP certifications or having passed consecutive food tests can 
be inspected at a lower rate (The General Administration of Quality Supervision 
Inspection and Quarantine, 2005, Article 39). The rule also indicates that inspection 
force should be reinforced in areas where quality/safety problems are reported (The 
General Administration of Quality Supervision Inspection and Quarantine, 2005, Article 
65). A regulator explained that such measure can resume public confidence on food 
‘Made in China’ and more importantly, avoid public anger towards the government 
(Interviewee 11). 
The abolishment of the ‘inspection-exemption’ scheme after the melamine milk 
scandal in 2008 provides strong evidence indicating the impacts of food incidents or 
scandals on inspection work. In 2001, an ‘inspection-exemption’ scheme was 
introduced by the AQSIQ (The General Administration of Quality Supervision 
Inspection and Quarantine, 2001), allowing high-quality food commodities meeting 
certain criteria to be free from inspection and food testing by all regulatory bodies at 
central, provincial, city and township levels. To gain the recognition, the product should 
obtain a leading market share in its sector, meet the established national food standards, 
and pass three consecutive inspections and food tests carried out by the Provincial 
Bureaux of Quality and Technical Supervision (The General Administration of Quality 
Supervision Inspection and Quarantine, 2001, Article 8). Each of the ‘inspection-
exemption’ recognitions was valid for three years (The General Administration of 
Quality Supervision Inspection and Quarantine, 2001, Article 12), while the designated 
products could have the ‘inspection-exemption’ label printed on the package.  
However, shortly after the report of melamine milk poisoning cases in 2008 (see 
Section 2.2.5 in Chapter 2), the ‘inspection-exemption’ scheme was criticised by the 
public and media as a total regulatory failure, and it was finally abolished by the 
 180 
Chinese Central Government. Before the incident, milk, baby milk and powdered milk 
of Sanlu were awarded the ‘inspection-exemption’ recognition. As a requirement, Sanlu 
had to submit annual reports to the AQSIQ, detailing food-testing results conducted by 
the company and other issues concerning product quality (The General Administration 
of Quality Supervision Inspection and Quarantine, 2001, Article 14). However, the State 
Council’s investigation revealed that Sanlu had been receiving complaints about sick 
infants since December 2007, but it neither conducted any food tests until June 2008 nor 
reported the suspicious quality problem to the AQSIQ. The company was criticised by 
the public of using the loophole of  the ‘inspection-exemption’ scheme to protect their 
business interests, and as a result fail to take remedy measures in due course ("Food 
cover-up fatal," 2008).  
As a response to the incident, the AQSIQ delivered a proclamation in September 
2008 to revoke all ‘inspection-exemption’ recognitions that were previously awarded to 
food commodities (The General Administration of Quality Supervision Inspection and 
Quarantine, 2008). On the next day, the State Council further requested the AQSIQ to 
abolish the whole ‘inspection-exemption’ scheme for all industrial products in China 
(The General Administration of Quality Supervision Inspection and Quarantine, 2008). 
The AQSIQ explicitly declared: 
In face of the current melamine milk incident of Sanlu Group in Shijiazhuang 
City, the AQSIQ has recognised the special nature of food production and the 
intricate causes of food incidents. To ensure food safety and protect the interest 
of consumers, the AQSIQ has decided to strengthen the regulatory force towards 
food production units. Henceforth, all ‘inspection-exemption’ recognitions on 
food products are revoked, while food producers can no longer claim their 
products as ‘inspection-exempted’ (The General Administration of Quality 
Supervision Inspection and Quarantine, 2008). 
On top of the abolition of the ‘inspection-exemption’ scheme, the inspection 
pattern also underwent changes after the melamine milk scandal. During the period, all 
regulatory bodies at the Guangdong provincial level (i.e. the Guangdong Bureau of 
Quality and Technical Supervision, the Guangdong Department of Health, the 
Guangdong Administration for Industry and Commerce, and the Guangdong 
Department of Agriculture) were commanded by the Chinese Central Government to 
devote their full regulatory capacities to inspect and conduct food testing on the sixty 
powdered milk companies running in Guangdong Province. On the other hand, 
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regulatory bodies at the city level or below were responsible for inspection and food 
testing of other food products (Interviewee 11). 
In summary, similar to the domestic agricultural food sector, the above 
illustration has indicated that information-gathering in the domestic manufactured food 
sector is impeded by inadequate regulatory capacity, despite the fact that more 
comprehensive information-gathering tools have been legally imposed on producers 
regardless of their size. Meanwhile, efforts of information-gathering are adjusted 
according to the prevailing situation of the manufactured food industry; and in 
particular, towards foodstuffs involved in scandals and consumer complaints. Using the 
words of an interviewed regulator (Interviewee 11), the adjustment aims to safeguard 
the reputation of food ‘Made in China’ and reinstate public confidence in Chinese food. 
7.4 Information-gathering on exported food products 
In this section, information-gathering on exported food products will be discussed, and 
it can be observed that a very different approach – an active ‘police-patrol’ approach, is 
deployed by regulators. Provided that methods of information-gathering and their 
applicability are largely equivalent among all exported food producers in China, this 
section will discuss the exported food sector as a whole category rather than separating 
into exported fruits/vegetables, exported meat/dairy products and exported 
manufactured food products. 
In Guangdong Province, Guangdong Entry-Exit Inspection and Quarantine 
Bureau is delegated with the power of information-gathering in the exported food sector. 
It has set up 33 branches in twenty cities and counties across the province, 100 sub-
branches and three sub-sections in the key ports of air, land or sea. In total, it employs 
more than 5,000 officers who wear a uniform distributed by the AQSIQ (Guangdong 
Entry-Exit Inspection and Quarantine Bureau, 2010). As discussed in Chapter 5 
(Section 5.1), all CIQs across the country are under the central government’s direct 
leadership and supervision through the AQSIQ. Under a vertical administration, 
information-gathering tools are universally applied on all types of food producers. 
These tools range from licensing/registration, to record keeping, to inspection and food 
testing.  
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In the exported food sector in China, a market access system is universally 
applied to both farming and food manufacturing. In other words, all farms and food 
processing enterprises are required to obtain an ‘export licence’ before exporting food 
abroad. For example, farms need to acquire an ‘export licence’ from the  provincial 
CIQs before start-up; similarly, manufactured food producers have to obtain an ‘export 
licence’ on top of the ‘food hygiene licence’, ‘business licence’ and ‘food production 
licence’ as required in the domestic manufactured food regime (see Section 7.3.1 above). 
At ports, the CIQs inspect every batch of products to confirm they come from registered 
farms or enterprises with an ‘export licence’. 
The ‘export licence’ issued by the CIQs imposes a wide range of controls on 
production conditions, including production scale, hygiene, environment, facilities and 
equipment, and professional training offered to workers. Specifically, family farms and 
small food workshops are precluded from gaining an ‘export licence’. In other words, 
small producers are ineligible to export food abroad despite the quality and safety of 
their food commodities. Meanwhile, the produce used in exported food manufacturers 
should be sourced from registered farms, which are usually either directly owned by the 
manufacturers, or directly managed and controlled by them.  
All exporting farms and manufactured food enterprises are legally required to 
keep records on its production process and sale, while these records are regularly 
checked by the CIQs ("The PRC Law on Import and Export Commodity Inspection," 
2002). For farmlands, information included in record keeping covers dates of planting 
and harvesting, chemical applications, food-testing results and details of importers. All 
exporting pig farms in Guangdong Province are further required to be equipped with an 
electronic recording device, which allows each batch of pigs to have a clear record on 
the use of feed and animal drugs, as well as the outbreak of animal diseases 
("Understanding the properties of avian influenza," 2014).  
For exporting manufactured food producers, while the produce used in food 
processing should be sourced from registered farms, they have to keep a record of 
details of the farms. Other information kept on record covers applications of food 
additives, food-testing results, conditions of production equipment and health conditions 
of workers. Sale record covers information about finished products for exportation and 
importing companies (Interviewee 12). The manager of a company processing food for 
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export claimed that their company has good intention and good practice to follow the 
record-keeping requirements and fill in all log books on a daily basis. Despite its 
satisfactory history of compliance, the company was encouraged by the regulator to 
install equipment which automatically measures and records temperatures of the factory, 
fridges and freezers (Interviewee 12). The manager claimed:  
Basically we are mindful of fulfilling every requirement and taking every piece 
of advice given by regulators. Our business reputation is the most important 
capital in the overseas market. Therefore, we, in a cooperative manner, offer all 
types of information requested by regulators, in order to prove that our products 
can meet the international food standards (Interviewee 12).  
If border rejections happen, these production and sale records are 
comprehensively checked by the CIQs. A regulator claimed: 
We are keen on protecting the reputation of food ‘Made in China’. If exported 
food commodities are banned at ports of importing countries, we will check the 
whole record of all implicated producers. Based on these records, we try to sort 
out the source of problem and provide recommendations to producers for 
rectification (Interviewee 10).  
The CIQs also carry out production site inspection of exported food producers. 
In Guangdong Province, manufactured food enterprises for export are inspected twice 
per year (Interviewee 10). Areas of inspection typically cover premises, facilities, 
equipment, workers, raw food and records of production and sale (Interviewee 12). 
Apart from inspections conducted by the CIQs, in some exceptional cases inspections 
can also be carried out by foreign regulatory bodies, depending on the 
bilateral/multilateral agreement. For example, according to a food import agreement 
signed between Hong Kong and the mainland China (Centre for Food Safety of the 
HKSAR Government, 2013), food imports from China is restricted to a limited number 
of Chinese suppliers. As routine control measures, officers from Hong Kong can visit 
and inspect these farms in China throughout the year without prior consent being given 
by the Chinese government. Onsite samples can be collected by officers from Hong 
Kong for testing. 
Testing of exported food is run by the CIQs at ports including air, land, or sea. 
Standards applied for testing are food standards of the importing countries or standards 
of international organisations such as the Codex and the ISO, depending on agreements 
with other trading partners (see Chapter 6). Instead of carrying out food tests by 
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sampling as what the domestic food regulatory regimes do, every batch of agricultural 
or manufactured food products for exportation is tested. Products passing the required 
food tests are accompanied by declaration forms, certificates, and/or identification tags 
about health quarantine, animal and plant quarantine and commodity inspection (D. 
Yang, 2004). The customs only permits commodities with declaration forms issued by 
the CIQs to leave the country ("The PRC Food Hygiene Law," 1995, Article 31) 
To explain why food testing is more comprehensively carried out in exported 
food products, the concern of international image is a key reason. An officer claimed 
that: 
Food safety is an issue of high concern to the Chinese Central Government, 
especially since exported food is related to international trade and trade dispute. 
This is the reason why the AQSIQ at the central level has clear commands over 
local CIQs to run food tests on all batches of products for export, and to inspect 
their production sites on a regular basis. All these measures aim to secure the 
worldwide image of food ‘Made in China’, and show the international world that 
China is a responsible trading partner (Interviewee 10).  
This intention of safeguarding international image is also reflected by the PRC 
Law of Import and Export Commodity Inspection ("The PRC Law on Import and Export 
Commodity Inspection," 2002), which explicitly explains that the legislative aim of the 
law is to “advance China’s economic and trade relations with other countries” ("The 
PRC Law on Import and Export Commodity Inspection," 2002, Article 1). The law 
specifies the details of inspection and product testing for imported and exported 
commodities, while these strategies are more ‘police-patrol’ inclined and are in high 
applicability to all producers when compared with the domestic regimes.  
Although the police-patrol approach of state-based regulatory strategies is highly 
costly (Lodge & Wegrich, 2012, p. 75), this constraint is seemingly a minor concern for 
regulators and the Chinese government. When discussing regulatory capacity, an 
interviewed officer explained that this is not a major consideration for the CIQs, 
provided that their budgeting and personnel are all directly administered by the AQSIQ 
at the central government level (Interviewee 10). As the CIQs are fully funded by the 
central government, they do not need to generate profits or revenue themselves or 
compete with other government bodies for resources. 
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In summary, from the above illustration it can be seen that an active approach to 
information-gathering is adopted in the sector of exported food. For example, there is a 
‘police-patrol’ measure of testing every batch of food commodities at ports; there is also 
a stringent licensing system for export which facilitates the surveillance by the CIQs. 
Frequent inspections are also made by inspectors to scan the environment, seek and 
assemble information about the exported food industry. The institutional design of 
placing the CIQs directly under the supervision of the AQSIQ also reveals a centralised 
approach of information-gathering. Compared with the domestic food sector, regulators 
of the exported food sector are less affected by the limitation of regulatory incapacity 
when carrying out information-gathering tasks. This is not only due to the limited 
number of exported food producers in a registered list, but also the funding source of 
regulators directly allocated by the Chinese Central Government. In general, the active 
approach of information-gathering can be explained by international pressure and 
obligation. To protect or build the reputation of food ‘Made in China’, the Chinese 
government aims to keep the rejection rate low at ports of importing countries. In the 
meantime, this also reveals the understanding of the Chinese government that the 
police-patrol type of enforcement is a better solution that guarantees the detection of 
wrong-doings and violation of standards. 
7.5 Discussion: Impact of internationalisation of regulation on 
information-gathering 
In summary, the previous sections so far have discussed various tools of information-
gathering deployed by regulators in different Chinese food regulatory regimes (see the 
summary Table 7-1). Depending on how far these tools are used, active, reactive or 
interactive approaches of strategy are identified. In particular, a ‘police-patrol’ oversight 
approach of information-gathering is identified in the exported food regulatory regime. 
In contrast, the domestic food regulatory regime witnesses a more complex scenario. In 
both regimes for domestic agricultural food and domestic manufactured food products, 
tools of information-gathering vary between regulated entities with different sizes. 
Typically, a reactive approach is used for collecting information about the activities of 
small family farms and small food workshops. For example, regulators neither impose a 
licensing/registration system on farming activities, nor actively inspect the small food 
businesses. Instead, regulators tend to intervene in response to consumer complaints and 
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food incidents. On the other hand, for medium and large-sized farms and food factories 
with high production volumes, regulators use an interactive approach to information-
gathering. For example, factory farms and food manufacturing firms are required to 
keep production and sale records, conduct their own food testing and analysis, and 
submit reports of food-testing results to regulators. Meanwhile, regulators intervene 
according to the information they gather in these records and reports, as well as food 
incidents and consumer complaints.  
In explaining the pattern of variations in information-gathering, factors of 
incapacity of regulators, public concern and food incidents, and international pressure 
have been examined in the chapter, while these factors are linked to the analytical 
framework introduced in Chapter 3. This section aims to explore the question raised in 
the beginning of the chapter: ‘to what extent does internationalisation of regulation 
impact on information-gathering in different regulatory regimes?’  
First, international scrutiny and the mission to safeguard the reputation of food 
‘Made in China’ has driven the Chinese government to invest adequate regulatory 
resources in monitoring its exported food products, while at the same time applying an 
active and centralised approach of information-gathering. On the other hand, in the 
domestic food sectors where international pressure is relatively lower and the capacity 
of regulators is comparatively limited, regulators are prompted to concentrate their 
efforts in monitoring large producers and applying a reactive approach of information-
gathering towards small producers. In other words, the internationalisation of regulation 
seems to have had a much larger impact on the control component of information-
gathering in the exported food sector than the domestic food sector. 
Second, despite the observed pattern, information-gathering tools are not static 
and are modified by regulators according to the prevailing situation of public concern 
and food scandals. Consumer complaints, food scandals and thus the triggered scrutiny 
of food ‘Made in China’ would lead to a shift of information-gathering focus to the 
affected types of food. This strategy of adjustment does not only apply to the exported 
food sector but also the domestic sector. In other words, safeguarding the reputation of 
products ‘Made in China’ under the context of internationalisation of regulation is 
becoming increasingly influential in shaping information-gathering strategies, in spite 
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of the fact that the overall information-gathering capacity of regulators has not been 
significantly improved.  
In general, the impact of the internationalisation of regulation on the control 
component of information-gathering in the Chinese food safety regulatory regimes 
seems to be weaker when compared with that of standard-setting. As discussed in 
Chapter 6, there was strong evidence signalling the harmonisation of Chinese national 
food standards to international standards and practices. However, considering the area 
of information-gathering, the influence of international factor is comparatively weaker 
and mixed. In most cases, tools of information-gathering in the domestic food 
regulatory regimes are primarily determined by the availability of regulatory resources. 
Only under exceptional scenarios concerning food incidents or crises, activities of 
information-gathering are altered, to the direction of the implicated food products. This 
is mainly because national brands are a ‘competitive identity’ of a country (Anholt, 
2007), and branding is also crucial to the competitiveness of Chinese-made products in 
the highly liberalised world markets (Potter, 2009; Kapferer, 2012). 
In the next chapter, the final control component, namely behaviour-modification, 
will be examined across different food regulatory regimes. 
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Chapter 8 : Behaviour-modification in different food 
regulatory regimes 
Closely linked to the previous chapter, this chapter will examine another control 
component on regulatory enforcement – behaviour-modification. Being the ‘effector’ 
component in a regulatory regime, the intention of behaviour-modification is to 
influence the behaviour of the persons and institutions sought to be controlled, in order 
to ensure that the regulatory standard and target are accomplished (Hood et al., 2001). 
This chapter aims to address the inquiry ‘to what extent does internationalisation of 
regulation impact on behaviour-modification in different regulatory regimes?’ Different 
perspectives in the analytical framework introduced in Chapter 3 will be applied. 
This chapter finds out that across different domestic food sectors, persuasion-
based approaches of enforcement are applied to small food businesses; on the other 
hand, whilst regulators are inclined to use deterrence-based approaches such as fines to 
modify violating behaviours of large enterprises, the revocation of a licence is unlikely. 
In contrast, highly deterrent measures are consistently applied to all producers in the 
exported food sector. This chapter argues that the pattern of enforcement action taken 
can be attributed to localised interests and the international image of food ‘Made in 
China’. In particular, the concerns of local economic and employment development and 
tax revenue largely determine the choice of behaviour-modification tools in the 
domestic food regulatory regimes. Meanwhile, as an impact of the internationalisation 
of regulation, the Chinese Central Government is under global pressure to safeguard its 
reputation regarding food safety and product quality in order to maintain or expand the 
profitable export trade. Therefore, it drives regulators to react promptly to food 
incidents and scandals, and use a consistently deterrent approach of behaviour-
modification in regulating the exported food sector.  
The chapter is structured as follows: first, Section 8.1 will briefly describe the 
two approaches of behaviour-modification, namely deterrence and persuasion, and is 
then followed by a brief summary of their application in the six food regulatory regimes 
in China. In Section 8.2, tools of behaviour-modification in the regulatory regime for 
domestic fruits/vegetables and meat/dairy products will first be discussed, followed by 
that of manufactured food products in Section 8.3 and exported food products in Section 
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8.4. Finally, in Section 8.5, the chapter concludes by discussing the impact of 
internationalisation of regulation on behaviour-modification in the Chinese food 
regulatory regimes. In particular, tensions between the local factor of organised interests 
and the international factor of safeguarding the reputation of products ‘Made in China’ 
will be analysed.  
8.1 Varieties of behaviour-modification actions and their 
applicability 
Monitoring the regulated industry by information-gathering (see Chapter 7) and 
influencing their non-compliance activities by behaviour-modification are both crucial 
to effective enforcement, which is essential to the successful implementation of 
regulations – regulations which are not enforced or not enforceable cannot fulfil social 
objectives (Gunningham, 2010). In exploring measures of behaviour-modification, a 
wide range of tools can be identified, and in a broad sense, they can be classified into 
two approaches – deterrence and persuasive. The ‘deterrence’ approach is penal and 
uses prosecutions in order to deter future non-compliance (Reiss, 1984). On the other 
hand, the ‘persuasive’ approach is an accommodating approach not focused on 
retribution but on repair and results (Hawkins, 1984). By persuasion and education in a 
patient and open-ended manner, regulators explain the rationale behind the regulations 
and act as a facilitator to help the regulatees achieve compliance (Hutter, 1997). Hence, 
the regulatees are influenced by the regulators and comply with the regulations. As one 
can see that neither approach fits all circumstances, the adoption of one single approach 
is thus not common. The key to the successful implementation of regulations is to 
establish a balanced, multi-pronged strategy including both deterrence and persuasion 
(Braithwaite, 1985; Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992, p. 25). 
Across the six studied food regulatory regimes in China, tools deployed by 
regulators to modify behaviours of the regulated industry cover a broad range. These 
include persuasive measures such as education, leaflet distribution, banner display, talks 
for knowledge transfer, moderately deterrent measures such as fines, confiscation of 
produce and temporary closure, and drastic measures such as revocation of licences and 
closure of businesses. To provide an overall picture for analysis, Table 8-1 compares the 
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applicability of different tools of behaviour-modification in the six Chinese food 
regulatory regimes. 
Table 8-1: Major behaviour-modification tools adopted in different food 
regulatory regimes 
Food regulatory 
regimes 
Persuasive: 
Persuasive measures 
adopted, e.g. 
education, leaflets, 
banners, lectures 
Moderately-deterrent: 
Moderate measures adopted, 
e.g. fine, confiscation of 
produce and temporary 
closure 
Highly-deterrent: 
Drastic measures 
adopted, e.g. 
revocation of 
licence and closure 
of business 
1. Domestic 
fruits/vegetables 
 
(Small-sized farms) 
 
(Medium & large farms) 
 
2. Exported 
fruits/vegetables 
   
3. Domestic 
meat/dairy 
products 
 
(Small-sized farms) 
 
(Medium & large farms) 
 
4. Exported 
meat/dairy 
products 
   
5. Domestic 
manufactured 
food products 
 
(Small-sized 
workshops) 
 
(Medium & large factories) 
 
6. Exported 
manufactured 
food products 
   
Source: author’s compilation, from interviews conducted by the author 
 
From Table 8-1, a significant variation is observed across different food 
regulatory regimes, centring on the extent to which these tools of behaviour-
modification are applicable to the regulated entities. A pattern can be observed: in the 
domestic food sectors, whilst regulators are inclined to use deterrence-based approaches 
such as fines to modify the wrong-doing of large-sized producers, persuasion-based 
approaches of enforcement are applied to small-sized producers. In both cases, orders of 
temporary business suspension or permanent closure are seldom used. On the other 
hand, a highly-deterrent approach of behaviour-modification such as the temporary or 
permanent revocation of export licence is universally applied to all exported food 
producers. This is closely related to the element of information-gathering discussed in 
Chapter 7 – the heterogeneity may be seen as a strategy which aims to regulate the 
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largest volume of domestic food given the constraint of limited regulatory capacity. 
However, this study suggests that in addition to inadequate resources, the heterogeneity 
of behaviour-modification approaches is also induced by the intentional behaviour of 
regulators, given that their self-interest is inextricably linked to the industry. Further, 
food safety crises which trigger international scrutiny and impair the international image 
are able to override localised interests and bring about adjustments in behaviour-
modification.  
8.2 Behaviour-modification on domestic fruits/vegetables and 
meat/dairy products 
Given that only minor variations are observed in terms of methods of behaviour-
modification between different agricultural subsectors, to avoid repetition, this section 
will discuss the agricultural food sector as a whole category rather than separating into 
domestic fruits/vegetables and domestic meat/dairy products. In this section, it can be 
seen that variations in the domestic agricultural food sector largely depend on the size of 
the regulated farms. Whilst regulators are more likely to use the deterrence-based 
approach to sanction medium and large-sized farms, they are inclined towards the 
persuasion-based approach to educate small farmers.  
8.2.1 Medium and large-sized producers 
Deterrence-based tools are taken to modify the wrong-doings of medium and large-
sized farmers in China. These include warnings, rectification orders, fines and 
confiscation of benefits, depending on the degree of the violation ("The PRC 
Agricultural Product Quality Safety Law," 2006, Articles 43-54). If the breach of law 
constitutes a criminal offence, the offenders can be penalised pursuant to the PRC 
Criminal Law ("The PRC Criminal Law," 1997). Since licensing/registration is not 
necessary for farming in China (see Chapter 7), this prevents termination of licences 
being applicable as a tool of sanction. 
Interviews and observations indicate that the above deterrence-based tools are 
commonly applied in regulating cooperative economic organisations, rural cooperatives 
and factory farms but not individual farmers. In particular, regulators are keen on 
imposing fines on law-violating behaviours. For example, if banned drugs or 
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unacceptable residue levels are detected in a test for pigs, confiscation of the whole 
batch of pigs will be put into place, alongside a fine of RMB 2,000-20,000 
(approximately USD 292-2,920) (Observation 1). Similarly, when large-sized retailers 
such as supermarkets are found to have excessive residual drug levels in their meat for 
sale, a warning will be issued, together with a fine of RMB 2,000-20,000 
(approximately USD 292-2,920). For repeated violation, regulators might order the 
retailer to change its food supplier. 
An inspector explained in the interview: 
Fines together with the confiscation of produce should be sufficient to prevent 
repeated violation. If the violation brings extensive food poisoning or casualties, 
we will identify it as a criminal offence and transfer the case to the police for 
criminal prosecution. The transferred case will then be beyond our scope of 
control (Interviewee 4).  
But when a further confirmation of this argument is sought from the manager of 
a large factory farm in District B, a sceptical picture is shown. He said: 
Our produce accounts for more than 30% of the total volume of vegetables in 
District B. Do you think they (i.e. the regulators) will bring us to prosecution 
even if we are detected with serious breach of law? This implies our farms will 
close down. Of course we are behaving well and just do the right things 
(Interviewee 20). 
When discussing the fines imposed on them, the manager expressed his view: 
We all know that fines are the main revenue of the inspectorates. So they are 
keen on collecting fines for our every single wrong-doing. This is not surprising 
at all. There are only three large farms here in the district. If they do not fine us 
heavily for violations and make surcharges for food testing, who else here in the 
district is able to pay them these fees? (Interviewee 20) 
To further explore the budgeting of the inspectorates, an interview was 
conducted with a government official on personnel management of civil servants 
(Interviewee 6). He explained that the inspectorates are professional units (shiye danwei) 
(see Section 5.1 in Chapter 5) that they are not included in the establishment of civil 
service and hence are not fully supported by the civil service funding. While the City A 
Bureau of Agriculture subsidises part of their budgeting and finance, these inspectorates 
have to collect a charge for food testing and other services, as well as fines to meet the 
budget. Anything surplus to the budget can be converted to bonuses for employees of 
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the inspectorates (Interviewee 6). Under the circumstances, the arrangement of allowing 
fines to become financial returns to regulatory employees provides a strong incentive 
for the regulators to impose fines on the medium and large-sized farms, given that they 
are able to pay.  
8.2.2 Small-sized producers 
Whilst large farms are more likely to encounter deterrence-based enforcement, small 
farms are more likely to be treated with persuasion when law-violating behaviours are 
detected by regulators. Inspectors are hesitant to fine them as a punishment because of 
the specific circumstances of small farmers’ poor living conditions. In this sense, an 
enforcement gap may emerge as a result. An inspector explained: 
For example, in terms of violation of pesticide or fertiliser use, many small 
farmers have difficulties in paying the minimum fine of RMB 2,000 
(approximately USD 292) specified in the law. This is particularly common for 
those living in poverty. We should have provided assistance to them earlier. Can 
they pay this huge amount of fines? You may think we can lower the fine but the 
law does not provide us with any discretion. RMB 2,000 is the minimum amount 
specified in the law (Interviewee 5). 
The claim of being unable to pay the minimum fine is valid when a reference is 
made to the average income of farmers. In 2008, the average annual income of rural 
residents in Guangdong Province was RMB 6,400 (approximately USD 934) (The 
Statistics Bureau of Guangdong Province, 2010), a fine of RMB 2,000 entailing 31% of 
their annual income. Regulators admitted that under these circumstances they would 
prefer not to penalise the small-sized individual farmers and family farms at all 
(Interviewee 5). 
When further discussing what type of assistance the regulators provide to 
farmers, the interviewed official pointed out that it was financial assistance (Interviewee 
5). This can be explained by the fact that the agricultural authorities in China are also 
responsible for agricultural industry development, rural development, village economics 
and poverty reduction (see Section 5.4.3 in Chapter 5). While the possible conflicting 
roles of the authority may exist, an interviewed official clarified that all these are their 
mandates and they have their discretion to prioritise them (Interviewee 8). Although the 
officials denied that they would sacrifice food safety, the possible trade-off between 
village economics and agricultural food safety regulation might reduce the 
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aggressiveness of food safety enforcement work. Thus, an enforcement gap may emerge 
when the top priority of the agricultural authorities is not food safety. 
Instead of deterrent tools of enforcement, regulators are inclined to modify non-
compliance behaviours of small farmers by persuasion and education. In terms of 
persuasion, regulators explain to farmers why the non-compliance activity constitutes a 
breach of law by using plain language without technical terms, and urge them to avoid 
the same wrong-doing in the future. Persuasion is perceived by regulators as the most 
effective way to modify behaviour of individual farmers, given that farmers are ill-
informed (Interviewee 13). Meanwhile, an interviewed regulator also clarified that there 
is an exception with farmers who are ill-intentioned to produce adulterated or 
counterfeit food products. In this case persuasion is not useful (Interviewee 13).  
Apart from individual interaction, education provided to farmers can also take 
the form of large campaigns. Campaigns are run by the village committees (cunmin 
weiyuanhui), co-ordinated by the local authorities of the Publicity Department of the 
Chinese Communist Party (formerly named the Propaganda Department). Large 
campaigns can be either initiated by the Chinese Central Government, such as the 
annual China Food Safety Publicity Week (China Economic Net, n.d.) and the 3.15 
International Consumer Rights Day (China Central Television, 2005), or by the local 
governments. In these campaigns, information about food safety is shared on 
noticeboards in public areas, slogans are displayed on banners in streets, lectures and 
workshops are given in schools and workplaces (Jin & Zhu, 2008, p. 327). It is 
compulsory for every household to send their representatives to attend the lectures, and 
spread the information to other family members and colleagues. Trained volunteers are 
also recruited to communicate with food producers. Campaigns can last for a few days 
or as long as a month. 
When discussing the rationale for holding the large campaigns, a regulator 
pointed out that small farmers are mostly ill-informed and they lack the necessary 
information and knowledge about food safety; therefore, education is the best way to 
change their behaviour. He claimed:  
Local farmers are ignorant and many of them are illiterate. They may apply a 
chemical in farming simply because someone told them it could increase the 
output. They neither think about the adverse effects on human health nor if the 
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chemical is banned. Our campaigns aim at educating them. And through mutual 
learning, an atmosphere of assuring food safety can be cultivated in the village. 
We also invite the media to report on the campaigns in order to have a greater 
impact on raising public awareness (Interviewee 13).  
 With respect to the efficacy of campaigns, the regulator however admitted that 
it is uncertain (Interviewee 13). Despite the uncertainty, since other deterrence 
approaches such as penalty or confiscation are not feasible, persuasion and education 
becomes the only viable resort to modify the behaviour of small farmers. This shows 
that persuasion and education, as an alternative behaviour-modification approach, may 
or may not be able to bring compliance, which actually largely depends on farmers’ 
choice. 
Food scandals, however, may bring about adjustments in the above behaviour-
modification actions, which will be discussed together with the domestic manufactured 
food section in Section 8.3. In summary, the above illustrations show that the 
livelihoods of farmers and the development of the agricultural industry are considered 
when enforcement decisions are made. In this sense, regulators may ‘turn a blind eye’ to 
violating behaviours of the regulated industry. On the other hand, since fines are a form 
of revenue for the regulatory bodies, there is a strong incentive for regulators to impose 
fines on medium and large-sized farms that are able to pay.  
8.3 Behaviour-modification on domestic manufactured food 
products 
A similar pattern is observed when looking further into the domestic manufactured food 
sector. Overall, whilst medium and large-sized enterprises are more likely to face 
deterrent tools of enforcement, small food workshops are more likely to be persuaded or 
warned to modify their misconduct. In both cases, although the revocation of a licence 
or closure of business is a tool that regulators can deploy, it is seldom used.  
8.3.1 Medium and large-sized producers 
Deterrence-based approaches to modify wrong-doings of food manufacturers are 
specified in the PRC Food Hygiene Law ("The PRC Food Hygiene Law," 1995, Articles 
39-53) and the PRC Product Quality Law ("The PRC Product Quality Law," 2000, 
Articles 49-72). These include warnings, fines, confiscation of benefits, suspension of 
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operation, revocation of licences and prohibition against operation. Again, if the breach 
of law constitutes a criminal offence, the offenders will be penalised pursuant to the 
PRC Criminal Law ("The PRC Criminal Law," 1997). 
Various interviews indicate that the above named methods are commonly found 
in sanctioning medium and large-sized food manufacturing enterprises, except for 
termination of licences and closure of business (Interviewees 9 and 11). In deciding 
which sanction to impose, the nature of violation is considered. For example, mild 
wrong-doings such as getting the floor wet or leaving food uncovered would result in 
warnings during inspection, often accompanied by fines (i.e. about RMB 2,000, 
approximately USD 292). In terms of more serious violations, the regulator will issue a 
rectification order to the regulated enterprise, specifying the amount of fines (i.e. about 
RMB 5,000, approximately USD 730), details of rectification and the deadline. 
Examples include laying aside raw and cooked food together, using unauthorised food 
additives, employing workers without physical examination reports, and falling short of 
the record-keeping requirement (Observation 3). The enterprise is required to submit a 
report informing the regulatory body that the wrong-doing has been rectified before the 
deadline. Regulators may re-visit the enterprise to oversee the result. If rectification is 
not made before the specified date, confiscation of products and revocation of licences 
can take place (Zhao, 2002). 
In extreme cases of violations, such as running food businesses which are 
banned, and manipulation of food-testing results, the regulator can issue an order of 
rectification and impose a fine of maximum RMB 5,000 (approximately USD 730), 
confiscate the benefits, and in some cases suspend the operation of the food business 
(Jin & Zhu, 2008). According to the PRC Food Hygiene Law, for such extreme cases, 
regulators can also permanently revoke the licence of the enterprises ("The PRC Food 
Hygiene Law," 1995, Articles 41-42). However, various interviews indicate that this 
rarely happens (Interviewees 9, 11 and 12). A regulatory official pointed out: 
Revocation of licences implies shutting down the food enterprise on a permanent 
basis. This needs prior approval from the City Government. This is beyond our 
scope of control and the approval process can be very time-consuming. Most 
large-sized enterprises have a significant impact on local employment and the 
local economy, do you really think the City Government would shut them down? 
This is an uneasy decision (Interviewee 11). 
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In this sense, an enforcement gap may emerge when the government weighs 
local interests such as unemployment and economy against food safety.  
On the other hand, the manager of a food factory pointed out that fines are 
unavoidable for every wrong-doing found (Interviewee 12). This is largely because 
fines are one of the main sources of revenue for the regulatory agencies, given that the 
medium and large-sized food factories are able to afford the fines. The manager 
expressed his view:  
Regulators impose fines for every wrong-doing including minor ones. They are 
keen on collecting fines because these are their revenue, salary and bonus. I can 
tell you an interesting story. Regulatory agencies are competing to impose fines 
on enterprises, especially for violations which involve a heavy fine. Because the 
same violation can only be penalised once, regulators thus come as a first-come-
first-serve basis. In other words, the one who arrives first to inspect the factory 
will be able to get the fine but not the other who comes late (Interviewee 12).  
According to the PRC Administrative Penalty Law, the same illegal act cannot 
be given an administrative penalty of fines more than once ("The PRC Administrative 
Penalty Law," 1996, Article 24). Regulators would, therefore, compete with each other 
to get control over areas which are profit-making in terms of fee collection. Since there 
are multiple regulatory bodies involved in domestic manufactured food regulation (see 
Sections 5.1 and 5.4.3 in Chapter 5), regulatory turfs are formed. 
When talking about the attitude towards fines, the manger defined fine payments 
as a social norm of giving and taking bribes in the food industry. He said: 
Though we think the inspectors are sometimes too demanding, it is acceptable 
because anyway we need to bribe them. Instead of giving them red pockets (i.e. 
money) or gifts directly, paying fines seems to be a legitimate way to build up 
social relationships (guangxi) with them (Interviewee 12).  
This shows how fines as a penalty are perceived by the regulatees as a form of 
favour or bribe to please the regulators. Similar to the case of the domestic agricultural 
food sector discussed above in Section 8.2, surcharges and fines are a source of revenue 
of the regulatory bodies, although this practice is prohibited by law in this case (The 
General Office of the State Council, 2001). The difference is that inspectorates of 
manufactured food are government departments included in the civil service system, 
while inspectorates of agricultural food are ‘professional units’ not included in the civil 
service establishment. For government departments, turning fines and fees as its own 
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revenue of the department is regarded by the Chinese Central Government as corrupt 
behaviour. In 2001, the State Council and the Ministry of Finance published a directive 
requiring that fees and fines must be turned over to the government exchequer but not 
kept by government departments themselves (The General Office of the State Council, 
2001). However, at the local level, the directive is sometimes disregarded, especially in 
localities with cash-strapped governments (D. Yang, 2004, p. 243). In this case, if the 
regulatees consider fines as a kind of bribe rather than a deterrent that has a threatening 
effect, they may not modify their law-violating behaviour.  
8.3.2 Small-sized producers 
On the other hand, the most deterrent tools specified in laws are less likely to be used on 
small food workshops; instead, regulators more often persuade the law-violating small 
producers to modify the wrong-doings and teach them how to prevent the violation of 
rules from happening in the future. 
With respect to moderate cases of violation, usually a formal rectification order 
is issued, accompanied with a small fine. Confiscation of benefits, suspension of licence 
and termination of licence are, however, unlikely, even though the violations are 
deemed serious. For example, according to the PRC Food Hygiene Law, for food 
business running without the three required licences (i.e. ‘food hygiene licence’, 
‘business licence’ and ‘production licence’; see Section 7.3.1 in Chapter 7), regulators 
should impose a fine, confiscate its benefits, and prohibit its operation ("The PRC Food 
Hygiene Law," 1995, Article 40). However, a regulator admitted in the interview that 
they rarely terminate their operations even though these food workshops are running 
illegally (Interviewee 11). Instead, regulators would provide advice and assistance to 
small workshops for obtaining the necessary licences. For example, according to the 
official statistics, in 2007, the Guangdong Bureau of Quality and Technical Supervision 
guided and assisted 743 food workshops in the province to gain the required licences 
("Coordination between regulatory authorities," 2007). 
While this finding is apparently similar to the situation of regulating small 
farmers (i.e. only persuasion is used), when further looking into the case we can find a 
slight difference between enforcement towards small food workshops and individual 
farmers. Regulators are hesitant to impose fines on individual farmers because they are 
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living in poverty and the minimum amount of RMB 2,000 is too high for them. Small 
workshop owners, however, more often face the penalty of fines, although usually in a 
small amount. This is largely because the PRC Food Hygiene Law does not specify the 
minimum amount for fines but the maximum only (i.e. a maximum of RMB 5,000, 
approximately USD 730) ("The PRC Food Hygiene Law," 1995, Article 41). Therefore, 
regulators are allowed to use discretion in deciding the amount for fines, considering the 
economic conditions of the regulated food workshops. Meanwhile, unlike the 
agricultural authorities, since regulators of the manufactured food sector are not 
responsible for food industry development, comparatively the consideration of the 
development of the food manufacturing industry is less obvious.  
Food scandals, on the other hand, may bring about adjustments in the above 
dynamics of behaviour-modification actions, in both domestic agricultural and 
manufactured food sectors. In particular, regulators are keen on applying aggressive and 
deterrent measures, such as suspension of operation on some selected cases, which can 
cause severe damage to the reputation of food ‘Made in China’ (Interviewee 9). 
Regulators may also invite the media to join the inspection and report on the 
sanctioning of corporations (Zhao, 2002). Regulators are alert to the adverse effects of 
food incidents, not only in terms of human health but also public anger against the 
government and the food industry (Interviewees 7, 8, 9 and 11). One of the regulatory 
officials claimed in the interview:  
The rising awareness of food safety among consumers and the media drives us 
to manage food-safety concerns proactively. Food scandals, such as the 
poisoning of Sanlu infant formula in 2008 with such an extreme impact, do not 
only ruin the milk industry but also the whole food industry of the country. 
Many people criticised the slow reaction of the government in handling the 
disaster. They remain sceptical about Chinese-made food and the role of the 
state. We’ve learned costly lessons from the incident. To rebuild public 
confidence, it is necessary for us to adjust our enforcement force towards 
foodstuffs reported with incidents, in particular for those large enterprises 
having high volume and extensive circulation across the country (Interviewee 9).  
Actually, popular sentiment of anger against the Chinese government has also 
evolved alongside food safety crises. In a recent survey conducted in 2012, it shows that 
respondents held food producers (84.8%) and the government (80.8%) accountable for 
the food safety problem (see Figure 8-1) (China Economic Net & Horizon Research 
Consultancy Group, 2012). 
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Figure 8-1: The result of a survey on responsibility for ensuring food safety 
 
Source: author’s compilation, from statistics released in the ‘2012 Research Report on Index of Consumer 
Confidence in Food Safety’  (China Economic Net & Horizon Research Consultancy Group, 2012) 
This shows that there is pressure for the Chinese government to strengthen its 
regulatory enforcement; and in their judgement, managing well and reacting promptly to 
food scandals is one of the key factors for comforting the public and rebuilding public 
confidence in food ‘Made in China’ (Interviewee 11). Overall, it can be seen that during 
extensive food incidents and scandals, the factor of image of food ‘Made in China’ 
overrides the factor of local interests. As a consequence, regulators are driven to apply 
moderate or drastic measures of behaviour-modification on domestic medium and large-
sized enterprises. 
In summary, a similar pattern can be observed across the two domestic food 
regulatory regimes: the violation of standards for large business results in fines, while 
for small business persuasion is more likely to be used. In both cases, the order of 
business suspension, termination of licences and closure of business is seldom used. 
Again, since fines are a form of revenue or bribe accepted by the regulatory bodies, 
there is a strong incentive for regulators to impose fines on food producers who are able 
to pay. Nevertheless, food scandals may bring an alternation to this pattern of 
behaviour-modification.  
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8.4 Behaviour-modification on exported food products 
When further looking into the regulatory regime for exported food products, a very 
different picture can be seen. Rather than having variations in behaviour-modification 
actions for different groups of regulatees, a highly deterrent approach is consistently 
substantial among all exported food producers in China. To avoid repetition, this section 
will discuss the exported food sector as a whole category rather than separating into 
exported fruits/vegetables, exported meat/dairy products and exported manufactured 
food products, provided that actions of behaviour-modification are largely equivalent 
among all exported food producers.  
It is found that enforcement work of the China Entry-Exist Inspection and 
Quarantine Bureaux (CIQs) is consistent with all regulated entities. As described in 
Chapter 5 (Section 5.1), the CIQs are under a vertical supervision of the General 
Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine (AQSIQ) at the 
central level. Their enforcement work simply adheres to the PRC Law on the Entry and 
Exit Animal and Plant Quarantine ("The PRC Law on Entry and Exit Animal and Plant 
Quarantine," 1992), without considering other factors such as food industry 
development, local livelihoods and employment (Interviewee 10). Meanwhile, highly 
deterrent measures of sanctioning are utilised by the CIQ officers. For example, in all 
types of violation, a temporary suspension of exports will be imposed on the involved 
exported farms or food enterprises until the wrong-doing is satisfactory corrected 
(China Entry-Exist Inspection and Quarantine Bureau, 2010a), accompanied by other 
sanctions including warnings, fines, and/or confiscation of products. Revocation of 
export licences will take place for serious cases of violation, or for a continuous three 
records of minor violation (Interviewee 10). A list of infringing enterprises is regularly 
announced and updated on the web by the AQSIQ (China Entry-Exist Inspection and 
Quarantine Bureau, 2010a). For example, in 2008, there were 47 food enterprises named 
on the list (China Entry-Exist Inspection and Quarantine Bureau, 2010b), and these 
enterprises were temporarily banned for export until satisfactory modifications were 
made. To explain these dramatic measures, a regulatory official suggested that the 
Chinese Central Government attempts to work ‘at any cost’ to ensure that its exported 
products do not cause any scandals and ruin the reputation of products ‘Made in China’ 
(Interviewee 10). 
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The interviewed regulatory official also commented that export-oriented 
enterprises treasure their reputation because they have all invested significant amounts 
of time and money in making their brand name successful overseas (Interviewee 10). He 
claimed that the CIQ officers believe that most of the export-oriented enterprises are 
well-intentioned, while law-violating behaviours normally result from the lack of 
information or knowledge. Exported farms and enterprises are also keen on 
communicating with regulatory officials about the latest information on international 
food standards and trade bans in the international food market. 
In the discussion of why the persuasion-based approach is not chosen to regulate 
the exported food producers, the interviewed official explained:  
Our enforcement work is adherent to the stated laws, rules and guidelines. 
Although we are friendly with the big businesses for exportation, this does not 
imply we are acting in favour of them. The AQSIQ has a clear command that 
non-compliance will directly result in sanctions. On the other hand, personally I 
think persuasion is not necessary because most large enterprises are well-
financed, well-resourced and are capable of compliance; and most importantly, 
they are willing to comply. Instead of saying we are persuading or teaching them, 
I would take our communications as interaction (Interviewee 10).  
While deterrent tools such as revocation of licences may cause economic and 
unemployment problems to the localities, the official explained: 
You can perceive us as the army under the command of the Chinese Central 
Government. Our finance is fully funded by the central government rather than 
the provincial governments. We are not concerned about tax revenues or other 
local factors such as unemployment (Interviewee 10). 
Being fully funded by the Chinese Central Government (see Sections 5.1 and 
5.4.3 in Chapter 5), the AQSIQ can neglect those local factors and focus on enforcing 
the regulations impartially and strictly. In other words, the deterrence-based approach 
can be consistently applied to all regulatees in the exported food regime. This also 
reveals the understanding of the Chinese government that the deterrence-based approach 
is a better solution to ensure the modification of wrong-doing. 
In summary, this finding is very different from the two regulatory regimes for 
domestic food products, where other factors such as economic contribution to the 
localities and fines as revenue are taken into account. Here in the case of the exported 
food sector, the interests of the localities are less able to shape behaviour-modification 
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actions. Instead, safeguarding the reputation of products ‘Made in China’ under the 
context of internationalisation of regulation is fundamental in determining the tools of 
behaviour-modification used.  
8.5 Discussion: Impact of internationalisation of regulation on 
behaviour-modification 
Having an understanding of the variations in terms of behaviour-modification in 
different food regulatory regimes (see the summary Table 8-1), this section will explain 
the pattern of variations by using the three perspectives outlined in the analytical 
framework. In particular, the question raised in the beginning of the chapter will be 
explored: ‘to what extent does internationalisation of regulation impact on behaviour-
modification in different regulatory regimes?’ Relatedly, how does the tension between 
localised interests and international pressure shape tools of behaviour-modification, if at 
all? Here, the following aspects will be assessed: organised interests in local politics 
including the business interests and interests of politicians/bureaucrats/regulators, as 
well as the international image of food ‘Made in China’. It will argue that while 
organised interest in local politics are often the main determinant of regulatory 
enforcement with respect to food for local consumption, the factor of international 
image and reputation comes up and becomes the overriding force in the exported food 
sector, as well as a motivation for regulators to adjust their enforcement work towards 
food scandals. 
The dynamic of tensions between the local factor of organised interests and the 
international factor of reputation is summarised in Table 8-2, while this section will go 
through the content of the table. 
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 Source: author’s compilation, from interviews conducted by the author 
As explained in Chapter 3 (Section 3.1.4) and Chapter 5 (Section 5.4.3), in the 
political/administrative system in China, the two indicators of GDP growth and 
employment rates of the region are closely linked to the career prospects of local party 
leaders and bureaucracies (Cheng & Li, 2012). Regulatory agencies, therefore, tend to 
consider various economic and social implications when making enforcement decisions 
as described above. In other words, the business interests and the interests of 
politicians/bureaucrats/regulators are inextricably linked. This argument is valid in 
explaining behaviour-modification measures imposed on both large and small-sized 
food producers in the domestic food sector. First, for small farms and food workshops, 
moderately and highly-deterrent sanctioning measures are seldom used because of their 
Table 8-2: Impact of organised interests and the reputation of  products ‘Made in 
China’ on behaviour-modification 
 
Domestic farms or food 
enterprises 
(small) 
Domestic farms or food 
enterprises 
(medium & large) 
Exported farms or food 
enterprises 
(small, medium & large) 
Organised 
interests in 
local politics 
Medium: 
Moderate impact on local 
economy and life if 
closure, i.e. 
unavailability of cheap 
food substitutes, 
moderate tax 
contribution to the local 
government, and 
involving a moderate 
number of local 
employees 
High: 
Large impact on local 
economy and life if 
closure, i.e. significant 
tax contribution to the 
local government, and 
involving a large number 
of local employees 
Medium to High: 
Large impact on local 
economy and life if 
closure, i.e. significant 
tax contribution to the 
local government, and 
involving a large number 
of local employees 
Reputation of 
products 
‘Made in 
China’ 
Small: 
Localised adverse impact 
on reputation and sales 
of food made by 
individual suppliers 
Medium: 
Moderately extensive 
adverse impact within 
China on reputation and 
sales of food made by 
local suppliers 
Large: 
Worldwide/extensive, 
adverse impact on 
reputation and sales of 
food exported from China 
Level of 
deterrence 
Low: 
Persuasive measures for 
knowledge transfer 
 
(e.g. education, leaflets, 
banners and lectures) 
Medium to High: 
Moderate to drastic 
measures to prevent 
repeated non-compliance 
(e.g. fine, confiscation of 
produce and temporary 
closure) 
High: 
Drastic measures to 
safeguard the reputation 
of ‘Made in China’ 
(e.g. revocation of licence 
and closure of business) 
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disadvantaged economic conditions and inability to pay fines. In a similar vein, 
regulators also hesitate to use highly deterrent measures such as revocation of licences 
or closure of businesses because this would endanger the livelihoods of food producers; 
and hence, village economics, rural employment and social stability.  
The importance of small workshops in rural economy and employment can be 
shown by the official data (see Figure 8-2). In 2007, there were 448,153 food processing 
units in China (The State Council Information Office, 2007), and among them, 352,815 
(78.8%) were small factories or workshops having less than ten workers. The problem 
of illegal operation was severe. In these 448,153 food processing units in total, only 
60,707 (14.4%) were running with the required licences (i.e. ‘food hygiene licence’, 
‘business licence’ and ‘production licence’), 223,297 (49.8%) having some required 
licences but not all of them, whilst the remaining 164,149 (36.6%) were without any 
licences ("AQSIQ further strengthens," 2007). Figure 8-2 summarises these figures, 
indicating that in China small food producers constitute an important part (78.8%) of 
the food industry in total. Based on the PRC Food Hygiene Law ("The PRC Food 
Hygiene Law," 1995) and the PRC Product Quality Law ("The PRC Product Quality 
Law," 2000), the shaded portions in Figure 8-2, 86.4% in total, should be prohibited 
from operation. In other words, if regulatory enforcement adheres to the laws, the food 
industry would be severely hit and the livelihoods of food workers would be at stake.  
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Figure 8-2: Licensing of the food manufacturing industry in China (2007) 
 
Source: author’s compilation, from statistics released by the State Council (The State Council Information 
Office, 2007) and AQSIQ ("AQSIQ further strengthens," 2007)  
What needs to be emphasised here is that these figures tend to understate the 
number of food businesses in China and especially those running illegally. The reason is 
twofold. First, food businesses running without licences are unlawful and they are 
unlikely to be on record. Second, the Chinese government tends to cover up the 
situation of having a huge number of illegal food producers, which entails the 
enforcement gap and regulatory failure. At the same time, this may signal to the public 
that they tolerate non-compliance to a large extent and may trigger public anger and loss 
of confidence towards the government and the food industry. However, despite the fact 
that the released statistics may understate the number of unlicensed food businesses 
running in China, this does not affect the validity of the argument here – an unusual 
huge number of illegal small food businesses have contributed a large share to the 
domestic Chinese food industry, and they are significant to local economy and 
employment.  
The Chinese Central Government was not unaware of the adverse effects that 
enforcement might bring to the food industry and livelihoods in the localities. For 
example, in 2007, the AQSIQ issued a directive titled Suggestions about Further 
Strengthening Regulatory Enforcement towards Food Workshops (The General 
Administration of Quality Supervision Inspection and Quarantine, 2007), claiming that: 
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Because of regional disparities and rural-urban disparities across the country, 
small food workshops will continue their operation for a long period of time in 
the future so as to meet consumer needs.  Food workshops are one of the pillars 
of rural economy in most areas in China. They provide employment 
opportunities to rural residents which help increase their income. This unusual 
circumstance makes regulation towards food workshops an enduring, difficult 
and complex task (The General Administration of Quality Supervision 
Inspection and Quarantine, 2007, Section 1). 
The directive also explicitly states that local governments are given authority to 
create their own plans and rules in handling the illegal food workshops according to the 
particular situation of the localities (The General Administration of Quality Supervision 
Inspection and Quarantine, 2007, Section 2.2). As argued by a regulatory official in the 
interview, regulatory enforcement in practice cannot ignore the context of the localities 
(Interviewee 11). Since small workshops are mostly run by families who are low-skilled 
labourers, prohibition against operation may give rise to unemployment problems, 
which means economic and social stabilities become questionable. This is a particular 
concern for the Guangdong local governments given that they have great difficulty in 
handling rural-urban disparity and an unusually massive floating population (see 
Section 4.3 in Chapter 4). In other words, the Guangdong Provincial Government and 
its lower level of governments are under high pressure to ensure adequate job supplies 
in order to keep their governing societies stable and ‘harmonious’ (hexie) (Zheng & Tok, 
2007; Chan, 2009). 
The consideration of local interests is more apparent when looking into 
enforcement decision-making towards medium and large-sized producers. On top of 
local economy and employment, tax revenue, which is again closely linked to the 
interests of local politicians and bureaucracies, can explain the behaviour-modification 
measures towards large-sized enterprises and farms. Since large enterprises are major 
taxpayers in local areas, temporary suspension or permanent termination of operations 
will imply less profit for the enterprises and hence less tax revenue received by the local 
government. In other words, highly-deterrent measures such as revocation of licences 
contradict the vested interest of the government and regulators. As a result, less 
aggressive tools such as penalties are imposed on medium and large producers, which 
can also serve as additional revenue for the government. 
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The milk scandal in 2008 exemplifies the close link between large enterprises 
and local governments (see Section 2.2.5 in Chapter 2). The Sanlu Group, one of the 
companies involved in producing the tainted infant formula, was formerly a state-owned 
cooperative established in 1956. Although various ownership reforms were carried out 
by the Shijiazhuang City Government on Sanlu since 2002 (X. Zhang, 2008), the close 
ties between Sanlu and the city government persisted because of Sanlu’s large 
contribution to the tax revenue of the city government ("Public hearing exposes Sanlu's 
intention ", 2009). In fact, the city government’s long delay in reporting the milk 
incident to the Hebei Provincial Government was perceived by the media as evidence of 
its intention to protect the Sanlu Group ("Sanlu continued its sale," 2009). The city 
government explained its delay by the reason of its support and trust towards Sanlu as a 
leading enterprise employing large numbers of workers and farmers ("Reasons behind 
the delayed reporting," 2008). In this incident, it can be seen that business interests and 
local economic conditions were considered by the government in regulatory 
enforcement.  
In contrast, regulatory enforcement towards exported food is not affected by 
local context factors because the CIQs are directly supervised and fully-funded by the 
AQSIQ at the central level. Therefore, localised interests of 
politicians/bureaucrats/regulators are less prominent in this case. 
In summary, the local governments often have vested interests in the economic 
health of firms or in the overall performance of the local economy. As argued by Ma 
and Ortolano (2000), it is the Chinese regulatory ‘pragmatism and parochialism’ that 
results in great variability in enforcing environmental laws in China. In the same vein, 
in the study of food regulation in China, the idea of pragmatism requires local 
regulatory bodies to take into account the health of the local economy, the offender’s 
ability to pay the fines and the employment of workers. These all bring about 
regulator’s aversion to taking severe enforcement actions against the regulated entities.  
While organised interests are highly significant in the decision-making process 
of regulatory enforcement in the domestic food sector, in the occasions where food 
incidents emerge, these interests seem to be overridden by the factor of safeguarding 
export trade and the image of China as a committed and responsible trading partner. In 
this scenario, moderate to drastic approaches of enforcement will take place, 
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notwithstanding the adverse effects it may bring to the local economy and employment. 
Here, international image and international obligations can be considered. Loo and 
Davies’ (2006) study on reputation management of China indicates that a good 
reputation can enhance the competitiveness of a nation and its product brands. As an 
emerging member of the international community, it is important for China to manage 
its reputation, its national brand, and shape how it is perceived in the international arena.  
However, as indicated by various studies (Loo & Davies, 2006; Roth, Tsay, 
Pullman, & Gray, 2008), Chinese products do not rank highly in the world in terms of 
an international brand. According to the Anholt Nation Brands Index (NBI) in 2007, the 
trend for China’s products was the worst of any of the 38 countries polled. It was 37th 
(the second-lowest country) for products, compared with 24
th
 in the late 2005. Its score 
has declined by nearly 6% over an 18-month period (Anholt & Global Market Insite, 
2007). As explained by Anholt, the author of the NBI report, “Faulty and dangerous 
products are hurting Brand China: evidence from the latest NBI scores shows that 
global public confidence in ‘Made in China’ products, previously never very strong, is 
declining even more steeply” (PRWeb, 2007). Paull’s (2008) study on China’s 
motivations in developing green food and organic food also suggests that Chinese-made 
food is significantly devalued by overseas consumers. In his study, Australian 
consumers commented on food from China in the survey as follows: “I do not like or 
trust products that come from China”, “Not really happy buying food from China even 
if it is cheaper”, “Generally I am dubious of any claims of ‘organic’ or ‘natural’ when it 
concerns a product from China”, and “Labelling on Chinese products is not trustworthy 
with reports on counterfeit labelling” (Paull, 2008, p. 9). Given the importance of 
reputation in global trade, there has been an urgent need for the Chinese government to 
overcome mistrust of Chinese products in the world.  
The global impact of lacking confidence towards Chinese-made food can be 
exemplified by the milk shortage in many countries. Following the tainted milk scandal 
in 2008, Chinese consumers have lost confidence in domestic milk products, especially 
infant formulas. Since then, they have bought foreign milk powder in bulk by any 
means necessary, including importing, smuggling and purchasing during visits 
("Shortage of baby milk," 2011). This has finally caused a shortage of milk and a surge 
in price of powdered milk for infants in many overseas markets ("Global shortage of 
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milk supply," 2010), including the United States, Canada, New Zealand, the United 
Kingdom, Japan and South Korea (2013). Global restriction in the form of baby milk 
rationing has therefore, been introduced in some countries such as the United Kingdom 
and in Hong Kong
36
. 
Table 8-3: China’s unit pricing coefficients of food exports and imports in 2006 
2006 Exports Imports 
Quantity (million tons) 24.17 20.27 
Value (USD billion) 26.66 13.40 
Unit pricing coefficient (USD billion per million tons) 1.10 0.66 
Source: author’s compilation, from Paull’s ‘The greening of China's food - Green Food, organic food, and 
eco-labelling’ (Paull, 2008) 
 Winning back trust overseas is also of critical importance to Chinese food 
exports. For example, Paull’s (2008) study calculates the ‘Unit Pricing Coefficient’ (i.e. 
cost per million tons) of China’s food exports and imports in 2006 (see Table 8-3). 
Having the coefficient of exports (1.10) higher than that of imports (0.66), this 
demonstrates China’s strategy of ‘Sell high, buy low’ in international food trade (Paull, 
2008, p. 2). Given that the figures were computed under the condition of a lack in 
foreign consumers’ confidence in Chinese-made food; therefore, if foreign consumers’ 
trust is improved, both the export quantity and value of China can be increased to a 
larger extent.  
On the other hand, the mission to safeguard the reputation of Chinese-made food 
is also important to the international image of the Chinese government itself. As argued 
by Beamish and Bapuji (2008), the often-reported inadequacies of the regulatory system 
in China and the activities of corruption further affect people’s perceptions that China 
has weak legal or ethical standards. To improve the public image of ‘China’s peaceful 
rise’ suggested by leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (The State Council 
Information Office, 2005), that the country is internally committed to improving the 
welfare of its own people and externally acting as a responsible world leader, 
strengthening its food safety monitoring has emerged as an important issue for the 
Chinese government. For example, right after the outbreak of the milk scandal in 2008, 
                                                 
36
 For example, in March 2013, the government of Hong Kong amended the law to prohibit the 
unlicensed export of powdered formula (exceeding 1.8 kg in weight) to secure sufficient quantity supplied 
for local infants ("The Import and Export (General) (Amendment) Regulation 2013," 2013). 
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Wen Jiabao, Premier of the State Council, emphasised in a public speech that people’s 
lives and health should not be sacrificed in exchange for economic growth and industry 
development. To resume the public confidence, Wen claimed that the government will 
strengthen its enforcement on food regulation, while government officials should be 
held accountable for food incidents ("Premier Wen Jiabao," 2008). The speech gave an 
image to the public that the Chinese Central Government endeavours to strengthen its 
enforcement power on food businesses, even if this may adversely impact on the 
country’s economy. Meanwhile, food safety concerns were further pushed forwarded by 
the Chinese Central Government by including the topic in the Twelfth Five-Year Plan of 
the People’s Republic of China (2011-2015) (The Eleventh National People's Congress, 
2011), a blueprint which outlines key economic and development targets for the country 
for the next five-year period. This indicates that the issue of food safety has a unique 
status and priority in the future works of the government. 
In summary, tensions between localised interests and the international image of 
food ‘Made in China’ can explain variations in behaviour-modification measures to a 
large extent. In most cases, organised interests in the localities tend to drive regulators 
to use mild behaviour-modification measures towards small domestic producers and 
moderate tools towards large domestic producers. However, in exceptional cases such 
as food incidents, the motivation of protecting the Chinese national brands within the 
country and across other foreign countries prompts regulators to use drastic measures on 
exported food producers and local producers involved in massive scandals, despite the 
fact these measures may compromise localised vested interests. In other words, local 
factors are only becoming less important when the factor of products ‘Made in China’ 
comes up as a key concern of the government under extensive exposure to international 
pressure, implied by the high export value and the lack of foreign consumer’s 
confidence in Chinese exported food as well as in the Chinese government in general. 
In general, compared with the other two control components of standard-setting 
(see Chapter 6) and information-gathering (see Chapter 7), the influence of 
internationalisation on the element of behaviour-modification in the domestic food 
regulatory regime is at its weakest. Under constraints of competition between economic 
growth and food safety agendas, as well as other regulatory and bureaucratic barriers 
such as inadequate regulatory resources, the nature of international influence on 
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domestic food safety enforcement in China remains minimal. Only under extraordinary 
circumstances such as the emergence of crisis which may catch national and 
international attention, enforcement strategies or measures are adjusted accordingly.  
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Chapter 9 : Conclusion 
Based on the analysis in Chapters 6-8, this chapter will set forth the empirical findings 
of the study. It will explain in what way and to what extent the internationalisation of 
regulation impacts on China, and, relatedly, how other local factors as described in the 
analytical framework are becoming less important under the context of 
internationalisation. This chapter will also discuss the theoretical and empirical 
contributions of the study. 
The chapter is structured as follows: first, Section 9.1 will briefly summarise the 
empirical findings of the study. By using a comparative approach, patterns of variations 
between different food regulatory regimes are presented. It will also assess in what way 
and how far the internationalisation of regulation explains regulatory practices, 
variations and changes in China’s food safety regulation. In Section 9.2, theoretical 
contributions and empirical implications of the study will be discussed.  
9.1 Empirical findings 
The previous three chapters have explored the three control elements, namely standard-
setting, information-gathering and behaviour-modification of different food regulatory 
regimes in China. This section aims to place the earlier analysis within an overall 
picture, and examine the effects of internationalisation of regulation on China’s food 
regulatory regimes.  
9.1.1 Observed variations 
To provide a basis for analysis, Table 9-1 outlines the key features observed in the six 
studied regulatory regimes. Similar to previous tables of comparison, what needs to be 
emphasised here is that the variations depicted in Table 9-1 are on a relative basis; the 
six food domains are weighted with each other. In other words, these are the relative 
differences. 
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Source: author’s compilation, from previous literature, laws and rules of the PRC and interviews 
conducted by the author 
With respect to standard-setting, the key feature is that standards for Chinese 
exported food are higher than that for domestic food, because the exported food sector 
directly adopts international food standards developed by the Codex and the ISO. But 
Table 9-1: Observed features of various food regulatory regimes 
Regimes Control components Observed key features 
1. Domestic 
fruits/vegetables 
Standard-setting 
Trend of convergence towards international 
standards 
Information-
gathering 
Small farms: Little activity 
Large farms: Medium-sized monitoring 
Behaviour-
modification 
Small farms: Persuasive 
Large farms: Moderately deterrent 
2. Exported 
fruits/vegetables 
Standard-setting Equivalent to international standards 
Information-
gathering 
Extensive data-gathering 
Behaviour-
modification 
Highly deterrent 
3. Domestic meat/dairy 
products 
Standard-setting 
Trend of convergence towards international 
standards 
Information-
gathering 
Medium-sized monitoring 
Behaviour-
modification 
Small farms: Persuasive 
Large farms: Moderately deterrent 
4. Exported meat/dairy 
products 
Standard-setting Equivalent to international standards 
Information-
gathering 
Extensive data-gathering 
Behaviour-
modification 
Highly deterrent 
5. Domestic 
manufactured food 
Standard-setting 
Trend of convergence towards international 
standards 
Information-
gathering 
Small workshops: Medium data-gathering 
Medium/large enterprises: Moderately extensive 
monitoring 
Behaviour-
modification 
Small workshops: Persuasive 
Medium/large enterprises: Moderately deterrent 
6. Exported 
manufactured food 
Standard-setting Equivalent to international standards 
Information-
gathering 
Extensive data-gathering 
Behaviour-
modification 
Highly deterrent 
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over the last decade, the standard-setting of the domestic food regulatory regime has 
witnessed a gradual transformation towards a convergence with the exported food 
regulatory regime, in terms of both the standards adopted and the practice of 
formulating standards. Consequentially, domestic food standards have gradually 
become higher. 
In terms of information-gathering, there are variations centring on how far 
regulators go in using different methods to collect information about the regulatees, and 
the extent to which these tools of information-gathering are applicable to the regulated 
entities. In general, an active approach, also known as ‘police patrol’ in the literature on 
oversight, is adopted in the exported food regime in China. In contrast, a combination of 
reactive and interactive approaches is used in the regimes for domestic food products. 
For individual farmers, farming households and small food workshops, a reactive 
approach, also known as ‘fire-alarm’, is used for collecting information about their 
production activities. On the other hand, large farms and food manufacturing factories 
with high production volumes are monitored based on an interactive approach of 
information-gathering. 
Regarding behaviour-modification, whilst regulators are more likely to use a 
deterrence-based approach on medium and large-sized domestic farms and food 
enterprises, they are inclined to use a persuasion-based approach on small farms and 
food workshops. In contrast, rather than differentiating between different types of 
producers, a highly deterrent approach of behaviour-modification measures are 
consistently applied to all exported food producers in China. 
In other words, regulatory variations are alive in food regulation in China. These 
variations can be categorised onto three levels: first, between food regulatory regimes 
across sectors; second, between components in the same regulatory regime; third, 
between different types of regulatees in the same control component and the same 
regulatory regime. Regarding the first type of variation, for example, regulatory regimes 
for exported food products are in general more centralised and comprehensive, with less 
discretion than regimes for domestic food products. With respect to the second type of 
variation, for instance, in the regime for domestic fruits/vegetables, although Chinese 
national food standards are moving upward to converge with international food 
standards, no similar upward trend has been found in the overall capacity for 
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information-gathering. Finally, in respect of the third type of variation, for example, in 
the regime for domestic fruits/vegetables, while medium-sized monitoring is imposed 
on large farms, little information-gathering and behaviour-modification activity is 
carried out on small farmers. Notably, the second and third types of variation are 
particularly prominent in various domestic food regulatory regimes but less obvious in 
the exported food regimes.  
9.1.2 Internationalisation of regulation: in what way and to what 
extent  
In exploring and explaining these observed variations, the internationalisation of 
regulation has been illustrated in the previous empirical chapters. This approach has 
also been contrasted with two other dominant accounts, including public opinions and 
organised interests. In particular, how the growing global influence shapes different 
control components has been discussed, and, relatedly in this context, how other local 
factors are becoming less important in the recent development of China’s food safety 
regulation. This section will revisit these international and local factors and assess their 
influence on the three control components in Hood et al.’s (2001) framework. It will 
also explain how the effects of internationalisation of regulation being able (or unable) 
to overcome local resistance and shape food safety regulation in China.  
As analysed in the analytical framework (see Section 3.1.2 in Chapter 3), the 
internationalisation of regulation can shape food safety regulation in China in a number 
of ways. These include coercive influence by legally binding requirements, ‘mimicking’ 
behaviours such as policy emulation under uncertainty, normative influence in the 
professionalisation process inside epistemic communities (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), 
and international pressure imposed on the Chinese government under the trend of 
globalisation and trade liberalisation. Here, the way and the extent to which these 
different forms of international influence impact on food regulation in China will be 
assessed. 
Coercive pressure and influence from legal mandates takes a prominent role in 
shaping the exported food regulatory regime in China. The extent of influence is also 
comprehensive, covering standards adopted, information-gathering tools deployed and 
behaviour-modification actions taken. In terms of exported food standards, as a WTO 
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member, Chinese exported food standards are obliged to follow the international food 
standards developed by the Codex Alimentarius, which are higher (i.e. more stringent) 
than the national food standards in China. Put another way, this practice is directly a 
result of formal mandate, or technical requirement exerted by the WTO on China. 
Similarly, extensive information-gathering tools and highly deterrent behaviour-
modification sanctioning have been put into place in order to detect standard-violation 
activities and modify such behaviours. In other words, there is no clear evidence 
signalling that ‘selective adaptation’ (Potter, 2003, 2004; Biukovic, 2008) or other 
counterbalancing acts (Hsueh, 2011) are adopted by the Chinese government in 
regulating its exported food sector, which can be prevailing in other strategic industries 
in China such as telecommunications (Hsueh, 2011) and legal reform (Potter, 2003, 
2004). In contrast, with respect to the domestic food regulatory regime, coercive 
pressure is more salient in shaping the control component of standard-setting but not 
information-gathering and behaviour-modification. For example, China has been under 
coercive pressure from other WTO members to use scientific risk assessment as a basis 
for setting national food standards, and turn these standards into compulsory standards.  
‘Mimicking’ or modelling behaviours (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) have shaped 
the domestic food regulatory framework to a large extent over the last decade. For 
example, China’s establishment of the State Food and Drug Administration in 2003 is a 
direct ‘importation’ from the U.S. system, against the backdrop of having ambiguous 
goals in undertaking regulatory reform but uncertainty in viable solutions to the 
problem of fragmented regulatory authority (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). In this case, 
modelling itself after similar organisations in the field seems to be a legitimate and 
viable solution at a lower cost, although this modelling at the later stage proved 
unsuccessful because of resistance from vested interests. This echoes with the argument 
in previous literature that policy transfer from developed economies can be problematic 
to developing countries (Minogue, 2004), because of their distinctive differences in 
terms of the complex economic, political, social and cultural spheres. 
Normative influence from the epistemic communities seems to take an important 
role in shaping the procedure of national food standard-setting in China as well. In 
recent years, the practice of national food standard development in China has become 
more transparent; and in particular, the practice of standard formulation has become 
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increasingly similar to that of the Codex and the ISO. This similarity can be perceived 
as a transfer of shared professional values in professional networks which promote 
normative isomorphism. Communicative interaction within international organisations 
can hence, gradually bring about regulatory convergence (Holzinger et al., 2008). In this 
case, participating in international standard organisations such as the ISO and the Codex 
allows the Standardisation Administration of China (SAC) to interact with other policy 
makers as well as professionals in the transnational epistemic communities (Adler & 
Haas, 1992; Haas, 1992; Koenig-Archibugi, 2010). Lessons of foreign experience are 
learnt (Rose, 1991b, 1993) and the international practice of standard development is 
diffused (Meseguer, 2005, 2006; Meseguer & Gilardi, 2009); as a result, the 
socialisation process reinforces China’s conformities to common international norms. 
What has to be clarified here is that whether an influence is coercive, mimetic or 
normative in nature may not be easily distinguishable, given that communication and 
cooperation often co-exist. For example, in the case of China’s national food standard 
harmonisation to international Codex or ISO standards, despite no formal coercive 
pressure imposed by other institutions or countries has been observed, the Chinese 
Central Government has taken the initiative in proposing standard harmonisation. This 
can be a result of catching up with international standards in order to enhance 
international trade; it can also be modelling itself after foreign experience; or it can be a 
consequence of socialisation in international epistemic communities. 
To summarise, international harmonisation and transnational communication are 
the key forms of international influence on China’s exported food regulatory regime, as 
well as food standard-setting in the domestic food regulatory regime. In particular, 
while coercive pressure is mainly exerted on the Chinese exported food regulatory 
regime only, national Chinese food standards have also witnessed a gradual 
transformation towards a convergence with international standards. The homogeneities 
in terms of the procedure of standard formulation and the standards adopted can be 
explained by the coercive powers of other WTO members, and ‘mimicking’ behaviours 
and professionalisation under the context of transnational communication (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983). This suggests that isomorphism originally deriving from coercive force 
has the potential to promote mimetic behaviours and learning from the transnational 
professional networks.  
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On the other hand, in explaining the other two control components of 
information-gathering and behaviour-modification in China’s domestic food regulatory 
regime, international pressure and the protection of national image and branding can be 
taken into account. In particular, the desire of the Chinese government to safeguard the 
reputation of products ‘Made in China’ in the highly liberalised world markets is one of 
the key factors in determining regulatory enforcement. Building the reputation of 
China’s national brand overseas is crucial to China’s export performance and 
competitiveness, especially in the food area. More importantly, this can show the 
international communities that the Chinese government is committed to food safety 
regulation. In this way an international image that China is ‘rising peacefully’ as a 
responsible world leader is being developed. This intention, therefore, has prompted the 
Chinese government to respond quickly to food safety crises, which open a ‘policy 
window’ for the ‘take-off’ of a policy issue and lead to policy changes (Kingdon, 1995, 
2002). Hood et al. (2001, pp. 140-141) explains that tragedies or upsurges of public and 
media interest may provide the ‘policy window’ of politician attention in which the 
professionals introduce new approaches or regulatory developments. For example, in 
China, numerous extensive food safety incidents in the early 2000s opened a window 
for the Chinese Central Government to deliver its first regulatory reform with an aim of 
re-centralising the regulatory authority. In 2009, the milk incident further opened a 
‘policy window’ for the Chinese Central Government to cut through persistent 
resistance deriving from vested interests in domestic politics and introduce the new 
PRC Food Safety Law. These type of “random problem windows” (Howlett, 1998, p. 
500) resulting from random events or crises offer policy entrepreneurs a chance to 
‘couple’ the three streams of problems, political and policy (Kingdon, 1995), and push 
forward regulatory changes. 
Notably under the context of internationalisation of regulation, other local 
factors such as organised interests in the localities are becoming less influential in 
shaping the domestic food regulatory regime. With respect to business interests, 
although large-sized food businesses have been involved in the process of national food 
standard development, their influence is becoming less significant under the context of 
internationalisation of regulation, and, in particular, when standard harmonisation work 
of national food standards with international standards is directly initiated by the 
Chinese Central Government. Similarly, regarding interests of 
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politicians/bureaucrats/regulators, although they have been influential in shaping 
regulatory enforcement in the domestic food safety regulatory regime, these interests in 
local politics are overridden by the aim of the Chinese government to safeguard the 
reputation of food ‘Made in China’ when food incidents emerge. The dynamics of how 
the two global and local factors evolve is as follows. In the decision-making process of 
enforcement actions, various local factors are considered by frontline inspectorates, 
including local economy, employment, tax revenue and other sources of revenue such as 
fines. These factors are linked to the vested interests of the local bureaucracies and 
political leaders because cadre appraisal and promotion in China is largely based on 
related economic performance evaluation (Cheng & Li, 2012). Frequent job rotation 
every four to six years also implies that local political leaders tend to look after short-
term agendas such as the current state of employment and tax revenue, instead of some 
issues which have no visible returns in the short term. Under these circumstances, 
extreme enforcement measures such as closing down food businesses appear to be 
undesirable. This echoes with Beck’s (1992) argument, that the protection of economic 
growth and employment drives some less developed nations to keep the loopholes in 
prescribed regulations wide and their enforcement lax (see Section 3.1.4 in Chapter 3). 
As a result, a form of ‘political capture’ emerges, as identified by previous literature 
(Cook et al., 2004, p. 13). Further, regulatory turf between various government bodies 
comes up, where rational bureaucrats seek to defend their power and hence their budget 
(Niskanen, 1994).  
Despite these local interests have been one of the key considerations of 
regulators in the decision-making process of enforcement action, these vested interests 
are becoming less influential when the intention of the Chinese government to 
safeguard the reputation of products ‘Made in China’ is strong. On the occasions where 
food incidents emerge, protecting profitable export trade and safeguarding the 
international image of China as a committed trading partner are becoming crucial. This 
is also important to build up an image that China is ‘rising peacefully’ as emphasised by 
leaders of the CCP (The State Council Information Office, 2005), that the country is 
internally committed to improving the welfare of its own people and externally acting as 
a responsible world leader. This finally prompts the Chinese government to adjust its 
enforcement measures towards areas of public awareness and international concern, 
despite the fact that this may compromise localised vested interests. In other words, 
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local factors are becoming less important when the Chinese government gives priority 
to the concern of safeguarding the reputation of products ‘Made in China’ when 
international pressure is high. 
In summary, an overall picture of how far the international influence shapes the 
three control components in the domestic and exported food regulatory regimes is 
portrayed in Table 9-2.  
Table 9-2: The influence of internationalisation on the three control components 
Control components Domestic food regulatory regime Exported food regulatory regime 
Standard-setting Strong Strong 
Information-gathering Mixed Strong 
Behaviour-modification Weak Strong 
Source: author’s compilation, from previous literature, laws and rules of the PRC and interviews 
conducted by the author 
From Table 9-2, it can be seen that the international influence on the Chinese 
exported food regulatory regime is integrated, covering the three control instruments in 
the regime. In contrast, for the domestic food regulatory regime, there is an uneven 
influence of internationalisation on the areas of standard-setting, information-gathering 
and behaviour-modification. With respect to standard-setting, as a result of 
harmonisation and transnational communication, the international influence appears to 
be strong. Regarding information-gathering, the picture is rather mixed. On the one 
hand, regulatory barriers such as the lack of resources in collecting and providing 
information are the key impediment to information-gathering activities. On the other 
hand, on occasions of food incidents which attract media attention and public concern, 
information-gathering effort is adjusted to the implicated food products as a response to 
domestic and international pressure. Comparatively, the influence of internationalisation 
seems to be at its weakest on the area of behaviour-modification. Bureaucratic and 
political interests such as the competing values of economic growth and food safety are 
considered when decisions on enforcement are made. Despite food safety incidents may 
alter enforcement strategies and measures, regulators are still reluctant to deploy highly-
deterrent tools in sanctioning non-compliance behaviours. In this sense, enforcement 
gaps are inevitably in place. 
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9.2 Theoretical contributions and empirical implications 
This study makes several contributions to the literature on regulation and regulatory 
enforcement. First, it shows the tensions between international influence and local 
influence, and analyses the dynamics between them. While localised interests are often 
regarded as a powerful force in shaping regulatory enforcement and policy 
implementation in general, they are never static in nature. In this study, it shows how 
local organised interests are overridden by international factors. This improves our 
current understanding of regulatory governance in developing countries, where the lack 
of capacity and commitment of regulators resulting from regulatory capture and 
political capture is often a potential obstacle to regulatory enforcement.   
Second, this study helps define enforcement gap and distinguish exactly where it 
falls – the area of information-gathering or behaviour-modification. Correspondingly, it 
helps distinguish enforcement gap resulting from information asymmetry because of 
regulatory capacity, from the enforcement gap as an intentional behaviour of regulators. 
More importantly, it shows how enforcement gap resulting from the lack of incapacity 
and commitment in the locality is potentially overridden by other international factors. 
This finding makes a contribution to the literature on regulatory enforcement, and 
particularly to that focused on less developed countries.  
In a broader sense, this study also contributes to our understanding of the current 
development in the Chinese political and social spheres. Although the Chinese state 
remains an authoritarian, this study shows that it has witnessed ongoing changes and 
become increasingly responsive to the diverse demands from the domestic society as 
well as the international world. The reason behind is that it is a key concern for the 
Chinese government to keep the societies stable and ‘harmonious’, and building an 
image that China’s ‘peaceful rise’ is not a threat to the world – which are declared 
visions for the country’s future, and are politically important to the ruling of the Chinese 
Communist Party. 
Finally, although this study covers China’s food regulation only, it also sheds 
light on other regulatory areas in China as well as other industrialising countries under 
similar levels of exposure to international force. In particular, it suggests how an 
industrialising country responds to international pressure and at the same time being 
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constrained by tensions in domestic politics. It also improves our understanding of how 
and why policy learning and policy transfer in developing countries succeeds or fails, 
given the constraints of weak state capacity and institutional endowment and the vested 
interests in the economy.  
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Appendix A : A coded list of interviewees 
Interviewee code Official capacity 
1.  Expert 
2.  Policy official 
3.  Official 
4.  Inspector 
5.  Inspector 
6.  Ex-official 
7.  Policy official 
8.  Expert 
9.  Scientist 
10.  Senior official 
11.  Expert 
12.  Manager of food business for exportation 
13.  Former inspector 
14.  Expert 
15.  Owner of food business 
16.  Owner of food business 
17.  Owner of food business 
18.  Owner of food business 
19.  Owner of food business 
20.  Owner of food business 
21.  Director of wholesale market 
22.  Owner of food business 
23.  Owner of food business 
24.  Owner of food business 
25.  Owner of food business 
26.  Owner of food business 
27.  Senior official 
28.  Inspectorate 
29.  Official 
30.  Senior official 
31.  Former inspector 
32.  Journalist 
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Appendix B : A coded list of observation 
Observation code Observed organisation 
1.  Government regulatory body – Branch 1 
2.  Government regulatory body – Branch 2 
3.  Food business with around forty workers 
4.  Food business with two workers 
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